The Next 100 Years

p o l a n d
The most enthusiastic participants in the American confrontation with the 
Russians will be the former Soviet satellites, particularly Poland. In a sense, 
they will be leading the Americans as much as being led. Poland has every­
thing to lose from Russia’s reemergence and little to protect it from the Rus­
sians. As the Russians come back to its frontier, Poland will look to the rest 
of Europe to support it through NATO. There will be little enthusiasm in 
Germany or France for any confrontation, so Poland will do what it histor­
ically did when confronted by Russia or Germany—it will seek an outside 
power to protect it. Historically this did not work. The guarantees made by 
France and Britain in 1939 did nothing to protect Poland against Germany 
or Russia. The United States will be different. It is not a power in decline, 
but a young, vigorous risk taker. To Poland’s pleasant surprise, the United 
States will be strong enough to block the Russians. 
The rest of Europe, particularly France and Germany, will have ex­
tremely mixed feelings about America’s superiority over the Russians. Hav­
ing lived through one cold war in the twentieth century, they will have little 
desire to live through another one. At a time of declining populations in all 

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of these countries, the Germans and the French might be relieved to see 
Russia—also with a declining population but still enormous—broken up. 
However, they will not be happy to see the United States in a strong posi­
tion in Europe outside of institutions like NATO, which the Europeans ac­
tually used to control and contain the United States. 
Nor will Germany, France, and the rest of Western Europe be used to 
the sudden self- confidence of Poland or of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Romania. The confrontation with Russia will paradoxically 
make these countries feel more secure because of the strong bilateral ties 
with the United States through which they seek to block Russian power. 
Freed from their primordial fear of the Russians and increasingly uncon­
cerned about a weakening Germany, these countries will see themselves as 
relatively safe for the first time in several centuries. Indeed, the Franco-
German decline will be felt all around the European periphery, driven partly 
by population decline, partly by moribund economies, and partly by the 
geopolitical miscalculation of opting out of the confrontation with Russia 
(and therefore disrupting NATO). The net result will be an intensification 
of the crisis of confidence that has undermined France and Germany since 
World War I. 
As a result, there will be a general redefinition of the European power 
structure. The collapse of the Russians will give the Eastern Europeans both 
the opportunity and the need to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy in 
the east. Eastern Europe will become the most dynamic region of Europe. 
As Russia collapses, the Eastern European countries will extend their influ­
ence and power to the east. The Slovaks, Hungarians, and Romanians have 
been the least vulnerable to the Russians because the Carpathians formed a 
natural barrier. The Poles, on the northern European plain, will be the most 
vulnerable, yet at the same time the largest and most important Eastern Eu­
ropean nation. 
As the Russians fall apart, the Poles will be the first to want to press east­
ward, trying to create a buffer zone in Belarus and Ukraine. As the Poles as­
sert their power, the Carpathian countries will also project power east of the 
mountains, into Ukraine. For five hundred years, Eastern Europe has been a 
backwater, trapped between the great Atlantic European powers and Ger­
many on the one side, and Russia on the other. In the wake of the collapse 

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of Russian power, the European order will shift to the east, to an Eastern 
Europe with deep ties to the United States. 
A political confederation among the Baltic countries, Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Romania will be impossible. They will have too many cul­
tural and historical differences between them. But an alliance between at 
least some of them is easy to imagine, especially when they share the com­
mon interest of moving to the east. 
That is precisely what they will do in the 2030s. Using their growing 
economic power—and military force as well, left over from their close col­
laboration with the Americans—they will form an alliance and face no sig­
nificant resistance to any eastern move. On the contrary, given the chaos, 
many in the region will actually welcome them as a stabilizing force. The 
difficulty will be coordinating the movement and avoiding major conflicts 
over particular areas. The region is naturally fractious; however, in the late 
2020s and 2030s, that will be the last thing on the Eastern European mind. 
Making certain that Russia never returns and increasing their labor force 
will be the major considerations. 
The precise lines of an Eastern European advance are impossible to pre­
dict. However, seeing an occupation of St. Petersburg from Estonia, or a 
Polish occupation of Minsk, or a Hungarian occupation of Kiev is no more 
difficult to imagine than a Russian occupation of Warsaw, Budapest, or 
Berlin. What goes west can go east, and if the Russians crumble, then an 
eastward movement out of Eastern Europe is inevitable. In this scenario, 
Poland becomes a major and dynamic European power, leading a coalition 
of Eastern European countries. 
The balance of power within Europe by 2040 will therefore shift to the 
east. All of Europe will be experiencing a demographic problem, but East­
ern Europe will be able to compensate for it through the kind of complex fi­
nancial relations that the United States traditionally maintains with allies. 
Eastern European countries might not surpass Western European countries 
in the absolute size of their economies, but certainly Eastern Europe will 
surpass Western Europe in terms of dynamism. 
So what does all this mean for France and Germany? It was one thing to 
live in a Europe that was disorganized but in which France and Germany 
were the decisive powers. It is quite another thing to live in a Europe that is 

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reorganizing itself and leaving them behind. With Britain drawn deeply 
into the American economic orbit and the Iberian Peninsula similarly at­
tracted to the opportunities of an American relationship, the French and the 
Germans will face a profound dilemma. 
Decadence means that you no longer have an appetite for great adven­
tures, but it does not mean that you no longer want to survive. By 2040, 
France and Germany are going to be has- beens, historically. Between popu­
lation crises and the redefinition of the geopolitics of Europe, the French 
and Germans will be facing a decisive moment. If they do not assert them­
selves, their futures will be dictated by others and they will move from deca­
dence to powerlessness. And with powerlessness would come a geopolitical 
spiral from which they would not recover. 
The key problem for France and Germany in their existential difficulties 
will be the United States. Although Eastern Europe will be surging as we ap­
proach the middle of the century, this surge will not be sustainable without 
support from the United States. If the United States could be forced to 
abandon its influence in Europe, Eastern Europe would not have the ability 
or confidence to pursue its strategic interests in the east. The old order 
would therefore be able to reassert itself, and some level of security could be 
retained by France and Germany. 
Obviously, the French and Germans won’t be in any position to con­
front the Americans directly, or to force them out alone. But with the end of 
the U.S.–Russian conflict, the immediate American interest in the region 
will decline. Inasmuch as U.S. power will still be in a state of constant flux, 
and its attention span short, the possibility of a reduced American presence 
will be real. There still may be an opportunity for the French and Germans 
to overawe the Eastern Europeans—particularly if American attention is di­
verted elsewhere in the world, such as toward the Pacific. 
U.S. interest in Europe may wane in the immediate wake of Russia’s col­
lapse, seemingly opening the door to increased Franco- German power. But 
this will be transitory. As the U.S. crisis with Japan and Turkey emerges and 
intensifies, the U.S. interest in Europe, as we shall see, will reemerge. The 
United States will have a very real interest in Eastern Europe once the Turks 
start to make their move in the 2020s. And that will likely be enough to 
block the reemergence of German and French power. 

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