ing inability of lenders to solve the adverse selection problem makes them less
willing to lend, which leads to a decline in lending, investment, and aggregate eco-
nomic activity.
As we saw in Chapter 8, individuals and firms with the riskiest investment projects
are those who are willing to pay the highest interest rates. If increased demand for
credit or a decline in the money supply drives up interest rates sufficiently, good
credit risks are less likely to want to borrow while bad credit risks are still willing
to borrow. Because of the resulting increase in adverse selection, lenders will no
longer want to make loans. The substantial decline in lending will lead to a sub-
stantial decline in investment and aggregate economic activity.
Increases in interest rates also play a role in promoting a financial crisis through
their effect on cash flow, the difference between cash receipts and expenditures.
A firm with sufficient cash flow can finance its projects internally, and there is no
asymmetric information because it knows how good its own projects are. (Indeed,
businesses in Canada and the United States fund around two-thirds of their invest-
ments with internal funds.) An increase in interest rates and therefore in house-
hold and firm interest payments decreases their cash flow. With less cash flow, the
firm has fewer internal funds and must raise funds from an external source, say, a
bank, which does not know the firm as well as its owners or managers. How can
the bank be sure if the firm will invest in safe projects or instead take on big risks
and then be unlikely to pay back the loan? Because of increased adverse selection
and moral hazard, the bank may choose not to lend even to firms that are good
risks and want to undertake potentially profitable investments. Thus, when cash
flow drops as a result of an increase in interest rates, adverse selection and moral
hazard problems become more severe, again curtailing lending, investment, and
economic activity.
In emerging-market countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Russia, and Turkey are
recent examples), government fiscal imbalances may create fears of default on
government debt. As a result, demand from individual investors for government
bonds may fall, causing the government to force financial institutions to purchase
them. If the debt then declines in price
which, as we have seen in Chapter 6, will
occur if a government default is likely
financial institutions balance sheets will
weaken and their lending will contract for the reasons described earlier. Fears of
default on the government debt can also spark a foreign exchange crisis in which
the value of the domestic currency falls sharply because investors pull their money
out of the country. The decline in the domestic currency s value will then lead to
the destruction of the balance sheets of firms with large amounts of debt denom-
inated in foreign currency. These balance sheet problems lead to an increase in
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, a decline in lending, and a con-
traction of economic activity.
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