The Next 100 Years

a s i a 
Japanese involvement in China goes back to the nineteenth century. During 
the period of turmoil between Europe’s interventions in China in the mid-
nineteenth century and the end of World War II, Japan was continually 
exerting its influence in China, usually seeking some kind of economic ad­
vantage. The Chinese have bitter memories of Japanese behavior in China 
in the 1930s and 1940s, but not so bitter as to block the Japanese from re­
turning to invest in post- Maoist China. 
In the 1930s, Japan looked to China for markets, and to a lesser extent 
for labor. In the 2020s, the emphasis will be, as we have pointed out, on la­
bor. With China regionalizing and to some extent fragmenting, Japan will 
have faced its old Chinese temptation in the 2010s and 2020s. Establishing 
some form of dominance over a Chinese region could rapidly contribute to 
solving Japan’s demographic problems without forcing the Japanese to pay 
the social and cultural price of immigration. But Japan will need to foster 
deep ties to whatever region it dominates in China. 
Various Chinese regions will be looking for protection from the central 
government as well as for investment capital and technology. Thus, the late-
nineteenth- and early- twentieth- century symbiotic relationship, based on 
coastal China’s need for investment and technology and Japan’s need for la­
bor, will reassert itself. 
Historically, Japan has another interest besides a need for labor—access 
to raw materials. As I have stated, Japan is the world’s second- largest econ­
omy, but it must import almost all of its raw materials. This has been a his­
torical challenge for Japan and was the main reason that it went to war with 
the United States in 1941. Many people forget that Japan was divided in­
ternally before the decision was finally made to attack Pearl Harbor. Some 
Japanese leaders argued that an invasion of Siberia would provide Japan 
with the raw materials it needed and was less risky than taking on the United 
States. Either way, the seriousness with which the Japanese pursued (and 
will continue to pursue) raw materials must not be underestimated. 
Pacific Russia is extremely rich in all sorts of minerals, including hydro­
carbons. By the 2020s, Japan will be facing energy problems and a contin­
ued dependence on the Persian Gulf, which in turn would mean being 

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entangled with the United States. Given American hubris after the second
fall of Russia, Japan, like the rest of the world, will be increasingly uneasy
about America’s next move. Therefore, with Russia fragmenting, it would
seem to make a great deal of sense for the Japanese to seek, at the very least,
economic control over Pacific Russia. Japan will respond whenever its access
to raw materials is threatened.
Japan will have a direct interest, then, in both northeast China and Pa-
cific Russia, but it will have no appetite for military adventure. At the same
time, Japan will be facing economic disaster by mid- century unless it starts
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