Federal government can’t solve alone

EXT – Doesn’t Solve Leverage

Global demand will keep Iran afloat

Beddor et al 9 “Securing America’s Future Enhancing Our National Security by Reducing Oil Dependence and Environmental Damage” Christopher Beddor, Winny Chen, Rudy deLeon, Shiyong Park, and Daniel J. Weiss August 2009, http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/08/pdf/energy_security.pdf

Last year, record oil prices driven by global demand and speculators flooded Iran's treasury with oil money, which helped keep Mahmoud Ahmadinejad afloat. Prior to Iran's presidential election The Economist noted, "The president's open-handed economic policies, based on a windfall of $250 billion in oil sales during his four-year term and intended to redistribute wealth, have won friends among the poor.” Reducing U.S. oil demand in the world market would be a big financial hit to Iran and other unfriendly petro states. And it would have the added benefit of making more fuel from stable nations available to countries such as China, which currently purchases from Iran and Sudan because U.S. demand dominates oil trade with friendly sources.

EXT – Iran War Defense

No Iranian lashout

Boroujerdi 7 (Mehrzad, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program, “Iranian Nuclear Miasma”, Syracuse Law Review, 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 619, Lexis)

The potential for groupthink miscalculations is also thwarted by the existence of multiple consensus-based decision bodies within the overall multilayered structure. 18 While this complex process can sometimes make Iranian policy confusing and contradictory, it does not necessarily lend itself to high risk behavior. Even if one agent makes a hasty decision or issues an aggressive policy statement, it may be immediately contradicted by another authority. 19 Individual leaders also have difficulty muting [*623] criticism within the regime and forcing all agents to agree on one course of action. While miscalculations and hasty behavior may be the rule at the micro-level, at the macro-level hasty action is checked by the competing nodes of power. While this structure could admittedly be problematic with regard to the nuclear program depending on what form of command and control system to control accidents and illicit transfer is established, it makes the prospect of Iran engaging in a boldly offensive or miscalculated action less realistic.

Iran isn’t a threat

Luttwak, 7 (Luttwak, senior associate – CSIS, professor – Georgetown and Berkeley, 5/26/’7

(Edward, “The middle of nowhere,” Prospect Magazine)

Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran. All the symptoms are present, including tabulated lists of Iran’s warships, despite the fact that most are over 30 years old; of combat aircraft, many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s) have not flown in years for lack of spare parts; and of divisions and brigades that are so only in name. There are awed descriptions of the Pasdaran revolutionary guards, inevitably described as “elite,” who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one—against Iraq, which they lost. As for Iran’s claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah proxy in last year’s affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 per cent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the ceasefire.

Then there is the new light cavalry of Iranian terrorism that is invoked to frighten us if all else fails. The usual middle east experts now explain that if we annoy the ayatollahs, they will unleash terrorists who will devastate our lives, even though 30 years of “death to America” invocations and vast sums spent on maintaining a special international terrorism department have produced only one major bombing in Saudi Arabia, in 1996, and two in the most permissive environment of Buenos Aires, in 1992 and 1994, along with some assassinations of exiles in Europe.

It is true enough that if Iran’s nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about—and Iran’s added contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran’s nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.

As for the claim that the “Iranians” are united in patriotic support for the nuclear programme, no such nationality even exists. Out of Iran’s population of 70m or so, 51 per cent are ethnically Persian, 24 per cent are Turks (“Azeris” is the regime’s term), with other minorities comprising the remaining quarter. Many of Iran’s 16-17m Turks are in revolt against Persian cultural imperialism; its 5-6m Kurds have started a serious insurgency; the Arab minority detonates bombs in Ahvaz; and Baluch tribesmen attack gendarmes and revolutionary guards. If some 40 per cent of the British population were engaged in separatist struggles of varying intensity, nobody would claim that it was firmly united around the London government. On top of this, many of the Persian majority oppose the theocratic regime, either because they have become post-Islamic in reaction to its many prohibitions, or because they are Sufis, whom the regime now persecutes almost as much as the small Baha’i minority. So let us have no more reports from Tehran stressing the country’s national unity. Persian nationalism is a minority position in a country where half the population is not even Persian. In our times, multinational states either decentralise or break up more or less violently; Iran is not decentralising, so its future seems highly predictable, while in the present not much cohesion under attack is to be expected.

The U.S. can credibly deter iran

Posen 06 (Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, AlterNet, March 30, http://www.alternet.org/audits/34219/)

Some worry that Iran would be unconvinced by an American deterrent, choosing instead to gamble that the United States would not make good on its commitments to weak Middle Eastern states -- but the consequences of losing a gamble against a vastly superior nuclear power like the United States are grave, and they do not require much imagination to grasp.

