15. NUMBER OF
PAGES
125
14. SUBJECT TERMS Iraq, Mahdi Militia, Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni militias, U.S. military,
British, Palestine, Jewish militias, Haganah
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF
REPORT
Unclassified
18. SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS
PAGE
Unclassified
19. SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF
ABSTRACT
Unclassified
20. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT
UU
NSN 7540-01-280-5500
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tandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
U.S. POST CONFLICT INTEGRATION POLICY OF MILITIAS IN IRAQ
James J. Smith
Captain, United States Army
B.S., University of Central Florida, 1997
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(DEFENSE DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2008
Author:
James J. Smith
Approved by:
Letitia Lawson
Thesis Advisor
Abbas Kadhim
Second Reader
Harold Trinkunas
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to examine what effect the United States policy towards militias
in Iraq has on the security, stability and troop levels. Conventional wisdom regarding the
imperative to eliminate militias in Iraq rests upon the correct observation that the state is
locked in a struggle over the legitimate use of force, and therefore over power and
authority, with the militias, but fails to appreciate that the militia may have more popular
legitimacy than the state. Recognizing this calls for a reconsideration of policy responses
to the militia phenomenon. This thesis will argue that while military defeat is tactically
feasible, it is unlikely to lead to strategic success because the militias have established
popular legitimacy and military attacks by an occupying power are only likely to increase
it. For similar reasons, engagement of the militia is likely to be more efficacious. The
thesis will use two case studies to investigate which policy might work best for Security,
Stability, Transition and Reconstruction operations in Iraq. A comparison is adopted to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of defeat and engagement as alternative military
strategies employ by an occupying power vis-à-vis indigenous militia forces in the
Middle East. The first case study is the United States occupation of Iraq from 2003 to
2007. The second case study is the British occupation of Palestine from 1920 to 1948.
The thesis will conclude with an analysis of similarities between each case, potential
policy prescription for the U.S., avenues for future research and some comments on the
semantics of words.
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