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The Lucifer Effect
former commander of the prison camp at Guantânamo Bay, Cuba—made
decisions and issued policies that facilitated serious and widespread viola-
tions of the law. The circumstances strongly suggest that they either knew
or should have known that such violations took place because of their ac-
tions. There is also mounting data that, when presented with evidence
that abuse was in fact taking place, they failed to act to stem the abuse.
The coercive methods approved by senior officials and widely em-
ployed over the last three years include tactics that the United States has
repeatedly condemned as barbarity and torture when practiced by others.
Even the Army field manual condemns some of these methods as torture.
Although much relevant evidence remains secret, a series of revela-
tions over the past twelve months, brought together here, already makes a
compelling case for a thorough, genuinely independent investigation of
what top officials did, what they knew, and how they responded when they
became aware of the widespread nature of the abuses.
As upsetting as were the images of abuse and torture by the Tier 1A night
shift MPs, they pale in comparison to the many murders of detainees by soldiers,
CIA, and other civilian personnel. "If the United States is to wipe out the stain of
Abu Ghraib, it needs to investigate those at the top who ordered or condoned
abuse and come clean on what the president has authorized," said Reed Brody,
special counsel for Human Rights Watch. He adds, that "Washington must repu-
diate, once and for all, the mistreatment of detainees in the name of the war on
terror."
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Many Abusers, Few Punished, Officers Get Free Ride
Let's set the record straight on the extent of abuses of detainees in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Guantânamo Bay, Cuba. A recent Army statement indicates
that more than 6 0 0 accusations of abuse of detainees have been reported since
October 2 0 0 1 . Of those, 1 9 0 have never been investigated or there is no known
investigation of them—the "ghost abusers." At least 4 1 0 other accusations have
been investigated with the following consequences: 1 5 0 faced disciplinary action,
79 were court-martialed, 54 were found guilty, 10 were sentenced to more than
one year in prison, 30 were sentenced to less than one year, 14 got no prison time,
10 were acquitted, 15 cases are still pending or charges were dropped, 71 were
administratively disciplined or nonjudicially disciplined. If one does the addition,
that leaves at least 2 6 0 investigations closed or whose ongoing status was unclear
as of April 2 0 0 6 , the time the report was published.
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One of the dog handlers,
Sergeant Michael Smith, was sentenced to six months in prison for using his un-
muzzled dog to torment prisoners. He maintained that he had been "following or-
ders to soften up prisoners for interrogation." He is also reported to have said that
"Soldiers are not supposed to be soft and cuddly," and he was not t h a t .
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Putting the System on Trial
4 0 5
As of April 1 0 , 2 0 0 6 , there was no evidence that the military has even
attempted to prosecute a single officer under the doctrine of command respon-
sibility for personally directed abuses or for those of their subordinates. In the de-
tailed report of all investigated abuses only five officers have been criminally
charged, none under the command responsibility doctrine. One Army captain was
charged with dereliction of duty for the deaths of two detainees in Afghanistan;
the charges were dropped. A Navy lieutenant was charged with assault and dere-
liction of duty in the death of a ghost detainee Manadel al-Jamadi; he was acquit-
ted. Three other officers, a lieutenant, a captain, and a major, were convicted at
court-martial of detainee abuse, either directly participating in abusing prisoners
or ordering their troops to do so; one received a sentence of only 45 days in prison,
another got two months, and the third was discharged with no prison sentence at
all. The military command goes soft on its errant officers by using nonjudicial
hearings and administrative reprimands that are usually meant for minor offenses
and carry weak sentences. This is so even in more than 70 cases of serious crimi-
nal abuse, including 10 homicides and 20 assault cases. Such leniency extends
also to CIA operatives in at least 10 abuse cases and 20 civilian contractors work-
ing for the CIA or the military. Thus, it becomes evident that detainee abuse was
widespread far beyond Abu Ghraib and further that there is a general failure of
command responsibility in any of the many cases of abuse and torture. (See the
Notes for access to the full report of the abuses and failures of prosecution of
guilty officers.
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)
H R W Goes up the Command Chain
After its detailed documentation of the widespread abuses perpetrated by soldiers
in MP and MI brigades, the CIA, and civilian contractors serving as interrogators,
the HRW goes nearly all the way up the chain of command in its accusation of
criminal responsibility for war crimes and torture:
While there are obviously steep political obstacles in the way of investigat-
ing a sitting defense secretary and other high-ranking officials, the nature
of crimes is so serious, and mounting evidence of wrongdoing is now so
voluminous, that it would be an abdication of responsibility for the United
States not to push this to the next level. Unless those who designed or
authorized the illegal policies are held to account, all the protestations of
"disgust" at the Abu Ghraib photos by President George W. Bush and oth-
ers will be meaningless. If there is no real accountability for these crimes,
for years to come the perpetrators of atrocities around the world will point
to their treatment of prisoners to deflect criticism of their own conduct.
Indeed, when a government as dominant and influential as the United
States openly defies laws against torture, it virtually invites others to do
the same. Washington's much-needed credibility as a proponent of human
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