EXT – No Impact to Proliferation

No impact to Iran prolif – won’t increase aggression**

Pillar, 12 (Professor Security Studies Georgetown, Paul, March/April, “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran” Washington Monthly, Vol 44 Issue 3/4, p 13-19, EbscoHost)

Given the momentousness of such an endeavor and how much prominence the Iranian nuclear issue has been given, one might think that talk about exercising the military option would be backed up by extensive analysis of the threat in question and the different ways of responding to it. But it isn't. Strip away the bellicosity and political rhetoric, and what one finds is not rigorous analysis but a mixture of fear, fanciful speculation, and crude stereotyping. There are indeed good reasons to oppose Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, and likewise many steps the United States and the international community can and should take to try to avoid that eventuality. But an Iran with a bomb would not be anywhere near as dangerous as most people assume, and a war to try to stop it from acquiring one would be less successful, and far more costly, than most people imagine. What difference would it make to Iran's behavior and influence if the country had a bomb? Even among those who believe that war with the Islamic Republic would be a bad idea, this question has been subjected to precious little careful analysis. The notion that a nuclear weapon would turn Iran into a significantly more dangerous actor that would imperil U.S. interests has become conventional wisdom, and it gets repeated so often by so many diverse commentators that it seldom, if ever, is questioned. Hardly anyone debating policy on Iran asks exactly why a nuclear-armed Iran would be so dangerous. What passes for an answer to that question takes two forms: one simple, and another that sounds more sophisticated. The simple argument is that Iranian leaders supposedly don't think like the rest of us: they are religious fanatics who value martyrdom more than life, cannot be counted on to act rationally, and therefore cannot be deterred. On the campaign trail Rick Santorum has been among the most vocal in propounding this notion, asserting that Iran is ruled by the "equivalent of al-Qaeda," that its "theology teaches" that its objective is to "create a calamity," that it believes "the afterlife is better than this life," and that its "principal virtue" is martyrdom. Newt Gingrich speaks in a similar vein about how Iranian leaders are suicidal jihadists, and says "it's impossible to deter them." The trouble with this image of Iran is that it does not reflect actual Iranian behavior. More than three decades of history demonstrate that the Islamic Republic's rulers, like most rulers elsewhere, are overwhelmingly concerned with preserving their regime and their power--in this life, not some future one. They are no more likely to let theological imperatives lead them into self-destructive behavior than other leaders whose religious faiths envision an afterlife. Iranian rulers may have a history of valorizing martyrdom--as they did when sending young militiamen to their deaths in near-hopeless attacks during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s--but they have never given any indication of wanting to become martyrs themselves. In fact, the Islamic Republic's conduct beyond its borders has been characterized by caution. Even the most seemingly ruthless Iranian behavior has been motivated by specific, immediate concerns of regime survival. The government assassinated exiled Iranian dissidents in Europe in the 1980s and '90s, for example, because it saw them as a counterrevolutionary threat. The assassinations ended when they started inflicting too much damage on Iran's relations with European governments. Iran's rulers are constantly balancing a very worldly set of strategic interests. The principles of deterrence are not invalid just because the party to be deterred wears a turban and a beard. If the stereotyped image of Iranian leaders had real basis in fact, we would see more aggressive and brash Iranian behavior in the Middle East than we have. Some have pointed to the Iranian willingness to incur heavy losses in continuing the Iran-Iraq War. But that was a response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of the Iranian homeland, not some bellicose venture beyond Iran's borders. And even that war ended with Ayatollah Khomeini deciding that the "poison" of agreeing to a cease-fire was better than the alternative. (He even described the ceasefire as "God's will"--so much for the notion that the Iranians' God always pushes them toward violence and martyrdom.) Throughout history, it has always been worrisome when a revolutionary regime with ruthless and lethal internal practices moves to acquire a nuclear weapon. But it is worth remembering that we have contended with far more troubling examples of this phenomenon than Iran. Millions died from forced famine and purges in Stalin's Soviet Union, and tens of millions perished during the Great Leap Forward in Mao Tse-tung's China. China's development of a nuclear weapon (it tested its first one in 1964) seemed all the more alarming at the time because of Mao's openly professed belief that his country could lose half its population in a nuclear war and still come out victorious over capitalism. But deterrence with China has endured for half a century, even during the chaos and fanaticism of Mao's Cultural Revolution. A few years after China got the bomb, Richard Nixon built his global strategy around engagement with Beijing. The more sophisticated-sounding argument about the supposed dangers of an Iranian nuclear weapon--one heard less from politicians than from policy-debating intelligentsia--accepts that Iranian leaders are not suicidal but contends that the mere possession of such a weapon would make Tehran more aggressive in its region. A dominant feature of this mode of argument is "worst-casing," as exemplified by a pro-war article by Matthew Kroenig in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs. Kroenig's case rests on speculation after speculation about what mischief Iran "could" commit in the Middle East, with almost no attention to whether Iran has any reason to do those things, and thus to whether it ever would be likely to do them. Kroenig includes among his "coulds" a scary possibility that also served as a selling point of the Iraq War: the thought of a regime giving nuclear weapons or materials to a terrorist group. Nothing is said about why Iran or any other regime ever would have an incentive to do this. In fact, Tehran would have strong