The Lucifer Effect
saluting superiors, which added to the lax standards that prevailed at the prison,"
said one member of the brigade. The soldier, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity, also said that commanders in the field routinely ignored General
Karpinski's orders, saying that they didn't have to listen to her because she was a
w o m a n . "
1 6
One task she did perform, after a fashion, consisted of weekly "scrubs,"
where she made decisions about which prisoners should be released either be-
cause they were not dangerous or because they probably had no useful informa-
tion and were neither insurgents nor criminals. However, I was told that
Karpinski played it safe by releasing relatively few detainees, while many new
prisoners were being brought in daily; therefore, the prison population continued
to swell. To make matters worse, though few were leaving, there was a constant
influx of new prisoners from other prisons, as, for example, when Camp B u c c a
was overcrowded.
As the prison population swelled to more than ten thousand during the first
six months of Karpinski's tenure, there were, among those imprisoned, thirty j u -
veniles, ages ten to seventeen. For these children not only were there no educa-
tional programs, but there were also no separate facilities. "It was heartbreaking
to see the conditions under which these young children were living for months on
end," said one observer. In addition, nothing was done to provide separate
arrangements for prisoners who were mentally ill or were suffering from a variety
of contagious diseases, like TB.
It is curious, then, that given the terrible conditions at Abu Ghraib, General
Karpinski would give a thumbs-up report in an interview with the St. Petersburg
Times in December 2 0 0 3 . She said that for many of the Iraqis imprisoned at Abu
Ghraib, "living conditions now are better in prison than living at home." She
added. 'At one point we were concerned that they wouldn't want to leave." How-
ever, at that very moment, as General Karpinski was giving such a cheery pre-
Christmas interview, Major General Antonio Taguba was conducting an
investigation of reports of numerous incidents of "sadistic, blatant, and wanton
criminal abuses" perpetrated by her Army Reserve soldiers in the 3 7 2 n d Military
Police Company, from the night shift on Tier 1 A.
General Karpinski was later admonished, suspended from duty, officially rep-
rimanded, and removed from this command. She was also demoted to the rank of
colonel and retired from the service. She was the first officer to be found blame-
worthy in the investigation of prisoner abuses, for her sins of omission and
ignorance—not for anything she did, but for what she did not do.
In her autobiography, One Woman's Army, Karpinski tells her side of the
story.
1 7
She recounts the visit of an Army team from Guantânamo, headed by
Major General Geoffrey Miller, who told her, "We're going to change the nature of
the interrogation at Abu Ghraib." That meant "taking off the kid gloves." to stop
being so soft on these suspected insurgents, and to start using tactics that would
get "actionable intelligence" needed in the war against terrorists and insurgents.
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