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Step A. State the generic hazard (hazard statement or TLH)

airport construction

Step B. Identify specific hazards or components of the generic hazard

construction equipment

closed taxiways, etc.

Step C. Link specific hazards to specific consequence(s)

aircraft colliding with construction equipment (construction equipment)

aircraft taking off into the wrong taxiway (closed taxiways), etc.

The runway construction example discussed in 4.5.3 can be used to extend the discussion about the “dilemma of the two Ps” in Chapter 3 to hazard analysis: efficient and safe provision of service requires a constant balance between production goals and safety goals. In the case of the runway construction example, there is clearly an

efficiency (production) goal: maintaining regular aerodrome operations during a runway construction project. There is an equally clear safety (protection) goal: maintaining existing margins of safety of aerodrome operations during the runway construction project. In conducting the hazard analysis, two basic premises of safety management must be at the forefront of the analyses:

hazards are potential vulnerabilities inherent in socio-technical production systems. They are a necessary part of the system as a result of the capabilities they provide or can potentially provide to the system to deliver its services. Aviation workplaces therefore contain hazards which may not be cost-effective to address even when operations must continue; and

hazard identification is a wasted effort if restricted to the aftermath of rare occurrences where there is serious injury or significant damage. This is graphically portrayed in Figure 4-1, by connecting hazard identification to the practical drift discussed in Chapter 3.

FOURTH FUNDAMENTAL — DOCUMENTATION OF HAZARDS

Hazards typically perpetuate in a system and deliver their damaging potential mainly because of the absence or ineffectiveness of hazard identification. Lack of hazard identification is often the result of:

not thinking about operational conditions with the potential to unleash the damaging potential of hazards;

1. 
   not knowing about operational conditions with the potential to unleash the damaging potential of hazards
   

Figure 4-1. The focus of hazard identification

2. 
   unwillingness to consider or investigate operational conditions with the potential to unleash the damaging potential of hazards; and
   
3. 
   unwillingness to spend money to investigate operational conditions with the potential to unleash the damaging potential of hazards.
   
1. 
   Unawareness and unwillingness can be overcome only through knowledge. The formal documentation of hazards is therefore an essential requirement for hazard identification as well as a trait of mature safety management. Safety information (i.e. analysed raw data) and safety intelligence (i.e. safety information that has been corroborated and further analysed by adding context) combine to generate safety knowledge that must formally reside in the organization, not in the heads of individual members of the organization. A formal repository of safety knowledge is a safeguard against volatility of the information. In addition, an organization that has historical safety knowledge will make safety decisions based upon facts and not opinions.
   
2. 
   Appropriate documentation management regarding hazard identification is important as a formal procedure to translate raw operational safety information into hazard-related knowledge. Continuous compilation and formal management of this hazard-related knowledge becomes the “safety library” of an organization. In order to develop knowledge on hazards and thus build the “safety library”, it must be remembered that tracking and analysis of hazards are facilitated by standardizing:
   
   1. 
      definitions of terms used;
      
   2. 
      understanding of terms used;
      
   3. 
      validation of safety information collected;
      
   4. 
      reporting (i.e. what the organization expects);
      
   5. 
      measurement of safety information collected; and
      
   6. 
      management of safety information collected.
      

4.6.7 Figure 4-2 illustrates the process of hazard documentation. Hazards are constantly identified through reactive, proactive and predictive sources and underlying methods of safety information collection. Following collection and identification, hazard information is assessed in terms of consequences, and priorities and responsibilities regarding mitigation responses and strategies. All this information, including hazards, consequences, priorities, responsibilities and strategies must be collected into the “safety library” of the organization. The product of the “safety library” is not only the preservation of the corporate safety memory, but the safety library becomes a source of safety knowledge to be used as reference for organizational safety decision making. The safety knowledge incorporated in the “safety library” provides feedback and control reference against which to measure hazard analysis and consequence management, as well as the efficiency of the sources or methods of safety information collection. It also provides material for safety trend analyses, as well as for safety education purposes (safety bulletins, reports, seminars and the like)