A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

participation is satisfied, all have the common status of equal citizen.
Finally, to avoid misunderstanding, it should be kept in mind that the
principle of participation applies to institutions. It does not define an ideal
of citizenship; nor does it lay down a duty requiring all to take an active
part in political affairs. The duties and obligations of individuals are a
separate question that I shall discuss later (see Chapter VI). What is
essential is that the constitution should establish equal rights to engage in
public affairs and that measures be taken to maintain the fair value of
these liberties. In a well-governed state only a small fraction of persons
may devote much of their time to politics. There are many other forms of
human good. But this fraction, whatever its size, will most likely be
drawn more or less equally from all sectors of society. The many commu-
nities of interests and centers of political life will have their active mem-
bers who look after their concerns.
37. LIMITATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION
37. Limitations on Participation
It is evident from the preceding account of the principle of participation
that there are three ways to limit its application. The constitution may
define a more or a less extensive freedom of participation; it may allow
inequalities in political liberties; and greater or smaller social resources
may be devoted to insuring the worth of these freedoms to the repre-
sentative citizen. I shall discuss these kinds of limitations in order, all
with a view to clarifying the meaning of the priority of liberty.
The extent of the principle of participation is defined as the degree to
which the procedure of (bare) majority rule is restricted by the mecha-
nisms of constitutionalism. These devices serve to limit the scope of
majority rule, the kinds of matters on which majorities have final author-
ity, and the speed with which the aims of the majority are put into effect.
15. See H. F. Pitkin, 
The Concept of Representation
(Berkeley, University of California Press,
1967), pp. 221–225, for a discussion of representation to which I am indebted.
200
Equal Liberty

---

A bill of rights may remove certain liberties from majority regulation
altogether, and the separation of powers with judicial review may slow
down the pace of legislative change. The question, then, is how these
mechanisms might be justified consistent with the two principles of jus-
tice. We are not to ask whether these devices are in fact justified, but what
kind of an argument for them is required.
To begin with, however, we should observe that the limits on the extent
of the principle of participation are assumed to fall equally upon every-
one. For this reason these restrictions are easier to justify than unequal
political liberties. If all could have a greater liberty, at least each loses
equally, other things the same; and if this lesser liberty is unnecessary and
not imposed by some human agency, the scheme of liberty is to this
degree irrational rather than unjust. Unequal liberty, as when the precept
one man one vote is violated, is another matter and immediately raises a
question of justice.
Supposing for the time being that the constraints on majority rule bear
equally on all citizens, the justification for the devices of constitutional-
ism is that they presumably protect the other freedoms. The best arrange-
ment is found by noting the consequences for the complete system of
liberty. The intuitive idea here is straightforward. We have said that the
political process is a case of imperfect procedural justice. A constitution
that restricts majority rule by the various traditional devices is thought to
lead to a more just body of legislation. Since the majority principle must
as a practical necessity be relied upon to some degree, the problem is to
find which constraints work best in given circumstances to further the
ends of liberty. Of course, these matters lie outside the theory of justice.
We need not consider which if any of the constitutional mechanisms is
effective in achieving its aim, or how far its successful working presup-
poses certain underlying social conditions. The relevant point is that to
justify these restrictions one must maintain that from the perspective of
the representative citizen in the constitutional convention the less exten-
sive freedom of participation is sufficiently outweighed by the greater
security and extent of the other liberties. Unlimited majority rule is often
thought to be hostile to these liberties. Constitutional arrangements com-
pel a majority to delay putting its will into effect and force it to make a
more considered and deliberate decision. In this and other ways proce-
dural constraints are said to mitigate the defects of the majority principle.
The justification appeals to a greater equal liberty. At no point is there a
reference to compensating economic and social benefits.
One of the tenets of classical liberalism is that the political liberties are
201
37. Limitations on Participation

---

of less intrinsic importance than liberty of conscience and freedom of the
person. Should one be forced to choose between the political liberties and
all the others, the governance of a good sovereign who recognized the
latter and who upheld the rule of law would be far preferable. On this
view, the chief merit of the principle of participation is to insure that the
government respects the rights and welfare of the governed.
16
Fortunately,
however, we do not often have to assess the relative total importance of
the different liberties. Usually the way to proceed is to apply the principle
of equal advantage in adjusting the complete system of freedom. We are
not called upon either to abandon the principle of participation entirely or
to allow it unlimited sway. Instead, we should narrow or widen its extent
up to the point where the danger to liberty from the marginal loss in
control over those holding political power just balances the security of
liberty gained by the greater use of constitutional devices. The decision is
not an all or nothing affair. It is a question of weighing against one
another small variations in the extent and definition of the different liber-
ties. The priority of liberty does not exclude marginal exchanges within
the system of freedom. Moreover, it allows although it does not require
that some liberties, say those covered by the principle of participation, are
less essential in that their main role is to protect the remaining freedoms.
Different opinions about the value of the liberties will, of course, affect
how different persons think the full scheme of freedom should be ar-
ranged. Those who place a higher worth on the principle of participation
will be prepared to take greater risks with the freedoms of the person, say,
in order to give political liberty a larger place. Ideally these conflicts will
not occur and it should be possible, under favorable conditions anyway, to
find a constitutional procedure that allows a sufficient scope for the value
of participation without jeopardizing the other liberties.
It is sometimes objected to majority rule that, however circumscribed,
it fails to take account of the intensity of desire, since the larger part may
override the strong feelings of a minority. This criticism rests upon the
mistaken view that the intensity of desire is a relevant consideration in
enacting legislation (see §54). To the contrary, whenever questions of
justice are raised, we are not to go by the strength of feeling but must aim
instead for the greater justice of the legal order. The fundamental criterion
for judging any procedure is the justice of its likely results. A similar
reply may be given to the propriety of majority rule when the vote is
16. See Isaiah Berlin,