SOVIET RULE AND THE DELINEATION OF BORDERS 101
forces of the
basmachi and peasant settlers could turn the tide and take full control
of the valley. During the same fall they proclaimed the creation of a Provisional
Autonomous Government of the Ferghana Valley.
However, by this time the military initiative wash passing into the Bolsheviks’
hands. Their forces were now much better equipped than formerly, thanks to their
ability to run the blockade between central Russia and Turkestan. Active combat
units deployed to the Ferghana Valley, including a Volga Tatar Rifle Brigade, en-
abled them to conduct a series of large-scale operations against the
kurbashis and
the Peasant Army. In January 1920, Mullah Ergash’s faction met its Waterloo in
the vicinity of the Bachkir fort in western Ferghana. At the same time, the seizure
of the fort at Gulcha led to the capture not only of the leadership of the Peasant
Army but of Monstrov himself. In February and March the Red Army attacked the
squads of Madaminbek, Kurshirmat, and Hol-Hodja in the central region of the
Ferghana Valley. The Reds went on to occupy major settlements in the foothills,
driving the
basmachi into the mountains and cutting off their communications with
the flatlands, on which they had depended for food and equipment.
Following up on their successes in the field, the Bolsheviks approached selected
kurbashis
with proposals to surrender and join the victors. This was part of a new
strategy which the Turkestan Commission had brought from Moscow and which the
Bolsheviks’ new leaders in Tashkent announced in 1919.
14
The core of this strategy
was to enlist local forces in the Bolsheviks’ ranks. Within the Communist Party
they created a Regional Muslim Bureau headed by Turar Ryskulov, and Party cells
that included many Muslim public figures and supporters of reforms. They adopted
resolutions condemning the actions of the “Armenian instigators,” and orders were
given to disarm the Armenian units. The Muslim Bureau branded
basmachi as
“desperate peasants” but offered amnesty to members of the resistance. In the fall
of 1919 a Muslim Communist named Nizamiddin Hodjaev was appointed head of
the Ferghana Revcom. He actively supported negotiating with the rebels and ending
the confiscation of corn, which were main sources of rural animosity toward the
authorities. He also advocated that sharia courts be legalized. Influential Muslim
clergymen were invited to participate
in the negotiations with the kurbashis.
The new policy gained even more momentum with the election of Ryskulov,
in January 1920, to the post of chairman of the authoritative Central Executive
Committee of the Communist Party in Turkestan. This culminated in the signing on
March 6, 1920 in Old Margilan of a treaty with Madaminbek, who bound himself
“to defend the Soviet government from its enemies in every possible way.” In return,
the Bolsheviks promised to preserve the people’s right to live under the laws of
Islam. Indeed, the treaty states explicitly that “The Soviet government will preserve
the principles of sharia law while protecting the interests of working people in
Turkestan. It grants the Muslim population the right to live according to this sharia
law as it relates to the local conditions and traditions of the population.”
15
Finally,
the
kurbashi cavalry were incorporated as combat units of the red Army.
Madaminbek was killed in May 1920, while negotiating to surrender. In the
102 ABASHIN, K.
ABDULLAEV, R. ABDULLAEV, KOICHIEV
wake of this, Kurshirmat and Hol-Hodja, who also had thought of surrender, now
declared the creation of an Islamic state of Turkestan and vowed to continue the
struggle against the Bolsheviks. The rebels elected Kurshirmat as their head. At the
same time Mikhail Frunze and Valerian Kuibyshev, the most powerful members of
the Turkestan Commission, sidelined Ryskulov and his supporters on the Muslim
Bureau and rewrote many of the agreements with the
kurbashis. This caused a
number of former
kurbashis to quit the Red Army and rejoin the resistance move-
ment. Frunze ordered severe measures against all who opposed the Soviets. The
Reds should “cease all negotiations with the gang leaders. . . . All members of the
basmachi
gangs should be considered robbers and enemies of the people and must
be executed on the spot. And persons or groups found guilty of aiding the
basmachi
will be subject to the most severe punishment under the laws of war.”
16
Fighting flared up once again during the summer of 1920, although by now the
rebel forces were much weaker and numbered not more than 6,000 fighters in total.
Attacks on the
kurbashis gained new momentum during the fall. Newly reinforced
Red Army regulars, now backed by artillery and even aircraft, defeated the
kurbashis
in central and eastern Ferghana, which left practically the entire valley under the
Soviets’ control. Operations continued against separate large detachments late in
1921 and early in 1922, but these were purely local affairs.
In conclusion, let us ask about the loss of lives in this war and the “price” that
society paid during this period of transition. The Ferghana Valley suffered more
heavily than practically any other area of Central Asia. Obviously, nobody at the
time was tallying the exact number of victims. Various documents of the time of-
fer their versions of the totals; these figures cannot be substantiated, but we can
arrive at tentative numbers on the losses by comparing relatively reliable data on
the population of the Ferghana province in 1914 and again in 1926. The two extant
census figures for 1914 are 2,190,424 and 2,130,700, the difference between them
a modest 60,000.
17
If we assume an annual natural increase in population of 1.4
percent, then the population of the Ferghana province by 1926 should have been on
the order of 2,588,116 or 2,482,788. However, the actual census for 1926 reported
a total of only 2,037,484.
18
Over the intervening twelve-year-period, the missing
number somewhere between 550,632 and 445,304 people. This figure includes
all the unborn for the period, as well as those who died prematurely as a result of
starvation, disease, or in combat operations, as well as those who simply left the
area. Between 1916 and 1922 the birth rate almost certainly declined. So, if we
reduce the annual rate of increase from 1.4 percent to 1 percent, then the shortfall
falls to somewhere between 430,740 and 339,670 people. Thus, one may reasonably
conclude that between a third and a half million people perished in the war.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: