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Iraqi formation of a new gov’t will take a long time
Meghan L. O'Sullivan (Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) March, 2010 “ After Iraq's Election, the Real Fight” http://www.cfr.org/publication/21612/after_iraqs_election_the_real_fight.html
There are several reasons that the process of forming a government is likely to be prolonged. The first is a positive development: the changing nature of Iraq's political parties. The once-dominant Shiite and Kurdish parties have fractured, and even Iraqis who prefer to vote for a party matching their sectarian or ethnic affiliation will have real choices on the ballot. This new fluidity bodes well for the emergence of non-sectarian politics, and it suggests that Sunday's vote will be split by a number of parties, all of which will want the chance to put forward the prime minister. A second and more troubling factor is likely confusion over the rules Iraqis must use to form their new government. As a political adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, I helped Iraqi leaders as they wrote their interim constitution in 2004, and I was struck by how vehemently they opposed the notion of designating particular jobs for members of particular sectarian or ethnic communities. Instead, in that document and in the permanent constitution, they created "transitional provisions" mandating that a three-person presidency council be elected by a two-thirds vote in parliament. This arrangement provided leverage to minorities and led to more moderate leaders. In practice, the presidency council and prime minister were put forward as a package -- the result of complicated negotiations involving multiple political parties. These complex provisions were the Iraqis' way of ensuring that all major groups were represented, without explicitly saddling the constitution with sectarian and ethnic politics.
Troops Key to Friendly Iraq Gov’t
Troops are key to maintain pressure on the Maliki government – key to stop Iraqi belligerence
Michael Schwartz (Professor of Sociology and Faculty Director of the Undergraduate College of Global Studies at Stony Brook University) March 2010 “Will US troops leave Iraq in 2011?” http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/05/26-1
Another sign that the Obama administration intends to maintain a significant military presence in Iraq after 2011 is the continued insistence that Iraq "democracy" must be guaranteed. In "Washington speak," this means that the government of Iraq must be an ally of the United States, a condition that has been iterated and reiterated by all factions (GOP and Democrat) in Washington, since the original invasion. Given the increasing unwillingness of the Maliki administration to follow US dictates (for example, on oil contracts, on relations with Iran, and on relations with Anbar and other Sunni provinces), the removal of troops would allow Maliki even more leeway to pursue policies unacceptable to Washington. Thus, even if Maliki succeeds himself in the Premiership, the US may need troops to keep the pressure on him. If he does not succeed himself, then the likely alternate choices are far more explicit in their antagonism to integration of Iraq into the US sphere of interest. (Even Iyad Allawi -- the leader of the major contender for a parliamentary plurality -- who was once a US client premier, has voiced stronger and stronger opposition to tight relations with the US.). The Obama administration would then be left with the unacceptable prospect that withdrawal would result in Iraq adopting a posture not unlike Iran's with regard to US presence and influence in the Middle East.
Withdrawal Collapses the Gov’t
Withdrawal collapses the Iraqi government
Ryan Mauro (national security advisor to the Christian Action Network, and an intelligence analyst with the Asymmetrical Warfare and Intelligence Center (AWIC)). “The Consequences of Withdrawal from Iraq.” 5/7/2007 http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq
Withdrawal would lead to a collapse of the elected Iraqi government, who all would then have to flee outside the region or be executed by terrorists. All the work done to bring about elections and representation for all the people of Iraq would vanish. In southern Iraq, the “Islamization” process would move full throttle, stripping away individual rights, particularly that of women. As Islamic extremist rule increases, and Iran grows more powerful, a radical Shiite state will be created that will oppress not only its own citizens, but seek to oppress others. Sectarian violence will spiral out of control, killing millions of Iraqis, both Sunni and Shia. Even more will be forced to flee their homes as radical militias seek to create homogenous regions. Shiite terrorist groups like Hezbollah will likely find safe haven and support. Sunni territory will become home to an assortment of terrorist organizations that will use it as a base to fund and plan attacks on the United States and nearby moderate Muslim nations. Al-Qaeda, who will certainly not hesitate to attack us again, will have access to safe harbor, recruits, and oil revenue. The Kurds of northern Iraq will likely declare independence, but will probably see a tremendous amount of violence and despair. Turkey will invade northern Iraq to stop the emergence of a Kurdish state, leading to yet another war. Iran will almost certainly join in.
Withdrawal causes regime complacency – disincentivizes internal political reform
Kenneth M. Pollack (Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution. From 1995 to 1996 and 1999 to 2001, he served as Director for Persian Gulf
Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council) 2003 “ Securing the Gulf “
On the other hand, the mere fact that the Persian Gulf states are so enamored of this strategy ought to give American planners pause. With the exception of Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion, most of these countries have shown a distressing determination over the years to ignore their problems -both external and internal -- rather than confront them. Although returning to a mostly over-thehorizon presence could provide the Persian Gulf states with the leeway they need to push through reforms, it is equally likely that they will see the withdrawal of U.S. forces as a panacea for all their problems and decide that internal reforms are therefore unnecessary. A reduced U.S. military and political presence, in turn, would weaken Washington's ability to press its local allies to make the tough choices they need to for their own long-term well-being
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