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militias into an effective security force, as government security forces continue to mature.
In the Anbar province, U.S. military forces adopted a similar strategy in 2006 that began
with the engagement of local sheiks and led to the employment of their militias to
perform local security responsibilities alongside U.S. and Iraq security forces. These
engagements also led to an improved police force, due to an increase in recruits whom
the locals trusted. Improved cooperation between U.S.
military, police and Sunni militias
has made Anbar province one of safest areas in Iraq in 2007 after being considered by
senior military officials as the most contentious area of Iraq in 2006. However the U.S.
remains committed to a non-engagement strategy vis-à-vis Shia militias. And Moqtada al
Sadr’s Mahdi Militia has continued to defy the occupation of Iraq by the U.S. The
evidence presented here suggests that isolation of the Mahdi Militia has and will continue
to create greater instability for two reasons. First, over the last three years, the U.S.
military tactics aimed at defeating the Mahdi Militia through targeted raids against militia
commanders has led to the unintended consequence of creating a power vacuum that has
been filled by criminal’s intent upon making a personal profit regardless of how it will
negatively impact the community. This evidence also suggests
that local communities
suffer the consequences of reduced security because the nascent Iraqi security forces are
still in the developmental stage and have yet to assume an independent role as a trusted
security provider. Therefore U.S. forces have been required to fill the role of security
provider, leading to the troop surge of 2007. However, U.S. planners have continuously
recognized the inability of U.S. forces to sustain the troop surge beyond 2008. They are
at the breaking point. It is unknown how much longer U.S. soldiers will be willing to
redeploy to Iraq for their fourth, fifth, or sixth deployment that
ranges from twelve to
fifteen months. Therefore, this strategy has the potential to create another power vacuum
if Iraqi security forces have not demonstrated the ability to assume an independent role as
sole security provider by then.
The second problem resulting from the lack of engagement with Shia militias is
the lack of oversight. The evidence suggests that this has allowed an uninterrupted line
of communication with other external actors that were willing to engage them. Iran
gladly accepted the role, co-opting as many Shia militias as possible and providing them
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with training, funding,
and equipment, which ironically has been used lethally to disrupt
U.S. military operations in Iraq. However, the likelihood of Shia militias turning to Iran
and then attacking U.S. forces would have been lower if U.S. policy-makers had adopted
a much more aggressive policy towards engaging moderate militia members and
including them into the overall security plan after the ceasefire in October 2004. The
good news is that recent experience in Anbar Province suggests that it is still not too late
to change course. Sadr’s efforts to rehabilitate the Mahdi Militia during a six month
cessation of attacks and General Petraeus’ encouraging response to Sadr’s decision also
suggests that Shia militias would be willing to cooperate with the United States.
However, the likelihood of Shia militias turning away from
Iranian sponsors much the
same way Sunni militias were inclined to turn away from al Qaeda will be greater if the
incentives offered by the U.S. and Iraqi government were right for an alliance of
convenience.
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