Social and Political Developments
Central Asia’s socio-political development has always included an element of “clan
politics” based on tribal, sub-ethnic, and local-territorial groupings.
1
Such politics
flourished especially in the Ferghana Valley. Indeed, during Khrushchev’s rule the
Ferghana political elite controlled virtually all political and economic sectors of the
three Ferghana republics: Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
The prevalence of Ferghana natives in Uzbekistan’s politics began in the time of
Yuldash Akhunbabaev, who chaired the national government from 1925 to 1943.
2
From 1950 to 1955 Ferghana native Amin Niyazov was first secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, having previously served on
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan and as speaker of the Uzbek
parliament. Between 1953 and 1955 Ferghanan Usman Iusupov, formerly First
Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party and Soviet minister of cotton, chaired
Uzbekistan’s Council of Ministers.
3
Yadgar Nasridinov from Kokand was vice
chairman of Uzbekistan’s Council of Ministers (1955–59) and then chaired the
Presidium of the Supreme Council of the republic (1959–70). Hadicha Sulaimonova
from Andijan served as Uzbekistan’s minister of justice (1956–58) and as minister
of Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court (1964–65).
Until the end of the Soviet period in Uzbekistan, a number of senior Party and
governmental posts at the national level were held either by people born in the
Ferghana Valley (e.g., I.B. Usmanhodzhaev from Ferghana, P.K. Habibullaev from
THE KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV ERAS 141
Andijan), or by people closely connected with the valley through professional and
personal ties (e.g., N.A. Mukhitdinov had worked in Namangan, S.K. Damalov in
Margilan and Ferghana).
In these years Ferghana Valley natives exercised similar authority in Tajikistan.
From 1946 to 1956 Ferghana native Bobojon Gafurov was First Secretary of the
Communist Party of Tajikistan, to be followed by another Ferghana native, Tur-
sun Ulzhabaev, who served from 1956 to 1961. Ulzhabaev’s tenure encompassed
nearly the entire turbulent period of economic development. However, his career
ended when he became a victim of Khrushchev’s politically driven program to set
and fulfill seemingly impossible goals for the cotton harvest. This strikingly pre-
figured the so-called Cotton Affair,
4
which rocked Uzbekistan from 1983 to 1987.
But it should be noted that it was Ulzhabaev who laid the economic foundations
for stable development in the northern (Ferghana) region of Tajikistan. In 1961
Ulzhabaev was replaced by Jabbor Rasulov, also from the Ferghana Valley, who
ruled the republic not only during Khrushchev’s reign, but also through nearly all
of the Brezhnev period, until 1982.
After 1961 Rasulov entered Tajikistan’s national political leadership. It is curi-
ous to note that even though the Brezhnev period witnessed the modernization
of hundreds of existing factories, it began with a decline in factory construction.
The new policy probably had its source in the great emphasis that both Moscow
and Dushanbe placed at this time on mechanizing cotton production and the agro-
industrial complex. In post-Soviet years Rasulov was to be harshly criticized for
these policies on the grounds that he shifted Tajikistan’s economy from industry
to agro-industry, which was by then considered regressive.
The 1960s were a kind of golden age for the Ferghana elites, as they made
use of strong support from Moscow to foster development in their region. As one
expert pointed out, “Since the 1940s, the key posts in [Tajikistan] have been held
by natives of the northern Leninabad region . . . They comprised the substance
and leadership of the party apparatus
5
. . . The north supplied Tajikistan’s ruling
elite.”
6
This can be observed in more recent periods as well, when such prominent
political figures as R. Nabiev, A. Abdullajanov, J. Karimov, A. Samad, S. Turaev,
M. Hudayberdiyev, and others all emerged from Ferghana.
The Tajik scholar S. Olimova called attention to a phenomenon characteristic
of all eastern societies, but which is especially pronounced in Tajikistan. Even an
influential leader who may have toiled loyally and effectively in the country’s sole
political party can be readily tarred with the brush of representing not “our” ethno-
regional group but “someone else’s.”
7
This is equally characteristic of Kyrgyzstan
and, to some extent, of Uzbekistan.
