P u t t i n g the System on Trial
3 9 5
in Cuba, but the report adds, "The use of dogs in interrogations to 'fear up' de-
tainees was utilized without proper authorization."
Once muzzled dogs were officially made available to induce fear in prisoners,
it did not take long to unofficially unmuzzle them in order to rev up the fear factor.
The Fay/Jones Report identifies a civilian interrogator [number 2 1 , a private CACI
employee] who used an unmuzzled dog during an interrogation and who yelled to
MPs where a dog was being used against a detainee to "take him home." To show
that the dogs could chew things up, that dog had just torn apart the detainee's
mattress. Another interrogator (Soldier 1 7 , 2nd MI Battalion) is accused of fail-
ing to report the improper use of dogs that he saw when the handler allowed the
dog to "go nuts" in scaring two juvenile detainees by sending an unmuzzled dog
into their cell. This interrogator also failed to report the dog handlers discussing
their competition to scare detainees to the point that they would defecate in their
pants. They claimed to have already made several detainees urinate on them-
selves when threatened by their dogs.
Naked Prisoners Are Dehumanized Prisoners
The use of nudity as an incentive to maintain detainee cooperation was imported
from prisons in Afghanistan and Guantanamo. When it came time to use that tac-
tic at Abu Ghraib, the Fay/Jones Report noted "the lines of authority and the proper
legal opinions blurred. They simply carried forward the use of nudity into the Iraqi
theater of operations. The use of clothing as an incentive [nudity] is significant in
that it likely contributed to an escalating 'de-humanization' of the detainees and set
the stage for additional and more severe abuses to occur [by the MPs]."
When Segregation Becomes Isolation
Although Lieutenant General Sanchez had approved the tactic of "isolation" over
extended periods of time for specific detainees, it appears that he really meant
"segregation" of them from fellow prisoners. However, at the Abu Ghraib hard
site, Sanchez was taken at his word, and many detainees were totally isolated and
completely removed from all outside contact, as in solitary confinement, "other
than the required care and feeding by MP guards and interrogation by MI." The
Fay/Jones Report notes that "These cells had limited or poor ventilation, no light,
and were often made excessively hot or cold. Use of isolation rooms in the Abu
Ghraib Hard Site was not closely controlled or monitored. Lacking proper train-
ing, clear guidance, or experience in this technique, both MP and MI stretched the
bounds into further abuse; sensory deprivation and unsafe or unhealthy living
conditions."
Assigning Blame: Officers, Ml, Interrogators, Analysts,
Interpreters, Translators, and Medics
The Fay/Jones Report concludes by declaring as culpable all those its investigation
found responsible for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib—fully twenty-seven indi-
396
The Lucifer Effect
viduals by name or identity code. What is significant to me is the number of peo-
ple who knew of the abuses, witnessed them, even participated in them in various
ways and did nothing to prevent, stop, or report them. They provided "social
proof" to the MPs that it was acceptable to continue doing whatever they wanted
to do. Their smiling, silent faces provided social support from the surrounding
network of the general interrogation team that gave thumbs up to abuses that
should have received reprimands. Once again, we see the evil of inaction facilitat-
ing the evil of action.
Medics and nurses often were guilty of not helping victims in distress, of ob-
serving brutality and looking the other way, and worse. They signed off on false
death certificates and lied about the nature of wounds and broken limbs. They
violated their Hippocratic oath and "sold their souls for dross," according to pro-
fessor of medicine and bioethics Steven H. Miles, in his book Oath Betrayed.
9
At the top of the Fay/Jones blame list is again the inept Colonel Pappas, with
twelve separate charges against him, and again Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan
(director of the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center). The following officers, not
on Taguba's hit list, are singled out by Fay and Jones as also culpable: Major David
Price (operations officer at that center), Major Michael Thompson (deputy opera-
tions officer at that center), and Captain Carolyn Wood, officer in charge of Inter-
rogation Control Element (ICE) at that center.
Before reviewing some of the reprehensible actions of the lower-level cast of
characters who played both directors and audience for the "Abu Ghraib Seven"
perpetrators, it is well to stop for a moment to consider the fate of Captain Carolyn
Wood. As leader of the 5 1 9 t h Military Intelligence Brigade when she was only a
lieutenant, Wood had an important role to play, but she misplayed it badly. At
Bagram Prison in Afghanistan, Wood authorized new, tougher interrogation
guidelines that somehow ended up in detainees being severely beaten; one was
killed, and a female detainee was sexually assaulted by three of her MI interroga-
tors. The Fay/Jones Report notes that "CPT Wood should have been aware of the
potential for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib," given her knowledge of prior abuses
by her MI soldiers. However, Wood received a Bronze Star for Valor after her duty
in Afghanistan and another Bronze Star, along with a promotion, following reve-
lation of the abuses in Abu G h r a i b .
1 0
If such leadership wins high distinctions,
what, then, constitutes bad leadership in that military corps?
Failures of bystander intervention by numerous observers of the abuse on
Tier 1A helped to perpetuate that abuse. Among those who were identified as wit-
nessing abuses and doing nothing about them were the following:
• Soldier 1 5 , MI interrogator, and Soldier 22 (who also heard MPs say they
were using detainees as "practice dummies" by striking them uncon-
scious)
• Soldier 2 4 , intelligence analyst (present during abuse of detainees in
many photographs)
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