T h e SPE's Meaning a n d Messages
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In the United States at the present time, the same alleged threats to national
security have frightened citizens into willingly sacrificing their basic civil rights to
gain an illusion of security. That ideology in turn has been the centerpiece justify-
ing a preemptive war of aggression against Iraq. That ideology was created by the
System in power, which in turn created new subordinate Systems of war manage-
ment, homeland security management, and military prison management—or
absence thereof, in default of serious postwar planning.
My scholarly fascination with the mind control strategy and tactics outlined
in George Orwell's classic novel 1 9 8 4
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should have made me aware of System
power sooner in my professional life. "Big Brother" is the System that ultimately
crushes individual initiative and the will to resist its intrusions. For many years,
discussion of the SPE did not even include a Systems-level analysis because the
original dialogue was framed as the contest between the dispositional and situa-
tional ways of understanding human behavior. I ignored the bigger problem of
considering that framing provided by the System. It was really only after I became
engaged in understanding the dynamics of the widespread abuses in the many
military prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba that the Systems level of analysis
became glaringly obvious.
The Nobel Laureate physicist Richard Feynman showed that the tragic disas-
ter of the space shuttle Challenger was due not to human error but to a systemic
problem with "official management." NASA's top guns insisted on the launch de-
spite the doubts of both of their engineers and the expressed concerns of the
manufacturer of a critical component (which became the flawed O-ring that
caused the disaster). Feynman argues that NASA's motivation may well have been
"to assure the government of NASA perfection and success in order to ensure the
supply of funds."
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In later chapters, we will adopt the point of view that Systems
as well as Situations matter to aid in our understanding of what went wrong at
the Stanford and Abu Ghraib Prisons.
In contrast to NASA's system that failed when it tried to live up to its politi-
cally motivated slogan of "faster, better, cheaper" was the horrific success of the
Nazi system of mass extermination. Here was a tightly integrated top-down
system of Hitler's cabinet, the National Socialist politicians, bankers, Gestapo
officers, SS troops, engineers, doctors, architects, chemists, educators, train con-
ductors, and more, each doing its part in this concentrated attempt at the geno-
cide of all European Jews and other enemies of the State.
Concentration camps had to be built, along with extermination camps and
their specifically designed crematoria, and new forms of lethally effective poison
gas had to be perfected. Propaganda specialists had to design campaigns in film,
newspapers, magazines, and posters that denigrated and dehumanized the Jews
as a menace. Teachers and preachers had to prepare the youth to become blindly
obedient Nazis who could justify engaging in the "final solution of the Jewish
question."
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A new language had to be developed with innocuous-sounding words con-
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