From 1950 to 1961, the Ferghana Valley native Ishak Razzakov served as First
Secretary of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, having served previously as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In general, the valley was well-represented
in the Kyrgyz leadership until the end of the Soviet period. Turabay Kulata, from
Kyzyl-Kiya, served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Kyr-
142 NAZAROV, SHOZIMOV
gyzstan; Abdy Suerkulov from Osh was Second Secretary of the Party from 1949
to 1959 and, concurrently chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Soviet (1947–50) and
minister of trade (1959–69). Ahmatbek Suyumbaev, who was from Kant but had
worked for a long time in Osh, held the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of Kyrgyzstan from 1968 to 1978. Osh native Absamat Masaliev served as mayor
of Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Frunze (now Bishkek), from 1970 to the 1980s, and as
Secretary and First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party, as well as Chairman
of the Supreme Soviet. Mirza Kaparov from the Uzgen region led the Republic’s
Komsomol from 1968 to 1972. Dzhumgalbek Amanbaev, who was originally from
Naryn but lived and worked for many years in Osh, was the last first Secretary of
the Kyrgyz Communist Party. Usen Sydykov, from Jalalabad, was first vice chair-
man of the Council of Ministers, chair of the State Agricultural Committee, and
then state counselor from 1988 to 1990; and Zulumbek Dzhamashev, also from
Jalalabad, chaired the republic’s Supreme Court from 1974 to 1990. Mamadiyar
Isabaev, from Nookat, was a member of the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan from
1987 to 1991. Finally, Madan Alymbekov, from Osh served as minister of justice
and chaired the republic’s Supreme Court.
Kyrgyz scholars A. Ayazbekov and E. Nogoibaeva note that “Until 1991, the
Kyrgyz elite was imitative in character, insofar as it developed first under the (par-
tial) influence of Kokand, then of the Russian Empire and, finally, of the Soviet
state. . . . For nearly a century the fundamental design of Kyrgyzstan’s political
culture was Soviet, its main features being the supremacy of one political party
and an austere hierarchical system for training elites, which involved recruitment
within a closed system.”
8
The same can be said of the Tajik elite and, to some
extent, of the Uzbek elite.
It is important to point out that under Khrushchev and Brezhnev connections
between the Communist Party’s first secretaries in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with
Moscow were largely mediated by Uzbekistan. This dependence of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan on Tashkent, which existed from the final Khrushchev years through
the entire Brezhnev period, was due to the strength of Tashkent’s voice in Moscow.
Out of all the Party first secretaries from Central Asia, only Uzbekistan’s sat in the
highest councils in Moscow. This person was Sharaf Rashidov, who from 1959
to 1983 was a “candidate member” of the Politburo of the Communist Party of
the USSR. As Khrushchev’s power eroded and Brezhnev worked to consolidate
his rule, Rashidov’s powers steadily increased. Rashidov was born in the Dzhizak
region but had extensive personal links with the Ferghana Valley.
Rashidov’s close personal ties with Brezhnev allowed him to control the Central
Asian republics. This led to a situation in which Jabbor Rasulov in Tajikistan and
Turdakun Usubaliev, the leader of Kyrgyzstan, undertook many political reshuffles
in their own republics under the guidance of Rashidov. At the same time Rashidov
served as an advocate and lobbyist for Central Asia’s interests in Moscow. This
arrangement eventually gave Uzbekistan a dominant position in Central Asia as
a whole.
THE KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV ERAS 143
These same years witnessed a planned process of urban development in the
Ferghana Valley, which in turn changed nearly all political and administrative
structures. The Uzbek sector saw the rise of Kuvasay (1954), Hamza (1974),
Kuva (1974), Yaypan (1974), and Rishtan (1977) in Ferghana province; Chust
(1969), Uchkurgan (1969), Kasansai (1973), Hakkulabad (1974), Chartak (1975),
Pap (1980), and Chartak (1983) in Namangan province; and Shakhrikhan (1970),
Markhamat (1974), Kurgantepa (1976), and Karasu (1981) in Andijan province.
In 1960, Namangan was divided into the Ferghana and Andijan provinces, an ar-
rangement that was reversed in 1967.
9
Fundamental changes also took place in the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Val-
ley during these years. In 1959, the provinces of Jalalabad and Osh were united
and remained so until 1990, forming a single Ferghana Valley province within
Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, in the Tajik sector of the valley new city centers were
formed alongside old cities, including Isfara (1953), Penjikent (1953), Chkalovsk
(1956), Kairakkum (1963), and Gafurov (1965).
Border issues that had arisen with the establishment of the Soviet republics
remained unresolved and highly controversial. In 1955 the presidiums of the
Supreme Soviets of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan reached agreement on how to re-
solve these disputes. They set up a joint commission that, on the basis of available
cartographical materials, came to a joint decision that provided for the transfer to
Kyrgyzstan of around 70,000 hectares of land belonging to Uzbekistan, including
the Burgandin Massif and northern Sokh.