reasons not to do it. Why would it want to lose control over a commodity that is scarce as well as dangerous? And how would it achieve deniability regarding its role in what the group subsequently did with the stuff? No regime in the history of the nuclear age has ever been known to transfer nuclear material to a nonstate group. That history includes the Cold War, when the USSR had both a huge nuclear arsenal and patronage relationships with a long list of radical and revolutionary clients. As for deniability, Iranian leaders have only to listen to rhetoric coming out of the United States to know that their regime would immediately be a suspect in any terrorist incidents involving a nuclear weapon. The more sophisticated-sounding argument links Iran with sundry forms of objectionable behavior, either real or hypothetical, without explaining what difference the possession of a nuclear weapon would make. Perhaps the most extensive effort to catalog what a nuclear-armed Iran might do outside its borders is a monograph published last year by Ash Jain of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Jain's inventory of possible Iranian nastiness is comprehensive, ranging from strong-arming Persian Gulf states to expanding a strategic relationship with Hugo Chavez's Venezuela. But nowhere is there an explanation of how Iran's calculations--or anyone else's--would change with the introduction of a nuclear weapon. The most that Jain can offer is to assert repeatedly that because Iran would be "shielded by a nuclear weapons capability," it might do some of these things. We never get an explanation of how, exactly, such a shield would work. Instead there is only a vague sense that a nuclear weapon would lead Iran to feel its oats. Analysis on this subject need not be so vague. A rich body of doctrine was developed during the Cold War to outline the strategic differences that nuclear weapons do and do not make, and what they can and cannot achieve for those who possess them. Such weapons are most useful in deterring aggression against one's own country, which is probably the main reason the Iranian regime is interested in developing them. They are much less useful in "shielding" aggressive behavior outside one's borders, except in certain geopolitical situations in which their use becomes plausible. The Pakistani-Indian conflict may be such a situation. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may have enabled it to engage in riskier behavior in Kashmir than it otherwise would attempt, because nuclear weapons help to deter Pakistan's ultimate nightmare: an assault by the militarily superior India, which could slice Pakistan in two and perhaps destroy it completely. But if you try to apply that logic to Iran, no one is playing the role of India. Iran has its own tensions and rivalries with its neighbors-including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other states on the Persian Gulf, and Pakistan. But none of these pose the kind of existential threat that Pakistan sees coming from India. Moreover, none of the current disputes between Iran and its neighbors (such as the one over ownership of some small islands also claimed by the United Arab Emirates) come close to possessing the nation-defining significance that the Kashmir conflict poses for both Pakistan and India. Nuclear weapons matter insofar as there is a credible possibility that they will be used. This credibility is hard to achieve, however, in anything short of circumstances that might involve the destruction of one's nation. In the case of Iran, there would need to be some specific aggressive or subversive act that Tehran is holding back from performing now for fear of retaliation--from the Americans, the Israelis, the Saudis, or someone else. Further, in order for Iran to neutralize the threat of retaliation, the desired act of mischief would have to be so important to Tehran that it could credibly threaten to escalate the matter to the level of nuclear war. Proponents of a war with Iran have been unable to provide an example of a scenario that meets these criteria, however. The impact of Iran possessing a bomb is therefore far less dire than the alarmist conventional wisdom suggests. To be sure, the world would be a better place without an Iranian nuclear weapon. An Iranian bomb would be a setback for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, for example, and the arms control community is legitimately concerned about it. It would also raise the possibility that other regional states, such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt, might be more inclined to try to acquire nuclear weapons as well. But that raises the question of why these states have not already done so, despite decades of facing both Israel's nuclear force and tensions with Iran. Ever since John F. Kennedy mused that there might be fifteen to twenty-five states with nuclear weapons by the 1970s, estimates of the pace of proliferation--like estimates of the pace of Iran's nuclear program--have usually been too high. Furthermore, it's not clear that any of this would cause substantial and direct damage to U.S. interests. Indeed, the alarmists offer more inconsistent arguments when discussing the dynamics of a Middle East in which rivals of Iran acquire their own nuclear weapons. If, as the alarmists project, nuclear weapons would appreciably increase Iranian influence in the region, why wouldn't further nuclear proliferation--which the alarmists also project--negate this effect by bestowing a comparable benefit on the rivals? In the absence of further proliferation among Iran's rivals, there is a chance that Iran would be marginally bolder if it possessed a nuclear weapon--and that the United States and other countries in the Middle East would be correspondingly less bold. Perceptions of strength do matter. But two further observations are important. First, once concrete confrontations occur, strategic realities trump perceptions. One of the conjectures in Jain's monograph, for instance, is that Hezbollah and Hamas might become emboldened if Iran extended a nuclear umbrella over them. But in the face of Israel's formidable nuclear superiority, would Iranian leaders really be willing to risk Tehran to save Gaza? The Iranians could not get anyone to believe such a thing. Second, one must ultimately ask whether the conjectured consequences of an Iranian bomb would be worse than a war with Iran. The conjectures are just that. They are not concrete, not based on nuclear doctrine or rigorous analysis, and not even likely. They are worst-case speculations, and not adequate justifications for going to war.

