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E.
THE UNITED NATION STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT
Between December 1947, when Britain announced that the termination of its
Mandate of Palestine and May 1948 when it was to redeploy its troops, the United
Nations Palestine Commission had to identify and implement an end state for Palestine.
It concluded that the best solution was a partitioning the country between the Palestinian
Arabs and the Jews. Recognizing the success of the Jewish militias over the previous
twenty years, the U.N. elected to employ indigenous militia forces as the primary security
element for both new states. On January 10, 1948, the U.N. published its report
A/AC.21/W.9 outlining the responsibilities:
265
Cohen,
Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948
, 302.
266
Peeke,
Jewish--Zionist Terrorism and the Establishment of Israel
, 292-300.
91
B.8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within
the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of
the state, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent
frontier clashes.
This armed militia is each State shall, for operational purposes be under
the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general
political and military control including the choice of the militias high
command, shall be exercised by the Commission.
267
The British military was to “maintain law and order in the areas they had not yet
evacuated” until such time as they were withdrawn.
268
The UN vision for security provision by militias was outlines by the Ralph
Bunche, chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP):
Something like that of the “Home Guard” in the United Kingdom, an
armed force raised from the people in order to defend some villages, to
defend their land and to supply something that is between an army and the
police….but capable of dealing with large-scale internal disturbances and
preventing frontier clashes and border attacks. On these assumptions the
successful execution by the armed militia of its tasks would require that it
be a mobile force possessing sufficient equipment and training to enable it
to defend the borders of each state and to cope with widespread disorders,
guerilla attacks by organized bands and sabotage of public utilities. In
addition, it would be required to maintain proper control of disturbed
areas, to protect life and property, to ensure the continued operation of
essential public utilities, and safe communication and transport
facilities.
269
The intent of this guidance was to allow Jewish militias to legally assume control
of multiple security requirements that were no longer accepted by the British occupation,
and which they had already successfully conducted in a clandestine form. The British
occupation of Palestine had required a static force that ranged from 60,000 to 100,000
soldiers, “two divisions, an armoured brigade and air force units [and a] … police force
267
Ralph Bunche,
Future Government of Palestine/UN Commission-Armed Militias-Working Paper,
United Nations, 1948), 1.
268
Bunche, 2.
269
Ibid.
, 2-3.
92
totaling some 32,000” personnel.
270
The estimated strength of the Haganah in 1948 was
40,000; the Jewish Settlement Police was approximately 16,000; the Palmach
approximately 6,000; the Irgun ranged from 3,000 to 5,000; and the Stern Gang ranged
between 200 and 300.
271
However, it was already clear that the Haganah would absorb
the Irgun and Stern Gang as a means of eliminating their radical activities that would
possibly shift from attacking British forces to Palestinian Arabs. In sum the U.N.
recognized that the Jewish militias, with an estimated operating strength of nearly 66,000
personnel who had been trained both legally and illegally during British occupation in all
the tasks described in the General Assembly’s resolution, were capable of assuming
security responsibilities. In so doing, the Jewish militias allowed the British to
completely withdraw their forces from Palestine while maintaining the security of the
Jewish population. The UN’s support for militias directly impacted the ability of the
Jewish Agency and the Haganah establish a functional and professional standing army,
the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) on May 28, 1948. The IDF was also successful in
dissolving the more radical Irgun and Stern Gang and absorbing their members into the
IDF.
272
270
Bunche, 3.
271
Ralph Bunche,
Future Government of Palestine/UN Commission-Armed Militias-Working Paper,
United Nations, 1948), 4.
272
Martin L. Van Creveld,
The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force
,
81.
93
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