However, in reaching its decision, the joint commission did not have access to
sensitive archival materials assembled during the border demarcation process from
1925 to 1945. Thus, it proceeded from the false premise that certain pasture lands
of the Kyrgyz Republic had been given to households in Uzbekistan’s Ferghana
province for long-term use in 1953. Since these households had not in fact used
these pastures, it seemed advisable to transfer them back to Kyrgyzstan.
To gain the force of law, this decision had to be confirmed by the councils of
ministers and the presidiums of the supreme soviets of both the Uzbek and Kyrgyz
republics, as well as by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The joint
commission’s protocol was reviewed by the governments of both republics and
confirmed by the Uzbek and Kyrgyz councils of ministers on August 3, 1955, and
October 22, 1956, respectively. Both governments then presented all the materi-
als to their respective supreme soviets for final confirmation. However, when the
Presidium of Uzbekistan’s Supreme Soviet examined the documents, it rejected
the Joint Commission’s decision regarding the transfer of several parts of the Sokh
region to Kyrgyzstan. As a consequence, the entire protocol was void. But the
Presidium of Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Soviet, without waiting for agreement from
both sides, ratified the joint commission’s proposed boundary line on March 30,
1961. However, since neither the Uzbek nor the USSR-wide supreme soviets had
concurred, the new boundary was not legally valid. All this formed the background
to the Ferghana crisis that exploded in 1958.
144 NAZAROV, SHOZIMOV
On April 10 of that year, the government of the Kyrgyz Republic had re-
quested the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek Republic to transfer the oil and
gas deposits of the north Sokh district to its own jurisdiction. On October 29 the
Uzbeks rejected this request. In September, Kyrgyzstan’s Council of Ministers
petitioned the Council of Ministers of the USSR to approve its proposal. In
following up on this petition, the State Planning Committee of the USSR, in a
letter dated October 4, 1958, sought the opinion of the government of the Uzbek
Republic. On October 18, 1958, the Uzbek government categorically rejected
the proposed transfer.
Faced with a standoff over this Ferghana boundary issue, the commission of
the Presidium of Council of Ministers of the USSR acted by fiat, instructing the
councils of ministers of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz republics to “[take joint actions]
to change the state border between these republics.” Thus, it settled the issue in
Kyrgyzstan’s favor.
The Moscow commission’s preemptory action raises the question: to what extent
can Kyrgyzstan’s claims on several heretofore Uzbek parts of the Sokh region be
substantiated? The joint commission’s protocol of 1955, on which the Kyrgyz side
based its subsequent appeals, had no legal standing because it had not been approved
by the supreme soviets of the Uzbek Republic and the USSR. Moreover, earlier
documents confirm that the oil and gas deposits in the Sokh enclave always had
belonged to the Uzbek Republic. On this basis, one may conclude that the deposits
of the northern Sokh were, and remain, the property of the Republic of Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
Several further territorial changes affecting Uzbekistan were carried out dur-
ing the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1956, the Bostanlik region was transferred
from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan in connection with the construction of the massive
Charvak reservoir.
10
In 1956, some 50,500 hectares of irrigated land of the Golod-
naya steppe, which was located in the Andijan region of Leninabad (now Sughd)
province, were transferred from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan.
11
And in 1963 Uzbekistan
received 3.5 million hectares of land from the Golodnaya steppe.
12
The Soviet government justified these frequent transfers of land from one re-
public to another on ideological grounds. The “Program of the Communist Party
of the USSR” adopted at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1962 expressly
stated that “In the Soviet republics, people of many nationalities live and work
together. Borders between union republics within the borders of the USSR increas-
ingly lose their importance; as all nations are equal, their life is built on a single
socialist foundation.”
13
During the second half of the 1950s and extending to the collapse of the USSR,
many peoples who had been repressed and deported to Central Asia under Stalin
were rehabilitated. This process deeply affected the Ferghana Valley. In 1956, the
Kyrgyz provinces of the valley alone had 19,482 Chechens and Ingush, 3,208
Balkars, and 2,819 Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils who had been ex-
pelled from the Caucasus.
14
THE KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV ERAS 145
In March 1958, Crimean Tartars held a protest rally in Kokand, demanding to
be allowed to return to their traditional homes in the Crimea following their forced
deportation.
15
In October 1996, rallies were organized in honor of the forty-fifth
anniversary of the founding of the Crimean Autonomous Region, with groups of
2,000 protestors in Andijan, Bakabad, and Ferghana City. The rallies were harshly
suppressed, 65 people were detained, and 17 convicted of participating in riots.
Several of these deportees were allowed to return to their historical homelands, but
the fate of deported Germans, Koreans, Crimean Tartars, Meskhetian Turks, Kurds,
Greeks, and Khemshils remained unresolved until the end of the Soviet period.
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