EXT – No Iran Proliferation

Prefer our ev—their authors continuously inflate threats

Innocent, 11 (Foreign policy analyst – Cato, member – IISS, 12/7/’11, Malou, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/ignore-the-hawks-on-iran-too/)

More credible voices suggest otherwise. The nonprofit Arms Control Association (ACA) observed that the most-recent IAEA report suggests “[I]t remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.” Iran was engaged in nuclear weapons development activities until it stopped in 2003, and as Cato’s Justin Logan observes, the IAEA’s own report shows there is no definitive evidence of Iran’s diversion of fissile material.

When Pletka was called out for her “less than a year” prediction, she turned up her nose and snapped:

Quibblers will suggest that there are important “ifs” in both these assessments. And yes, the key “if” is “if” Iran decides to build a bomb. So, I suppose when I said “less than a year away from having a nuclear weapon,” I should have added, “if they want one.” But… isn’t that the point? Do we want to leave this decision up to Khamenei?

Confronted with ambiguous information, and forced to infer intentions, hawks evince the very same arrogance and overconfidence that helped open the door for Iranian influence in the region in the first place by toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime (Pletka advocated repeatedly for this leading up to the 2003 invasion). Pletka and others who years ago had the gall to argue that Iraq “will end when it ends” are today worthy of being ignored on Iran.

No Iran prolif – security estimates overblown*

Hymans, 13 (Professor IR USC, 2/18, Jacques, “Iran Is Still Botching the Bomb” Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139013/jacques-e-c-hymans/iran-is-still-botching-the-bomb)

At the end of January, Israeli intelligence officials quietly indicated that they have downgraded their assessments of Iran's ability to build a nuclear bomb. This is surprising because less than six months ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned from the tribune of the United Nations that the Iranian nuclear D-Day might come as early as 2013. Now, Israel believes that Iran will not have its first nuclear device before 2015 or 2016. The news comes as a great relief. But it also raises questions. This was a serious intelligence failure, one that has led some of Israel's own officials to wonder aloud, "Did we cry wolf too early?" Indeed, Israel has consistently overestimated Iran's nuclear program for decades. In 1992, then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres announced that Iran was on pace to have the bomb by 1999. Israel's many subsequent estimates have become increasingly frenzied but have been consistently wrong. U.S. intelligence agencies have been only slightly less alarmist, and they, too, have had to extend their timelines repeatedly. Overestimating Iran's nuclear potential might not seem like a big problem. However, similar, unfounded fears were the basis for President George W. Bush's preemptive attack against Iraq and its nonexistent weapons of mass destruction. Israel and the United States need to make sure that this kind of human and foreign policy disaster does not happen again. What explains Israel's most recent intelligence failure? Israeli officials have suggested that Iran decided to downshift its nuclear program in response to international sanctions and Israel's hawkish posture. But that theory falls apart when judged against Tehran's own recent aggressiveness. In the past few months, Iran has blocked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from gaining access to suspect facilities, stalled on diplomatic meetings, and announced a "successful" space shot and the intention to build higher-quality centrifuges. These are not the actions of a state that is purposely slowing down its nuclear program. Even more to the point, if Tehran were really intent on curbing its nuclear work, an explicit announcement of the new policy could be highly beneficial for the country: many states would praise it, sanctions might be lifted, and an Israeli or U.S. military attack would become much less likely. But Iran has not advertised the downshift, and its only modest concession of late has been to convert some of its 20 percent enriched uranium to reactor fuel. It is doubtful that the Iranians would decide to slow down their nuclear program without asking for anything in return. A second hypothesis is that Israeli intelligence estimates have been manipulated for political purposes. This possibility is hard to verify, but it cannot be dismissed out of hand. Preventing the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran is Netanyahu's signature foreign policy stance, and he had an acute interest in keeping the anti-Iran pot boiling in the run-up to last month's parliamentary elections, which he nearly lost. Now, with the elections over, perhaps Israeli intelligence officials feel freer to convey a more honest assessment of Iran's status. This theory of pre-election spin is not very satisfying, however, because it fails to explain why Israeli governments of all political orientations have been making exaggerated claims about Iran for 20 years -- to say nothing of the United States' own overly dire predictions. The most plausible reason for the consistent pattern of overstatement is that Israeli and U.S. models of Iranian proliferation are flawed. Sure enough, Israeli officials have acknowledged that they did not anticipate the high number of technical problems Iranian scientists have run into recently. Some of those mishaps may have been the product of Israeli or U.S. efforts at sabotage. For instance, the 2010 Stuxnet computer virus attack on Iran's nuclear facilities reportedly went well. But the long-term impact of such operations is usually small -- or nonexistent: the IAEA and other reputable sources have dismissed the highly publicized claims of a major recent explosion at Iran's Fordow uranium-enrichment plant, for instance. Rather than being hampered by James Bond exploits, Iran's nuclear program has probably suffered much more from Keystone Kops-like blunders: mistaken technical choices and poor implementation by the Iranian nuclear establishment. There is ample reason to believe that such slipups have been the main cause of Iran's extremely slow pace of nuclear progress all along. The country is rife with other botched projects, especially in the chaotic public sector. It is unlikely that the Iranian nuclear program is immune to these problems. This is not a knock against the quality of Iranian scientists and engineers, but rather against the organizational structures in which they are trapped. In such an environment, where top-down mismanagement and political agendas are abundant, even easy technical steps often lead to dead ends and pitfalls. Iran is not the only state with a dysfunctional nuclear weapons program. As I argued in a 2012 Foreign Affairs article, since the 1970s, most states seeking entry into the nuclear weapons club have run their weapons programs poorly, leading to a marked slowdown in global proliferation. The cause of this mismanagement is the poor quality of the would-be proliferator's state institutions. Libya and North Korea are two classic examples. Libya essentially made no progress, even after 30 years of trying. North Korea has gotten somewhere -- but only after 50 years, and with many high-profile embarrassments along the way. Iran, whose nuclear weapons drive began in the mid-1980s, seems to be following a similar trajectory. Considering Iran in the broader context of the proliferation slowdown, it becomes clear that the technical problems it has encountered are more than unpredictable accidents -- they are structurally determined. Since U.S. and Israeli intelligence services have failed to appreciate the weakness of Iran's nuclear weapons program, they have not adjusted their analytical models accordingly. Thus, there is reason to be skeptical about Israel's updated estimate of an Iranian bomb in the next two or three years. The new date is probably just the product of another ad hoc readjustment, but what is needed is a fundamental rethinking. As the little shepherd boy learned, crying wolf too early and too often destroys one's credibility and leaves one vulnerable and alone. In order to rebuild public trust in their analysis, Jerusalem and Washington need to explain the assumptions on which their scary estimates are based, provide alternative estimates that are also consistent with the data they have gathered, and give a clear indication of the chance that their estimates are wrong and will have to be revised again. The Iranian nuclear effort is highly provocative. The potential for war is real. That is why Israel and the United States need to avoid peddling unrealistic, worse-than-worst-case scenarios.

