A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

participation call for discussion: its meaning, its extent, and the measures
that enhance its worth. Starting with the question of meaning, the precept
of one elector one vote implies, when strictly adhered to, that each vote
has approximately the same weight in determining the outcome of elec-
tions. And this in turn requires, assuming single member territorial con-
stituencies, that members of the legislature (with one vote each) represent
the same number of electors. I shall also suppose that the precept necessi-
tates that legislative districts be drawn up under the guidance of certain
general standards specified in advance by the constitution and applied as
far as possible by an impartial procedure. These safeguards are needed to
prevent gerrymandering, since the weight of the vote can be as much
affected by feats of gerrymander as by districts of disproportionate size.
The requisite standards and procedures are to be adopted from the stand-
point of the constitutional convention in which no one has the knowledge
that is likely to prejudice the design of constituencies. Political parties
cannot adjust boundaries to their advantage in the light of voting statis-
tics; districts are defined by means of criteria already agreed to in the
absence of this sort of information. Of course, it may be necessary to
introduce certain random elements, since the criteria for designing con-
stituencies are no doubt to some extent arbitrary. There may be no other
fair way to deal with these contingencies.
12
The principle of participation also holds that all citizens are to have an
equal access, at least in the formal sense, to public office. Each is eligible
to join political parties, to run for elective positions, and to hold places of
authority. To be sure, there may be qualifications of age, residency, and so
on. But these are to be reasonably related to the tasks of office; presum-
ably these restrictions are in the common interest and do not discriminate
unfairly among persons or groups in the sense that they fall evenly on
everyone in the normal course of life.
12. For a discussion of this problem, see W. S. Vickrey, “On the Prevention of Gerrymandering,”
Political Science Quarterly,
vol. 76 (1961).
196
Equal Liberty

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The second point concerning equal political liberty is its extent. How
broadly are these liberties to be defined? Offhand it is not clear what
extent means here. Each of the political liberties can be more or less
widely defined. Somewhat arbitrarily, but nevertheless in accordance with
tradition, I shall assume that the main variation in the extent of equal
political liberty lies in the degree to which the constitution is majori-
tarian. The definition of the other liberties I take to be more or less fixed.
Thus the most extensive political liberty is established by a constitution
that uses the procedure of so-called bare majority rule (the procedure in
which a minority can neither override nor check a majority) for all sig-
nificant political decisions unimpeded by any constitutional constraints.
Whenever the constitution limits the scope and authority of majorities,
either by requiring a greater plurality for certain types of measures, or by
a bill of rights restricting the powers of the legislature, and the like, equal
political liberty is less extensive. The traditional devices of constitutional-
ism—bicameral legislature, separation of powers mixed with checks and
balances, a bill of rights with judicial review—limit the scope of the
principle of participation. I assume, however, that these arrangements are
consistent with equal political liberty provided that similar restrictions
apply to everyone and that the constraints introduced are likely over time
to fall evenly upon all sectors of society. And this seems probable if the
fair value of political liberty is maintained. The main problem, then, is
how extensive equal participation should be. This question I leave aside
for the next section.
Turning now to the worth of political liberty, the constitution must take
steps to enhance the value of the equal rights of participation for all
members of society. It must underwrite a fair opportunity to take part in
and to influence the political process. The distinction here is analogous to
that made before (§12): ideally, those similarly endowed and motivated
should have roughly the same chance of attaining positions of political
authority irrespective of their economic and social class. But how is this
fair value of these liberties to be secured?
We may take for granted that a democratic regime presupposes free-
dom of speech and assembly, and liberty of thought and conscience.
These institutions are not only required by the first principle of justice
but, as Mill argued, they are necessary if political affairs are to be con-
ducted in a rational fashion. While rationality is not guaranteed by these
arrangements, in their absence the more reasonable course seems sure to
be rejected in favor of policies sought by special interests. If the public
forum is to be free and open to all, and in continuous session, everyone
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36. Political Justice and the Constitution

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should be able to make use of it. All citizens should have the means to be
informed about political issues. They should be in a position to assess
how proposals affect their well-being and which policies advance their
conception of the public good. Moreover, they should have a fair chance
to add alternative proposals to the agenda for political discussion.
13
The
liberties protected by the principle of participation lose much of their
value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to
use their advantages to control the course of public debate. For eventually
these inequalities will enable those better situated to exercise a larger
influence over the development of legislation. In due time they are likely
to acquire a preponderant weight in settling social questions, at least in
regard to those matters upon which they normally agree, which is to say
in regard to those things that support their favored circumstances.
Compensating steps must, then, be taken to preserve the fair value for
all of the equal political liberties. A variety of devices can be used. For
example, in a society allowing private ownership of the means of produc-
tion, property and wealth must be kept widely distributed and government
monies provided on a regular basis to encourage free public discussion.
In addition, political parties are to be made independent from private
economic interests by allotting them sufficient tax revenues to play their