Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

2. The 
Palmach 
Despite the tensions created between the British and the Jewish community by the 
Macdonald White Paper, they would again seek, and receive, the assistance of Jewish 
militias in 1941, this time for national rather than local security. In 1940 German 
occupation of Palestine was a real possibility. British forces in Palestine were not 
prepared or capable of repelling a German attack, and feared that Palestinian Arabs 
would welcome German troops in an effort to undermine the British occupation and 
Jewish Yishuv. So the British again turned to Jewish militias for support. In 1941 
“Cooperation” was established between the militias and British military and was aimed at 
defeating an attack by German-Italian armies invading Palestine. This agreement 
allowed for the Jewish militias to establish an elite striking force known as the 
Plugot 
Mahatz
, or Palmach. “Cooperation” allowed Jewish militias to fully invest in the 
recruitment, training and funding for the Palmach, which would later deploy with British 
forces to combat Axis power on multiple fronts.
237
Five examples highlight the success 
of this strategy of with a local militia. 
The first engagement cost the lives of 23 Palmach fighters and one British officer 
on May 18, 1941, all of whom perished at sea enroute to sabotaging oil refineries in Syria 
to prevent them from being used by Axis powers. However, the British were so 
impressed with the discipline, readiness, and capabilities of the Palmach that they were 
integrated into the planning of small unit tactics of sabotage, sniper, ambush and patrol 
operations, which were to be deployed if the Germans invaded Palestine. The British 
provided sabotage and communication training in conjunction with naval and land 
military training conducted by the Haganah. The second engagement occurred on June 7, 
236
John and Hadawi, 336. 
237
“Palmach: The Elite Striking Force of the Haganah,” in Israeli Ministry of Defense [database 
online]. Kiryat-Ono, Israel October 18, 2007 [cited 2007]. Available from 
http://www.palmach.org.il/show_item.asp?itemId=8570&levelId=42859&itemType=0 (accessed October 
18, 2007). 

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1941 and consisted of Palmach fighters serving in critical roles alongside Australian 
vanguards during the attack of Syria and Lebanon. The Palmach fighters were broken 
down into thirteen different teams tasked for dangerous missions that included disrupting 
communication, seizure of key terrain and routes, and serving as lead navigators for 
Allied armies behind enemy lines. Palmach operations would continue in Syria and 
Lebanon until March 1943 and consisted of missions that involved gathering intelligence, 
disseminating propaganda and disrupting key infrastructure. The fourth example is the 
establishment of the Mishmar Ha’emek training camp, which was run jointly by the 
British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Haganah leadership. The camp was 
specifically designed to train Palmach fighters in patrolling, sniper operations, and 
sabotage. The British provided trainers, financial support, maintenance assistance and 
food. By the conclusion of training in June 1942, nearly 1100 Palmach fighters were 
jointly trained by British military and Haganah militiamen. This served as a critical 
foundation for the professional Palmach force. The fifth example encompasses a plan 
between the British military and Haganah called the Northern Plan. By June 1942 the 
Axis powers were threatening to overrun British forces near Egypt. The plan entailed 
supporting the British retreat from Palestine while consolidating Jewish communities in 
mountainous and dense housing in Haifa, Mount Carmel, the Bay of Haifa and part of the 
Zvulun Valley. Once consolidated the Jewish fighters would be required to repel Axis 
attacks until the British military was able to regroup and move back to Palestine to 
reinforce the Jewish militias.
238
In sum, the engagement strategy that the British military used with the Palmach 
demonstrates that engagement can succeed in traditional military operations at the 
national level as well as in community defense at the local level. However, the British 
failed to capitalize on what they had initiated. Once the threat of Axis occupation 
receded, the British military strategy of engagement receded as well. Additionally, the 
British government’s policy of uphold the MacDonald White Paper of 1939 would 
238
“Palmach: The Elite Striking Force of the Haganah,” in Israeli Ministry of Defense [database 
online]. Kiryat-Ono, Israel [cited 2007]. Available from 
http://www.palmach.org.il/show_item.asp?itemId=8570&levelId=42859&itemType=0 (accessed October 
18, 2007). 

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undermine the willingness of the Jewish militias to cooperate with British forces absent 
the threat of Nazi Germany. Indeed, the Haganah went underground in 1945 and began 
movement of resistance against the British. The British response was an ultimately 
unsuccessful strategy of defeating Haganah and the other Jewish militias.