30
United States
The Economist
September 5th 2020
2
there to “domestic terror”. Earlier, when
asked about the white teenager charged
with killing two protesters and injuring an-
other in Kenosha, who has become a cause
célèbre among some conservative media
hosts, the president suggested he had acted
in self-defence.
Promises to restore law and order might
seem more persuasive coming from an in-
surgent outsider than from an incumbent
president. When Mr Trump took office in
2017, he pledged “I alone can fix it,” and
promised an end to “American carnage” in
his inaugural address. Now he argues that
the explosion of urban violence under his
administration is proof of Democratic mis-
management and the need for him to have
a second term. Some accept the argument.
According to a poll released by YouGov on
August 28th, 32% of adults believe re-elect-
ing Mr Trump would make the country saf-
er (though a plurality, 43%, think he would
make it less safe).
Can such a strategy work? Some com-
mentators, perhaps scarred by the last con-
test where Hillary Clinton seemed to be the
heavy favourite throughout, already spy a
polling bounce for Mr Trump. At least in the
national polls, the purported bounce looks
quite dainty. His vote share has increased
by one percentage point, from 45% on June
17th to 46% in
The Economist
’s average of
presidential-election polls. Some of that
bump came in the week after the party con-
vention—when incumbents usually enjoy
a real, if ephemeral, boost in support dur-
ing the post-coronation bliss.
Previous racial unrest has not been es-
pecially kind to the president. According to
our maths, Mr Trump experienced the
worst three weeks of the campaign after
George Floyd was killed by police in Minne-
sota on May 25th. His deficit in the polls
ballooned then from seven points to 11
points in a relatively short span of time.
It is still too early to determine how
large Mr Trump’s national bounce will ulti-
mately be, or whether it will subside. So far,
the president’s average support over the
course of the election has been both low
and the most stable on record. And since
the national election will not be decided by
the popular vote but by the electoral col-
lege, if he ekes out a victory again this time,
it is likely to come by a similar route.
At the state level, our election model-
ling finds Mr Trump’s position in the Mid-
west has improved relative to his June low.
Whereas he was down 11points in Michigan
two months ago, he is down just six now; in
Wisconsin, an 11-point hole is now a six-
point one; and the president is down just
five points in Pennsylvania, up from nine
earlier this year. These are still significant
deficits, but the trend is certainly looking
up for Republicans.
Mr Franklin, the Wisconsin pollster, is
also cautious. Older voters are dismayed by
the president’s handling of covid-19. Many
disapprove of his approach to race rela-
tions, although they still trust him on the
economy. For weeks, polls have shown
public support for Black Lives Matter to be
slipping. In Wisconsin, approval peaked at
61% in June before falling to 48% in August.
It may be even lower now. So far, however,
Mr Franklin has seen no evidence of that
shift affecting overall support for either Mr
Biden or Mr Trump.
The foot soldiers feel the strain. “We’re
ground zero, we’re under the gun,” says
Terry Dittrich, the Republican chairman in
neighbouring Waukesha County—the bell-
wether county for election-night pundits.
Should Mr Trump fall short here, “the rest
of the state has to make up for that”. Mr Dit-
trich admits there has been a wobble of
late. The Republican Party typically expects
to scoop 65-70% of votes in his county. In
the midterms, in 2018, the Democrats’ vic-
torious candidate for Senate, Tammy Bald-
win—an openly gay war hero—scooped a
heady 38% support in Waukesha, points
out Matt Mareno, the Democrats’ party
chairman in the county. If Mr Biden could
match her result, then he predicts “it’s
game over” in the state.
So far, Republicans have cheered the
new suburban strategy. “The more chaos
and anarchy and vandalism and violence
reigns, the better it is for the very clear
choice on who’s best on public safety and
law and order,” said Kellyanne Conway, a
close adviser to the president, in a televi-
sion interview. Mr Dittrich also applauds
the new approach. He says he has received
a surge of texts, “general feedback” and
(unspecified) polling evidence in the past
week to suggest voters are startled by the
urban violence and are flocking back to Mr
Trump. Kathy Broghammer, the Republi-
can party chairwoman in Ozaukee County,
is even more enthusiastic, pointing to a
surge in interest among Republican volun-
teers because of “the threatening feeling
we see in Kenosha”. “We love our law and
order,” she says. “People are saying, by golly
I’m gonna roar.”
7
T
here’s a reason
that the period from
Labor Day to election day is consid-
ered the home straight in a presidential
contest. Robert Erikson and Christopher
Wlezien, two political scientists at Co-
lumbia University and the University of
Texas at Austin, have studied the history
of American election-polling since 1952
and found that the leader in the polls one
week after the second party convention
has always won the popular vote. Two
candidates have trailed in the polls
around Labour Day, then won in the
electoral college: George W. Bush in 2000
and Donald Trump in 2016. In both cases
the polls were much tighter than they are
now. Joe Biden therefore has past perfor-
mance on his side.
Mr Trump’s odds have improved in
betting markets, suggesting that many
think the combination of the Republican
National Convention and the protests in
Portland, Kenosha and elsewhere are
working in his favour. That in turn sug-
gests they expect a lot more volatility in
the polls than has ever been seen before.
Going back to 1948, how wildly polls
have changed in the first seven months
of the election cycle helps explain how
much they vary in the last three. The
standard deviation of the average of
national polls—a measure of how much
they jump around from day to day—over
the first two-thirds of the election cycle
has explained 50% of the variance in the
last third (a perfect relationship would be
100%). Polls in the last third of the cam-
paign have tended to be about 40% as
volatile as the first two.
Mr Trump’s poll numbers have been
low and stable. Mr Biden’s numbers have
moved with a historically low standard-
deviation of 0.9 percentage points so far.
Mr Trump is a known quantity. Few
voters are yet to make up their minds
about him and political polarisation has
decreased the share of true swing voters
in the electorate. A bet on volatility in the
polls is therefore highly contrarian.
History is on the side of the herd.
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