No centrifuge acquisition – media reports are a hoax

Butt, 13 (Research Professor at James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2-20, Yousaf- Former Scientist at Federation of American Scientists, Physicist at High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, , “Iran centrifuge magnet story technically questionable” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/iran-centrifuge-magnet-story-technically-questionable)

Last week, the Washington Post reported that "purchase orders obtained by nuclear researchers show an attempt by Iranian agents to buy 100,000 … ring-shaped magnets" and that such "highly specialized magnets used in centrifuge machines … [are] a sign that the country may be planning a major expansion of its nuclear program." As evidence, the Post's Joby Warrick cited a report authored by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security PDF (ISIS); dated Feb. 13, the report says that an Iranian firm, Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars Co., made an inquiry "posted on a Chinese commercial website … to buy 100,000 ring magnets." As Warrick goes on to explain: "it is unclear whether the attempt succeeded." There are serious deficiencies in both the Washington Post story and the assertions in the ISIS report. Given that issues of war and peace may hang on the veracity of such claims, the assertions warrant careful scrutiny. The magnets in question have many uses besides centrifuges and are not only, as Warrick describes them, "highly specialized magnets used in centrifuge machines." Such ceramic ring magnets are everyday items and have been used in loudspeakers, for example, for more than half a century. The ISIS report neglects to explain the many other applications for such ceramic ring magnets and jumps to the conclusion that the inquiry is surely related to Iran's nuclear program. Why ISIS does not offer alternate and more plausible applications of these unspecialized magnets is a puzzle. Such magnets are used in a variety of electronic equipment. For instance, one vendor outlines some of the various possible uses in speakers, direct current brushless motors, and magnetic resonance imaging equipment. This is not the first time ring magnets have surfaced in allegations related to centrifuge applications. Almost exactly a decade ago, as the United States was preparing to invade Iraq, then-director of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei said that reports regarding similar ring magnets in Iraq were unrelated to centrifuges: With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets -- or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets -- for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme, I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of twelve different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters, and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic bearing. Robert Kelley, a nuclear engineer and former IAEA chief inspector and deputy leader of the agency's Iraq Action Team, told me last week that, between 2002 and 2003, his group "tracked similar ring magnets that Iraq was trying to procure (openly in insecure channels) and found they were for field telephones …. We got started with an ‘intelligence tip' and ran it to ground. Nothing whatsoever to do with centrifuges." The Iraq Survey Group also weighed in on this issue, saying PDF it "has not uncovered information indicating that the magnet production capability being pursued by Iraq beginning in 2000 was intended to support a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program. … The declared use of the magnet production lines were for production of ring magnets in the Saham Saddam Missile and for field telephones." A pair of ring magnets is used in the top suspension bearing of the IR-1 gas centrifuges. As others have already noted, it seems to make little sense to order ceramic magnets that are, as ISIS describes, "almost exactly" the right dimensions. If one is intending to purchase 100,000 ceramic ring magnets for critical high-speed centrifuge applications, why not order them exactly the right size? Ceramics are almost impossible to machine due to their brittle nature and are generally ordered to the precise specifications desired. Albright's suggestion in the ISIS report PDF that "some minor re-design would be necessary of the top end cap and top magnetic bearing of the IR-1 [centrifuge] design but these are seen as fairly trivial" could be correct. But why would a purchaser wish to redesign, re-machine, and re-test tens of thousands of centrifuges, instead of ordering the correctly sized part in the first place? Although ISIS redacted measurements in the English translation of the inquiry to purchase the 100,000 magnets, it did not redact them from the original shown on the last page of the ISIS report PDF. The original clearly states that the magnets have "BHmax Min 3MGo"; MGo is shorthand for mega-Gauss Oersted, a measure of the magnetic energy stored in the magnets. (B and H are, respectively, the magnetic flux density and the magnetic field strength.) This value is substantially less than the 10 MGo trigger level given for centrifuge applications in Annex 3 of the Notifications of Exports to Iraq mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996). Although magnets with an energy product of 3 MGO could be consistent with