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Economic hazards are the consequence of the socio-political environment within which operations related to the provision of services take place. Examples of economic hazards include:

growth;

recession; and

cost of material or equipment.

Safety management activities aimed at controlling safety risks will mostly, but not necessarily exclusively, address technical and natural hazards.
SECOND FUNDAMENTAL — HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
It has already been discussed that hazards are part of the fabric of any socio-technical production system. Therefore, the scope of hazards in aviation is wide. Examples of the scope of factors and processes that should be looked into when engaging in hazard identification include:

design factors, including equipment and task design;

procedures and operating practices, including their documentation and checklists, and their validation under actual operating conditions;

communications, including means, terminology and language;

personnel factors, such as company policies for recruitment, training, remuneration and allocation of resources;

organizational factors, such as the compatibility of production and safety goals, the allocation of resources, operating pressures and the corporate safety culture;

work environment factors, such as ambient noise and vibration, temperature, lighting and the availability of protective equipment and clothing;

regulatory oversight factors, including the applicability and enforceability of regulations; the certification of equipment, personnel and procedures; and the adequacy of oversight;

defences, including such factors as the provision of adequate detection and warning systems, the error tolerance of equipment and the resilience of equipment to errors and failures; and human performance, restricted to medical conditions and physical limitations.

As discussed in Chapter 3, hazards may be identified in the aftermath of actual safety events (accidents or incidents), or they may be identified through proactive and predictive processes aimed at identifying hazards before they precipitate safety events. There are a variety of sources of hazard identification. Some sources are internal to the organization while other sources are external to the organization.

Examples of the internal sources of hazard identification available to an organization include:

flight data analysis;

company voluntary reporting system;

safety surveys;

safety audits;

normal operations monitoring schemes;

trend analysis;

feedback from training; and

investigation and follow-up of incidents.

Examples of external sources of hazard identification available to an organization include:

accident reports;

State mandatory occurrence reporting system;

State voluntary reporting system;

State oversight audits; and

information exchange systems.

The fundamental point in this discussion is that no source or programme entirely replaces others, or makes other sources or programmes redundant or unnecessary. Hazard identification conducted under mature safety management practices resorts to a judicious combination of internal and external sources, reactive, proactive and predictive processes, and their underlying programmes.
All personnel in aviation organizations should receive the appropriate safety management training, at a level commensurate with their responsibilities, so that everybody in the organization is prepared and able to identify and report hazards. From this perspective, hazard identification and reporting are everybody’s responsibility. However, organizations must have designated personnel with the exclusive charge of hazard identification and analysis. This would normally be the personnel assigned to the safety services office, discussed in Chapter 8. Therefore, broadening the previous perspective, in aviation organizations, hazard identification is everybody’s responsibility, but accountability for hazard identification lies with dedicated safety personnel.
How hazards are identified will depend on the resources and constraints of each particular organization. Some organizations will deploy comprehensive, technology-intensive hazard identification programmes. Other organizations will deploy modest hazard identification programmes better suited to their size and the complexity of their operations. Nevertheless, hazard identification, regardless of implementation, complexity and size, must be a formal process, clearly described in the organization’s safety documentation. Ad hoc hazard identification is an unacceptable safety management practice.
Under mature safety management practices, hazard identification is a continuous, ongoing, daily activity. It never stops or rests. It is an integral part of the organizational processes aimed at delivering the services that the organization is in business to deliver. Nevertheless, there are three specific conditions under which special attention to hazard identification is warranted. These three conditions should trigger more in-depth and far-reaching hazard identification activities and include:

any time the organization experiences an unexplained increase in safety-related events or regulatory infractions;

any time major operational changes are foreseen, including changes to key personnel or other major equipment or systems; and

before and during periods of significant organizational change, including rapid growth or contraction, corporate mergers, acquisitions or downsizing.

THIRD FUNDAMENTAL — HAZARD ANALYSIS

Hazard identification is a wasted exercise unless safety information is extracted from the data collected. The first step in developing safety information is hazard analysis.

Hazard analysis is, in essence, a three-step process: