|
A new wave of anti-western Chinese nationalism has emerged, instigated by new communication technology
Shen 10 (Simon, associate professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Hong Kong Institute of Education, When China Plugged In: Structural Origins of Online Chinese Nationalism, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/06_china_internet_shen.aspx) MAH
Indeed, the Chinese authorities have actually been relatively liberal in allowing online debate and discussion that can be very critical of government policy and action. But rather than creating a new political “space” where the promotion of liberalism flourishes, this new “space” has tended to be primarily a forum for the discussion of national interests and the promotion of what might bluntly be called “nationalism”. This is not to say that there is a clear and coherent expression of ideology or indeed a clear and coherent set of policy preferences and options, but simply that there is a dominant sentiment that defending national interests in the face of a largely hostile international environment should be the government’s main task – and that in some ways the government is not fulfilling this task effectively. Crucially, we argue that there is not a single voice, a single response and a single demand. Rather, there are different responses on a case-by-case level, and the purpose of this book as a whole is to tease these out by the provision of an empirically rich set of case studies. Furthermore, there are also different voices within individual case studies, and this will be a key component of the individual chapters. These features alone are sufficient to convince ourselves against seeing the online Chinese nationalists as a monolithic group. Instead, no matter how patriotic they appear to be, as Peter Hays Gries concludes, “China’s cyber-nationalists, armed with PCs and cell phones, are increasingly contesting party claims to nationalist legitimacy.”[24] In a departure from the first wave of the nationalist movement, which was confined to debates by (public) intellectuals of numerous incidents, the “second wave” of online nationalism has emerged from BBS groups such as the Strong Nation Forum (Qianguo Luntan). The grass-roots version of nationalism, while being equally anti-Western, has at the same time also challenged the official propaganda. Contemporary online Chinese nationalism was first embarked upon in 1999 after the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; the precedent of the Strong Nation Forum was exactly the “BBS bulletin forum Protesting Against the Violence of NATO”. The second wave can be regarded as building momentum in 2005, when the first online nationalistic campaign was mobilized into physical movements against Japan. As various communicative theorists argue, speedy communication has been crucial for the creation of this new form of Web 2.0 nationalism, showing that the netizens can be anti-Western on one hand while still being critical of the party-state.[25] As Shih-Diing Liu has commented, such nationalism is different from the officially propagandized nationalism; it is bottom-up in nature and has emerged from the people (renmin minzu zhuyi)
Political Capital K/T Agenda
Hu’s low political capital ensures that his own agenda won’t be passed because of concessions.
Yongnian 9 (Zheng, Professor of Chinese Culture, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political IMplications”, China: an International Journal, Volume 7 Number 1 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/china/v007/7.1.zheng.html) MKB
The political capital of the central leadership figure in Chinese politics since the founding of the PRC in 1949 has been diminishing with each generation.20 Mao ruled like a God, and Deng Xiaoping, while nowhere near as autocratic as Mao, drew on a long history as a revolutionary and had massive credibility in the Party and with the public.21 Conversely, Jiang Zemin [End Page 8] took years to be taken seriously, while Hu Jintao is the weakest compared with Mao, Deng or Jiang.22 The farewell to the strong-man politics has pushed forward China's leadership structure in an increasingly power-sharing direction that facilitates intra-party consultations, bargaining or even polls in secret behind closed doors. The weaker the top leader is, the more he will rely on "collective decision-making" (jiti juece) when appointing successors and enacting national strategies. Certain informal rules and institutions based on balance of power among different factions and restriction of top leaders' power have come into being in China's elite politics, ensuring that candidateship of future successors is not solely the reflection of the incumbent top leader's own will, but an outcome of compromises among different groups and one step further, the result of polls in a limited range. This way of producing future leadership guarantees policy continuation and stability while forestalls individual dictatorship. As the Party chooses rather than the public, future leaders, no matter who they are, will be committed to preserving the CPC power and represent the extensive interest of different groups inside the Party instead of one faction.
Hu’s increased popularity increases his political capital and allows him to pursue his agenda.
News Max 5 (“China’s Grip on Dissidents Tightening, Dimming Tiananmen Square Legacy”, Newsmax.com, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/6/3/145733.shtml) MKB
Hu has also shown little patience for public dissatisfaction, said David Zweig, director of the Hong Kong-based Center on China's Transnational Relations. "He certainly has not shown himself to be the liberal that people thought he would be," Zweig said. "He has responded quite forcefully to challenges to the party's authority. They are very nervous about social unrest. They want to hold on tight to their power." Aside from favoring one-party rule, Hu's agenda is unclear. "The difference between Jiang and Hu is that Hu is far more popular than Jiang among the Chinese public," said Cheng Li, a professor of political science at Hamilton College in New York. "Hu has more political capital. The message is a mixed one. Hu wants to promote political reforms, as he states, but these political reforms should not be out of control."
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
