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Has Sarbanes-Oxley Led to a Decline



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Mishkin Eakins - Financial Markets and Institutions, 7e (2012)

Has Sarbanes-Oxley Led to a Decline 

in U.S. Capital Markets?

There has been much debate in the United States in

recent years regarding the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley,

especially Section 404, on U.S. capital markets.

Section 404 requires both management and company

auditors to certify the accuracy of their financial state-

ments. There is no question that Sarbanes-Oxley has

led to increased costs for corporations, and this is espe-

cially true for smaller firms with revenues of less than

$100 million, where the compliance costs have been

estimated to exceed 1% of sales. These higher costs

could result in smaller firms listing abroad and discour-

age IPOs in the United States, thereby shrinking U.S.

capital markets relative to those abroad. However,

improved accounting standards could work to encour-

age stock market listings and IPOs because better infor-

mation could raise the valuation of common stocks.

Critics of Sarbanes-Oxley have cited it, as well as

higher litigation and weaker shareholder rights, as

the cause of declining U.S. stock listings and IPOs,

but other factors are likely at work. The European

financial system experienced a major liberalization

in the 1990s, along with the introduction of the

euro, that helped make its financial markets more

integrated and efficient. As a result, it became easier

for European firms to list in their home countries. The

fraction of European firms that list in their home

countries has risen to over 90% currently from

around 60% in 1995. As the importance of the

United States in the world economy has diminished

because of the growing importance of other

economies, the U.S. capital markets have become

less dominant over time. This process is even more

evident in the corporate bond market. In 1995, cor-

porate bond issues were double that of Europe,

while issues of corporate bonds in Europe now

exceed those in the United States.

S U M M A R Y



1. There are eight basic facts about U.S. financial struc-

ture. The first four emphasize the importance of finan-

cial intermediaries and the relative unimportance of

securities markets for the financing of corporations;

the fifth recognizes that financial markets are among

the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy; the

sixth states that only large, well-established corpora-

tions have access to securities markets; the seventh

indicates that collateral is an important feature of debt

contracts; and the eighth presents debt contracts as

complicated legal documents that place substantial

restrictions on the behavior of the borrower.



2. Transaction costs freeze many small savers and bor-

rowers out of direct involvement with financial mar-

kets. Financial intermediaries can take advantage of

economies of scale and are better able to develop

expertise to lower transaction costs, thus enabling

their savers and borrowers to benefit from the exis-

tence of financial markets.

3. Asymmetric information results in two problems:

adverse selection, which occurs before the transac-

tion, and moral hazard, which occurs after the trans-

action. Adverse selection refers to the fact that bad

credit risks are the ones most likely to seek loans, and



Chapter 7 Why Do Financial Institutions Exist?

161

moral hazard refers to the risk of the borrower’s

engaging in activities that are undesirable from the

lender’s point of view



4. Adverse selection interferes with the efficient func-

tioning of financial markets. Tools to help reduce the

adverse selection problem include private production

and sale of information, government regulation to

increase information, financial intermediation, and

collateral and net worth. The free-rider problem

occurs when people who do not pay for information

take advantage of information that other people have

paid for. This problem explains why financial inter-

mediaries, particularly banks, play a more important

role in financing the activities of businesses than secu-

rities markets do.



5. Moral hazard in equity contracts is known as the 

principal–agent problem, because managers (the

agents) have less incentive to maximize profits than

stockholders (the principals). The principal–agent

problem explains why debt contracts are so much

more prevalent in financial markets than equity con-

tracts. Tools to help reduce the principal–agent prob-

lem include monitoring, government regulation to

increase information, and financial intermediation.

6. Tools to reduce the moral hazard problem in debt

contracts include collateral and net worth, monitor-

ing and enforcement of restrictive covenants, and

financial intermediaries.



7. Conflicts of interest arise when financial service

providers or their employees are serving multiple

interests and have incentives to misuse or conceal

information needed for the effective functioning of

financial markets. We care about conflicts of inter-

est because they can substantially reduce the

amount of reliable information in financial markets,

thereby preventing them from channeling funds to

parties with the most productive investment oppor-

tunities. Three types of financial service activities

have had the greatest potential for conflicts of inter-

est: underwriting and research in investment bank-

ing, auditing and consulting in accounting firms, and

credit assessment and consulting in credit rating

agencies. Two major policy measures have been

implemented to deal with conflicts of interest: the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Global Legal

Settlement of 2002, which arose from a lawsuit by

the New York attorney general against the 10 largest

investment banks.

K E Y   T E R M S

agency theory, p. 140

audits, p. 142

collateral, p. 144

conflicts of interest, p. 155

costly state verification, p. 147

creditors, p. 152

economies of scope, p. 155

equity capital, p. 145

free-rider problem, p. 141

incentive compatiblep. 149

initial public offerings (IPOs), p. 156

net worth (equity capital), p. 145

pecking order hypothesis, p. 144

principal–agent problem, p. 145

restrictive covenants, p. 137

secured debt, p. 137

spinning, p. 156

state-owned banks, p. 153

unsecured debt, p. 137

venture capital firm, p. 147

Q U E S T I O N S




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