From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

Party of Malaya and its radio broadcasts from China. It read, “For years China
instigated and helped guerrilla insurgency in Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia.
Many Asean leaders have put these unfortunate events behind them.
Unfortunately, a residue of China’s past policies continues to trouble relations
between China and Asean.”
When we resumed talks that afternoon, I referred to this. Their protocol had
said that this part was unacceptable and had to be left out if the speech was to be
delivered, otherwise there would be no speeches. This was most unusual. I had
already given copies to the Singapore press and they would have released the
speech to foreign correspondents, so it was not possible to delete anything. Zhao
replied that the Chinese people would not forgive him if I delivered this speech

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and he did not respond to some of the points made by me. He did not want to
turn “a grand and friendly banquet” held in my honour into an occasion for a
hard exchange of words which would have an adverse international effect. There
was no question of wanting to tell me what I should not say at the banquet; he
was merely suggesting that both sides cancel the speeches. If my views were
nevertheless made known to the public, he would understand. I agreed to no
speeches.
He launched into the Chinese view of Soviet global strategy. He assured me
that China would do its part to allay the suspicions and fears of Malaysia and
Indonesia towards China. Soviet objectives were to control oil resources and sea
lanes, including the Straits of Malacca, in order to strangle Japan and Western
Europe, and to some extent the United States; the collaboration between the
Soviet Union and Vietnam was not one of fortuitous expediency but a strategic
collaboration. He said Malaysia and Indonesia could never win over Vietnam
away from the Soviet Union unless either Vietnam renounced regional
hegemony, in which case it would not need the Soviet Union, or the Soviet
Union renounced global hegemony, in which case it would not need Vietnam.
As for party-to-party relations, it was a historical problem of a global nature
and China was sincerely making efforts as far as possible so that it would not
affect its relations with Asean countries. The problem would take some time to
solve. He would say formally to me that China would solve the problem, but not
overnight.
The overseas Chinese question was another problem left over from history.
China was not in favour of dual nationality and had encouraged Chinese living
abroad to take up the nationality of their host country. But if ethnic Chinese
abroad remained Chinese nationals, China could not cease to have contact with
them. As for the contributions made by ethnic Chinese abroad to China’s
modernisation, this did not represent the policy of the government of the
People’s Republic of China. China would make an effort to reduce the suspicion
of other countries over the question of overseas Chinese. However, both sides
should be concerned with more important issues than the policy of China
towards overseas Chinese. On Cambodia, I would be meeting Deng Xiaoping,
who would deal with all the points I would wish to raise; in other words, Deng
was the final authority.
The next morning I met Deng Xiaoping for over two hours in a different
room in the Great Hall of the People. He looked lively and vigorous. He had
been well-briefed and did most of the talking. He said my talks with Zhao had

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gone well, adding that General Ne Win also had not delivered a speech at the
banquet in his honour at the Great Hall of the People, but had “good talks” with
the Chinese. This was his reassurance that the cancellation of my speech would
make no difference to the outcome of our talks.
Deng argued that China was a huge country with a large population. It did
not need the resources of other countries. It was preoccupied with the problem of
uplifting its people out of poverty and backwardness, “a great undertaking that
might take half a century”. China was too populous. There were just too many
things to do. He hoped I would explain China’s “genuine and clear” position to
Indonesia and Malaysia. China wanted to see a strong Asean, “the stronger, the
better”. China had a “global strategy” in handling its relations with Asean
countries, the United States, Japan and Western Europe. He fully understood
Singapore’s position regarding establishing diplomatic relations with China, that
we would do so after Indonesia. Singapore’s calculations were correct and in
conformity with Singapore’s “strategic considerations”.
On Cambodia, he said, there were two basic points that must be met: first, a
political settlement of the Cambodian question must be based on Vietnamese
withdrawal from Cambodia, otherwise there was nothing to talk about; second,
there had to be unity among all resistance forces inside Cambodia. The Khmer
Rouge was willing to unite with other resistance forces; it was prepared to accept
Sihanouk or, if Sihanouk was not willing, Son Sann as head of state. But neither
was willing, I said. He stressed there was no alliance to speak of without the
Khmer Rouge forces. Pol Pot’s policies were wrong, but any political settlement
in Cambodia must be based on “prevailing realities”.
One such reality, I said, was that except for the PRC the rest of the world
believed that Pol Pot was murderous and mad, and Sihanouk and Son Sann were
right in not working with the Khmer Rouge. Thailand and Singapore were in
danger of being seen as stooges of China for supporting the DK (Democratic
Kampuchea) government’s seat in the UN.
In my view, two major problems had to be solved: first, international
representation at the UN, because a vacant seat would eventually be filled by
Heng Samrin; second, how to intensify resistance fighting in Cambodia. Much
of the fighting was by the Khmer Rouge, but this must not be forever. Malaysia
and Indonesia must be satisfied that continued support of the DK government
would not lead to the restoration of China’s influence in Cambodia. Both
believed Vietnam’s argument that Asean’s actions helped China to weaken
Vietnam and would allow China to increase its influence in Southeast Asia.

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President Suharto had told me that in 10 years China could create great problems
for the region.
Instead of answering my points, Deng asked how the Malaysians and
Indonesians could drive the Vietnamese out of Cambodia. I replied that neither
was troubled by the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; they believed a strong
Vietnam could oppose any southward expansion by China. The problem was one
of perspectives. The question was not what China intended to do, but what China
was capable of doing, and whether it was in China’s interest. Malaysia and
Indonesia saw China as the supporter of communist forces that had troubled
them for the last 30 years.
Deng repeatedly asked me to play a role in promoting an alliance between
the Cambodian resistance groups. China had built a “palace-like residence” for
Sihanouk in Beijing. There was friendship between him and Sihanouk, but they
deliberately avoided talking politics. I recapitulated his position: first, that China
would support and encourage the establishment of a non-communist force to
resist the Vietnamese; second, that China would accept the emergence of an
independent Kampuchean government after a Vietnamese withdrawal from
Cambodia, even though China did not have any hold on such a government. He
confirmed it. At a press conference in Beijing with foreign correspondents I
made these two points. Their reports were never contradicted by the Chinese.
Deng asked me to tell my Asean neighbours that they should not believe that
any power which was communist would naturally have good relations with
China. The Soviet Union was the biggest threat and one needed to have a good
and clear understanding of the damaging effects of its global policy. He asked
rhetorically, what would Indonesia gain by thwarting China’s policy of opposing
Soviet global strategy? Making concessions to Malaysia and Indonesia would
not solve the problem, because they had the wrong strategic assessments.
On that note, we went to lunch where they served a Chinese delicacy, the
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