applications in suspension bearings of the older IR-1 centrifuges, they are also consistent with a host of other applications. Curiously, the inquiry to the China-based company that is shown on the last page of the ISIS report PDF is very casual and overt. The alleged inquiry states, "Dear Sir We are a great factory in south of Iran and for our new project we need 100.000 pcs Ferrite Barium strontium ring magnet . … we would like buy from you [sic] company. We should be glad if you supply this magnet for us." Presumably, an attempt to source 100,000 parts related to Iran's controversial and often secretive nuclear program would not be conducted quite so openly. Not only would such an overt attempt at sourcing the ring magnets be inconsistent with the secrecy surrounding Iran's nuclear program; it would also be at odds with procurement best-practices, for several reasons. First, such a large order would likely drive up the market price and perhaps even signal to the supplier to choke off the supply, in hopes of obtaining a better price later. Also, before indicating that such a huge order may be in the works, a serious engineering operation would likely obtain a few sample magnets to formally qualify them. Such an order would, more reasonably, be directed to the manufacturer or direct supplier (in this case, apparently, a rather small Indian firm, Ferrito Plastronics), rather than to a Chinese middleman. Obtaining 100,000 ceramic ring magnets without sample qualification would be highly risky and unprofessional. It would be inconsistent with Iran's generally excellent record in systems management and engineering PDF involving a range of technologies and industries. Both the Washington Post story and the ISIS report on which it is based repeatedly call the inquiry a "purchase order" or "order." This is a mischaracterization. The evidence presented (Figures 3 and 4 in the ISIS report) merely shows a web inquiry as to whether the supplier has any interest in discussing the question further. There is no mention of money, delivery dates, or letters of credit. All of these items would be part of a formal purchase order. The apparent manufacturer or supplier of the magnets in question, Ferrito Plastronics, is evidently a "tiny firm in a dark alley in Chennai's electronic spare parts hub on Meeran Sahib Street." According to the Times of India, "the Chennai firm does supply magnets. But these, avers company proprietor Bala Subramanian, are the ones used in loudspeakers, coils, and medical equipment. Besides these, there are decorative magnets for fridges." The proprietor states that his monthly turnover is slightly less than $2,000. Such a firm would seem unlikely to be the optimal source for 100,000 high-quality centrifuge ring magnets. Although the purpose of the alleged inquiry is subject to interpretation, it seems unlikely to be related to Iran's nuclear program. Assuming that the request to buy 100,000 magnets is genuine, it would be consistent with, for instance, an Iranian loudspeaker company interested in obtaining such ceramic ring magnets. That is just one possible hypothesis, of course, but it seems a better explanation of the alleged inquiry than the suggestion of an overt attempt by Iran's nuclear program to source 100,000 of the wrong-sized ceramic ring magnets from a tiny Indian company via a Chinese middleman. It is worth noting that the best Western intelligence concludes that no nuclear weapons work is going on in Iran right now, and that Iran is not an imminent nuclear threat. James Clapper, the US director of national intelligence, has confirmed PDF that he has "a high level of confidence" that no nuclear weaponization work is underway in Iran. Outgoing Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has also weighed in: "Are [Iranians] trying to develop a nuclear weapon? No." And in an interview for a 2011 article in the New Yorker, ElBaradei said PDF that he did not see "a shred of evidence" that Iran was pursuing the bomb after 2003, adding, "I don't believe Iran is a clear and present danger. All I see is the hype about the threat posed by Iran." Given these expert assessments, reporters and editors should raise the bar for the evidence underpinning stories of alleged Iranian nuclear weapons-related work. This Washington Post article is the second in about three months to make serious unsubstantiated claims regarding Iran's nuclear program. In the previous story, the Associated Press used flimsy evidence to suggest that Iran may be working on a nuclear bomb. Clearly, the media reporting on Iran's controversial nuclear program have a duty to do a better job of vetting evidence and sources. Similarly, non-governmental organizations that are supposed to supply unbiased expert advice should strive to provide professional analyses that lay out all possible explanations and do not jump to unwarranted conclusions. We have all been witness to what may happen when a fictional threat is spun up over non-existent weapons of mass destruction -- the result isn't pretty. When news reports cast thin evidence in hyperbolic terms, the public is invited to run rampant with speculation about Iran's nuclear program. At a time when military action is apparently being seriously contemplated, the international community needs to look past trivialities, focus on the facts, and find realistic opportunities for ending the Iranian nuclear standoff.

