School Didactics And Learning: a school Didactic Model Framing An Analysis of Pedagogical Implication of Learning Theory

The Neuropsychological Alternative.
If we accept that we, as individuals, cannot be aware of our own
learning processes, does this mean that nobody can be aware of these processes?
What if we are successful in describing learning on a neurological level? Could we not say that the
neurologist is then aware of this process even though we ourselves are not aware of it, in a similar sense
that we may measure the haemoglobin of our blood without otherwise being aware of it?
It may very well be possible in the future to describe psychic processes in neurological terms. In fact this
may even be the only reasonable way of describing psychic acts as we ourselves are not aware of the
processes which make experience possible. However, from a pedagogical perspective the
neuropsychological alternative is of less, almost negligible importance.
So, if we deny the relevance of the neuropsychological alternative because it is pedagogically useless and
still admit that we ourselves cannot, in principle, be aware of our own acts through which we experience reality,
it means that we seriously question the pedagogical implications of the cognitivist view of the process of
learning.
TEACHING AND THE LEARNING RESULT
The Level of Description and Teaching
The main result of the previous ontological analysis in 
Chapter 6
supported the view that the cognitivist
paradigm accepts a dualist position on the ontological mind-brain problem. This means that the content of
awareness, i.e. mental representations, constitutes an autonomous level of description not reducible to any
other level.
This position thus claims that there is both room and need for an autonomous science of the mental world.
In other words, mental reality is not treated in any reductionist manner. Consequently eliminative
materialism as well as different forms of contextual reductionist positions are refuted. 
We have previously drawn attention to the methodological problem of accepting an autonomous
representational level of description. Accepting the criticism from Wittgenstein, Ryle, Popper, Hirst and
others leads us to the point where it becomes interesting to limit our descriptive ambitions to how
individuals publicly structure their experiences (for a discussion on the Wittgensteinian perspective on
private languages see Uljens, 1994b, pp. 11–17).
If the representational level may be questioned from such a perspective, it is easier to defend it against the
neuropsychologist attack. Accepting a neuropsychological level of describing learning would be more
difficult from a pedagogical point of view; only the neurologist would be able to express himself in
scientific terms when referring to the process and result of learning.
The Nature of Memory and Teaching
Accepting that the aim of teaching is to facilitate learning, which hopefully will lead to learning processes
called radical restructuring and that these changes should be described on a representational level, there is
reason to look at the implications of the result of this process.
7
As the result of the learning process is stored in the long-term memory, there is reason to pay attention to
how such representations form part of memory. Here I will limit the discussion to commenting on Tulving’s
(1983) distinction between different types of long-term memory.
Tulving (1983) distinguishes between a procedural memory and a cognitive memory system, together
constituting the long-term memory. In the procedural memory, both motoric and cognitive procedures are
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SCHOOL DIDACTICS AND LEARNING

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stored, most of which are automatized and many of which are combined cognitive-motoric skills (e.g.
playing the piano). The second part of the long-term memory is called the cognitive memory, in which
knowledge is stored both semantically and analogically.
In addition, Tulving (1983) divides the cognitive memory into two subsystems: episodic and semantic
memory. In the episodic memory, episodes and events, limited in time and space, are stored regardless of
whether they are individually experienced or indirectly experienced, e.g. through reading. In some respects
episodic memories can be compared with narrative knowledge, which is organized in terms of stories. The
semantic memory again contains formalized knowledge where concepts, symbols, principles and the like
are related systematically to each other. This knowledge is not as clearly content-related or context-
dependent as episodic knowledge.
One pedagogical question raised by these distinctions is whether a teacher should start their teaching with
a general principle or an event exemplifying such a principle. In other words, should the teacher try to
support the construction of knowledge to be stored in the semantic or episodic memory?
The question of how the semantic and episodic memory are interrelated thus has pedagogical
implications. For example, if the teacher is expected to organize meaningful learning environments, then
one question is how relevant content (episodes) is chosen from the student’s perspective and from the
perspective of the general principles that are the goal of teaching. In other words, how are general principles
(semantic knowledge) embedded in specific contents (episodic knowledge)? In Willman’s (1903)
terminology we deal here with the question of what the educational substance is in some specific
educational content. In Willman’s view the teacher’s job is to search for the educational substance. The
cognitivist approach would emphasize the student’s previous conceptual model as an important factor to take
into account in deciding what is to be considered this educational substance. By emphasizing the student’s
model in this way, it is possible to see a relation between the formal human science theory of education (see
Klafki, 1963, p. 23