it is because it is presented as an impossibility. It is only the first o f a series
not be accomplished. One could argue, though, that it needs to be taken
seriously in order to be appreciated as an impossibility. These tasks, the
Get with child a mandrake root.
Or who cleft the Divils foot.
Or to keep off envies stinging.
What winde.
The next stanza urges the addressee to depart on this impossible quest;
riousness; if finding a faithful woman is like catching a falling star, this is
cross (New York: Anchor, 1967), 90.
148
C O N C E P T S
apparently very serious indeed.
If, at one level, the explicitly impossi
ble “Goe and catche a falling starre” is not a serious command, this is not
because it occurs in a poem. Poems are full o f serious commands, from
the “Stay, traveler,” o f the epitaph, to addresses to the beloved. They are
full also o f performatives seriously accomplished: Virgil’s “Arma virumque
cano” [Arms and the man I sing] is a perfect performative, to which a
“hereby” could be added: it accomplishes the act to which it refers. One
might suspect that, ultimately, what Austin objects to is not the use of
the performative verb in a literary context but the status o f the subject:
the actor onstage or the author in a poem speaks through a persona. But,
as Johnson writes, once we consider “the conventionality o f all performa
tive utterances (on which Austin often insists), can it really be said that
the chairman who opens a discussion or a priest who baptizes a baby or
the judge who pronounces a verdict are persons rather than personae . . .?
The performative utterance automatically fictionalizes its utterer when it
makes him the mouthpiece for a conventionalized authority.” ’’ The sus
picion that people are all too often performing a role when they issue per
formatives and that the fictionality o f literary performatives might be a
model for “serious” performatives could be what makes Austin determined
to set aside the nonserious and the fictional— as if he could preserve the
serious performative from the charge o f theatricality by deeming theatri
cal and literary performatives quite a different matter. It is not, I would
stress, that there is no difference between the command o f a general on the
battlefield and a command in a poem, but both, doing things with words,
have a performative power, and both involve the problems o f iterability
and citationality.
The second irony o f the literary fortunes o f the performative is that
for Austin the notion of the performative situates language in concrete so
cial contexts and functions, such as getting married, christening a boat,
calling a meeting to order, thanking, apologizing, promising, warning. To
talk about performative utterances is, for him, to adopt a perspective op
posing that of theorists who try to analyze language without concern for
its contexts o f use. His program would go along with the Wittgensteinian
18. Barbara Johnson, “Poetry and Performative Language: Mallarmé and
Austin,” in Johnson,
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