Сборник материалов II октябрьской международной научной конференции по проблемам теоретической экономики

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112
L. Galiullina
Universiteit Maastricht
GRADING EFFECTS ON STUDENT EFFORT: 
THE ROLE OF TARGETS, BELIEFS, 
AND EXPLANATORY STYLES
I build a two-period behavioral economics model to study 
grading effects on student effort. In my model, the student’s 
utility function decreases with effort and gets a positive shift if 
the student anticipates the grade target to be achievable with the 
chosen amount of effort. The utility-maximizing choice of effort 
in the first period depends on the grade target, on its importance 
to the student, and on the student’s initial beliefs about their 
ability and return to effort. Having received the grade from the 
first study period, the student attributes an unexplained part of 
the actual grade to either unstable or stable factors. Under the 
unstable attribution, the student in period 2 adjusts only their 
grade target. Under the stable attribution, the student additionally 
updates their beliefs about their ability and/or return to effort. 
Hence, the choice of the second-period effort depends on the 
first-period grade. The model predicts several types of grading 
effects on study effort. Notably, no matter whether the student 
attributes academic success or failure to stable or unstable factors, 
higher initial grades, ceteris paribus, lead to lower (or at least 
not higher) future effort; the only notable exception to this 
negative grading effect is a dramatic jump from zero to maximum 
effort that happens when the initial grade gets high enough to 
switch the student from a «giving up» regime (originating from 
extremely low initial grades) to a grade-targeting one. The model 
provides practical implications on how to motivate students who 
hold various types of self-beliefs, success and failure attribution 
styles, and grade targets.