No prolif risk – just fear-mongering

Mueller, 12 (Professor PolSci Ohio State, 11-19, John, “History and Nuclear Rationality” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/history-nuclear-rationality)

We seem to be at it again. Just about the entire foreign-policy establishment has taken it as a central article of faith that nuclear proliferation is a dire security threat and that all possible measures, including even war if necessary, must be taken to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Concern is justified, but the experience of two-thirds of a century suggests that if Iran does obtain the weapons, it will use them in the same way others have: to stoke the national ego and to deter real or imagined threats. For the mostpart, the few countries to which the weapons have proliferated have found them a notable waste of time, money, effort and scientific talent. They haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. This was the case even when the weapons were taken on by large countries with seemingly deranged leaders. Thus, when he got nukes, the Soviet Union’s Stalin was plotting to “transform nature” by planting lots of trees and China’s Mao had recently launched a campaign to remake his society that created a famine killing tens of millions. It was simplicity and spook on steroids. It is scarcely ever observed that nuclear proliferation has thus far had consequences that are substantially benign. This suggests that simplicity and spook continue to prevail up there at that foreign-policy summit. Send in the chimps.

EXT – Wont Close the Strait

Alternate routes solve Hormuz closure

Luft, 12 (Director Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 7-19-’12 (Gal- Senior Advisor United States Energy Security Council, “Choke Point” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2012/07/19/choke_points)

So far, Iran's threats have invited yawns from the oil market, which seems to be more concerned about declining demand from stagnant economies than a drop in supply. (Oil prices have dropped nearly 20 percent since April.) And there are good reasons to think Iran is bluffing: At its narrowest, the Strait is about 25 miles wide -- a fact that even the most neurotic traders seem to have grasped. Blocking an area as wide as Singapore will require a vast and sustained naval effort that the Iranians cannot muster. To be sure, they could mine coastal waters and harass the occasional vessel, but closing the Strait for a meaningful length of time is a far-fetched scenario that would undoubtedly trigger a swift and decisive U.S. military response. Yet Tehran would have us think otherwise. What the mullahs, their generals, and the 100 Iranian lawmakers who've expressed support for the bill to block the Strait should know is that, like the Ottomans a century ago, they are likely to be the prime casualties of any real or threatened disruption to maritime trade. The reason is simple: It's not about the heavy price the Iranians would pay if they went through with a military effort to close the Straits. In fact, they're paying the price already, as talk of closure has already made the Strait of Hormuz increasingly irrelevant. In recent weeks, two pipelines that bypass the Strait have become operational. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline can now pump as much as 1.5 million barrels per day from Habshan in Abu Dhabi some 230 miles south to Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. This represents 60 percent of the UAE's oil exports already, and this capacity can be easily expanded to almost 2 million barrels per day. In addition to becoming the new outlet to the Arabian Sea, Fujairah will have storage space for 12 million barrels as well as three sub-sea pipelines and mooring buoys for deepwater tanker loading. Saudi Arabia has also invested in infrastructure that enables it to bypass the Iranians. In June, it reopened the Iraq Pipeline through Saudi Arabia (IPSA), which was confiscated from Iraq in 2001 and travels from Iraq across Saudi Arabia to a Red Sea port north of Yanbu. This pipeline will be able to carry 1.65 million barrels per day. Together, these two pipelines could eventually reduce oil traffic in the Strait by 25 percent. But this is only the beginning. At least two more projects connecting Saudi Arabia to Oman and Yemen are under consideration. Iraq also has an outlet, which is currently being expanded, to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Should whatever regime replaces Syrian President Bashar al-Assad be interested, Iraq may also revive the Iraq-Syria pipeline as another means of shipping crude from southern fields to the Mediterranean. These projects have the potential to remove millions of additional barrels from Hormuz's busy schedule. But it is not only Iran's neighbors who are behind the efforts to reduce the strategic importance of Hormuz on their export lifeline -- China's also involved. Like Tsarist Russia (though for the opposite reason), fuel-hungry China is fixated on keeping its economic lifelines open and under control. China is one of the top purchasers of Iranian oil, and though it has been less than cooperative in the international boycott over Tehran's nuclear program, its allegiance to Iran pales in comparison to its dependency on the other Gulf energy exporters -- Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE -- which in total supply 35 percent of China's crude imports, or three times the volume supplied by Iran. Securing the flow of oil from those countries is therefore a paramount objective for Beijing. It was a Chinese state-owned construction company that built the pipe to Fujairah, and there are also plans in the works to build an oil pipeline connecting Pakistan's Arabian Sea port of Gwadar to Xinjiang province in western China. If built, this pipeline will be able to collect oil from African ports and the alternative terminals mentioned above and pump it directly to China. Much of Iran's current regional clout derives from its geographical location, but its antagonistic behavior is driving the country's neighbors and clients to seek ways to defuse this power and eliminate their dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. The effort to reduce Hormuz traffic presents the West with a new opportunity to augment its current Iran containment strategy while eliminating for good one of the biggest impediments to global energy security: a choke point that for decades has enabled rogue regional players to hold the world economy hostage. Using steel on the ground rather than aircraft carriers in the water, world powers can do to Iran what Russia did to the Ottomans. This time around, however, it won't require a world war.

