Pragmatics, intention, and implication

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Chapter Seven
PRAGMATICS, INTENTION, AND IMPLICATION
Many linguists have tried to sweep pragmatics under the rug as 
not being "true" linguistics, an attitude that is happily changing. 
Language production and comprehension can be analyzed only 
in the pragmatic usage. All analyses of language data have to 
proceed from a consideration of the discourses that sentences, 
both uttered and written, are embedded in. Realizing that all 
language is discourse based empowers analyses of speech and 
writing. Context-free explanations do not work. Pragmatic analy­
ses include intention and implication, both of which impel 
actual speech forms and also guide the hearer's interpretation of 
meaning.
[1] P ra g m a tics.
T
hose aspects of meaning which cannot be explained by the break­
down of words in relation to syntactic forms are often relegated to 
p r a g m a t ic s
. 
Gordon and Lakoff (1975, p. 83) succinctly characterize this 
by noting “ . . . under certain circumstances, saying one thing may entail 
the communication of another.” In practice, it has proven difficult to 
the point of impossible to draw borders which delim it the scope of 
semantics, semiotics, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and pragmatics 
itself (Levinson 1983, pp. 1-15; Fillm ore 1984). As Kearns (1984, p. 163) 
avers “ . . . we do not begin with syntax and then add semantics; the 
semantics is prior.”
Many linguistic scholars have labored long and hard to maintain a 
boundary between language itself and the practical rules for its use 
(Fromkin 1975). Nevertheless, it has been abundantly clear for a very 
long time that there is no way to divide the two (Chaika 1977, 1981, 
1982b; 1989). Fauconnier (1985) emphasizes that language is pragmatics 
and is structured for pragmatic purposes. H e gives as an instance that 
there is an assumption that there is a link between an author and his 
works, so that “Plato is on the top shelf” typically means “the book by
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Pragmatics, Intention, and Implication
151
Plato. . . ” In Faucconier’s terms,