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Notes
225
Part I
1. Langdell, preface, vi.
2. Heath, 
Ways with Words
, 367–368.
Chapter 1
1. Zemans and Rosenblum, 
Public Profession
.
2. The impetus for much of this research developed from Michael Silverstein’s seminal
work on metapragmatics, linguistic ideology, and the place of pragmatics in the social realiza-
tion of language structure. See Silverstein, “Shifters,” 11–55; Silverstein, “Language Structure,”
193–247; see also the set of essays on this subject in Schieffelin et al., 
Language Ideologies
.
3. To avoid excessive use of so-called scare quotation marks, I have generally lim-
ited their use to the first introduction of phrases, such as “think like a lawyer.” When used
in this way, the quotation marks indicate one of several ideas that I hope readers will keep
in mind during subsequent uses of such phrases. First, these initial scare quotes will fre-
quently be used to indicate folk terminology: that is, phrases or words used within the
culture I am studying (here, the U.S. legal profession and academy). Words like “think”
in this context are to be read as an indigenous category that we are unpacking through
linguistic and cultural analysis, rather than terms to be taken at face value. I want the reader
to understand that I maintain a similar analytic distance regarding the legal academy’s
indigenous caste system that divides law schools into “elite,” “local,” and so forth—as well
as toward terms such as “other” or “minority,” terms that have long been problematized
within fields like anthropology. Second, quotation marks may index the first use of a term
that has a particular, more technical meaning in this book than in common usage (for
example, “double edge”). Quotes may also signal terms used figuratively or metaphori-
cally, or terms directly quoted from the writings or speech of others (or both, as for example
when I say that scholars have written of law “on the books” and law “in action”).

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Another metapragmatic note: throughout the book, I would advise readers who are
interested in some of the more technical points to focus on the notes. In the interests of
creating a more accessible text, I have relegated many of the more technical points to the
endnotes.
4. This combination has produced a data set that is quite rich, which I will continue
to mine in future work on the intersection of language, socialization, and institutional
practices.
5. As will be explained later in the book, I take the notion of a “double edge” from
the work of Moishe Postone, which carries forward the Frankfurt School tradition. At the
same time, I think somewhat similar notions can be found in the work of both Weber and
Durkheim (see below).
6. I am indebted in particular on this point to Susan Hirsch, a leading anthropolo-
gist of language and law whose work on Kenyan courts has served as a model for our field.
Hirsch’s research carefully delineates how the language of law can simultaneously perpetu-
ate domination and yet also open possibilities for resistance, because “there are always gaps
to be exploited by those who seek a hearing for their experiences.” Hirsch, 
Pronouncing
and Persevering
, 246. I have also been influenced more directly by Hirsch’s insightful com-
ments on my work, nudging me to think more thoroughly about the “cultural dominance”
half of this dichotomy. Hirsch, “Making Culture Visible,” 127. Discussions with Leti Volpp,
as well as my reading of her work, also helped to underscore this point for me. Volpp,
“(Mis)Identifying Culture.”
7. See discussion in Chapter 2; also see, for example, work by the Scollons linking
discourse and worldviews. Scollon and Scollon,