Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, many thanks are owed to Doctor Letitia Lawson of the National Security 
Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School for her continued support and 
patience. Her counsel, mentorship, advice, intricate assessments, and most importantly, 
her ability to help separate the “forest from the trees” enabled me to overcome what 
seemed as a daily challenge. Also, her ability to patiently deal with an Army officer who 
believes that written prose consists of bullet format sprinkled with acronyms is what I 
envision as the epitome of an academic scholar. Second, I am greatly indebted to my 
wife who continued to support me with this endeavor when so many family nights and 
weekends were otherwise spent in the library or in front of a computer screen. Finally, I 
would like to dedicate this thesis to the brave Soldiers of Dragon Company, First 
Battalion, Thirtieth Infantry Regiment (formerly known as Third Battalion, Fifteenth 
Regiment) of the Third Infantry Division, where many are serving on their third tour in 
Iraq, for their ability to adapt to an extremely difficult environment. They truly embody 
what it means to be a learning organization. 

---

xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

---

1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many different organizations have resisted coalition forces passively and actively 
since the beginning of the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003. These groups include Iraqi 
nationalist parties, regional and global insurgent organizations, transnational criminal 
groups and local criminal gangs, and sectarian militias. Although these organizations 
have highly diverse goals and objectives, the tendency to lump them together as 
“terrorists” undermines the ability of policy makers to respond to each appropriately.
Some of these organizations, such as Al Qaeda and Ansar al Sunnah, have a clear and 
unwavering commitment to the destruction of the Iraqi government and the U.S. led 
Coalition. On the other hand, Shia militias, most notably the Mahdi Militia and the Badr 
Corps, have much more complex strategies. Militias sometimes cooperate with the Iraqi 
government and coalition forces, at other times challenge them politically, and at still 
other times resist them violently. Political factions supported by militias are currently 
participating in the Iraqi government. These unclear and mixed signals have left coalition 
forces in a quandary about how to respond effectively to the challenge presented by Iraqi 
militias. Over the course of the occupation Coalition policy on the Shia militias has 
varied from kinetic military action to voluntary disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration, to indirect support for Iraqi government policies to abolish them legally.
In terms of military strategy, a “one size fits all” counterinsurgency strategy, 
involving the elimination or destruction of the enemy, has been implemented with a view 
toward achieving short term success. Yet as retired United States Marine Corps General 
Charles C. Krulak once said: “Bullets help sanitize an operational area, they don’t win a 
war.”
1
A key component in establishing an effective military policy in Iraq will be to 
understand the different types of resistance organizations that operate in a military 
commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). There is a consensus in both policy and 
strategy discussions that Shia militias must be eliminated if a stable and democratic state 
1
Quoted in McFate, Montgomery and Jackson, Andrea V., “The Object Beyond War: 
Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition,” Military Review, The Professional 
Journal of the U.S. Army LXXXVI, January-February (2006): 61. 

---

2
are to be established, but there has been little investigation of the foundations of this 
consensus. This thesis seeks to question this consensus through a comparative 
investigation of the effects of alternative strategies toward militia forces in Iraq and 
elsewhere.