Iran won’t close the Strait

Saul, 10 (Jonathan, interviewing Iranian and American Security analysts Peter Pham and Meir Javendanfar,

http://archives.dawn.com/archives/7274)

Iran is unlikely to risk blocking or mining the Strait of Hormuz if tension with the West rises, because it stands to lose vital oil revenues from closing the strategic waterway and lacks the military capability. Iran has threatened to close the strait, a vital route for world oil supplies, if it is attacked over its nuclear ambitions. Some Iran watchers say Tehran could opt to block the strait if more severe sanctions are imposed. Western powers suspect Iran`s nuclear activities are aimed at developing atomic weapons, not generating electricity as Tehran insists. Analysts believe the threat itself is enough to raise oil prices to well above $100 a barrel, potentially damaging a still fragile global economic recovery. “Oil prices rose by around $12 a barrel when Israel went into Lebanon in 2006 and neither of those countries are even involved in oil production,” said Paul Harris, head of natural resources risk management at Bank of Ireland. “You`d be looking at least double that kind of jump from an event on that scale in the region.” Many analysts say Tehran cannot afford to risk a prolonged disruption of the narrow waterway, which borders Iran`s coastline at the mouth of the Gulf, and through which 40 per cent of all seaborne oil trade, about 17 million barrels, passes daily. Iran itself exports around 2.4 million barrels daily – most of it via the Strait of Hormuz. “They would cut their own throats because two-thirds of the Iranian government`s budget comes from exports from the same strait,” said J. Peter Pham, an adviser on strategic matters to US and foreign governments. “Iran gains more from the threat of closing the strait than actually closing it.” `Fraught with problems` The strait, just 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, lies between Oman and Iran. Neighbouring oil-producing countries, including Saudi Arabia, the world`s largest crude oil exporter, are dependent on its shipping lanes. “Closing the strait would reduce Iran`s leverage in the region as it would put Persian Gulf countries squarely in the camp of America,” Iran analyst Meir Javedanfar said, adding that it could tempt them into financing Iranian opposition movements.Many analysts believe that, if Iran retaliated, it would choose to mine the strait`s sea lanes as it did during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Military analysts believe Iran has three mine-laying ships and three mine-laying helicopters, plus three Russian-built Kilo class submarines. “Military operations on the offence are fraught with problems,” said Eugene Gholz, professor of national security policy at the University of Texas. “The Iranians would have to do it over and over again every day to maintain the disruption.” Global intelligence company Stratfor said the strait`s cramped, shallow waters made submarine activity difficult. “In any event, the Iranian navy does not have enough Kilos to have any confidence in its ability to sustain submarine operations for any meaningful period after hostilities began,” it said in a study.

Iran won’t shutdown Hormuz – it’s suicide

Nader, 12 (Senior Policy Analyst RAND, 10-2, Alireza, “Will Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz?” United States Institute of Peace Iran Primer, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2012/10/02/USIP.html)

Iran's naval forces cannot permanently hold or close the Strait, however. The United States would be able to neutralize Iran's military assets, given its overwhelming firepower. And Iran's conventional navy would not be able to reinforce the Revolutionary Guards, since its antiquated frigates and corvettes, most dating from the Shah's time, would be sitting ducks for U.S. fighters. Iran's three Russian-supplied Kilo submarines could also be quickly detected and sunk. Iran might instead seek to repeat the strategy used by Hezbollah in the 2006 war with Israel—holding ground by bleeding the adversary. It may hope to emerge as the political and psychological victor by hitting a few U.S. warships, perhaps even a carrier, causing high oil prices, and increasing international pressure—all tactics designed to force the United States to stop its strikes. Impeding shipping in the narrow Strait would give Iran much-needed leverage since it cannot technically win a military confrontation against the United States. Just by threatening to close the Strait, Iran increases pressure on the United States to restrain Israel from attacking Iran. Other key players—including major oil importers such as China, Japan, and India—would be reluctant to support military action because of heavy dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Closing off the Gulf sealanes would also limit the flow from Saudi Arabia and the neighboring oil-rich sheikhdoms, which Iran may calculate gives it a psychological edge. But the Islamic Republic would also pay a heavy price for fighting in the Persian Gulf. Its forces could be destroyed without first inflicting substantial damage, which would humiliate the regime. Despite military rhetoric, Iran's naval forces are poorly matched against the U.S. Fifth fleet. Iran is also heavily dependent on freedom of navigation through the Persian Gulf to export its own oil, especially important given its increasingly troubled economy. Most Iranian exports and imports flow through the Strait. Iran may be more dependent on the Strait than other regional players, such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, both of which are building pipelines to bypass the strategic waterway. Despite repeated warnings, the regime's intentions and capabilities remain unclear. Its threats in the Strait may instead be part of a long-term strategy to buy time, to forestall a military conflict while working on its nuclear program. In the meantime, Iranian posturing in the Persian Gulf is a powerful form of deterrence against Israeli or U.S. strikes.