Federal government can’t solve alone

Hegemony Advantage

1NC Hegemony Advantage

Domestic oil doesn’t solve energy independence

CBO may 2012 (congressional budget office, seems pretty qualled, “Energy Security¶ in the¶ United States” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/05-09-EnergySecurity.pdf)

The worldwide market for oil makes it almost ¶ impossible for a large country like the United States ¶ to gain independence, or separation, from that ¶ market. In the United States, decisions about how ¶ much oil to import are made not by the government, ¶ but by private firms that extract, refine, and sell ¶ products made from oil—for example, gasoline, ¶ diesel, and jet fuel—to households and businesses. ¶ Those private firms enter into trading arrangements ¶ with other private firms or governments that produce ¶ oil based on the profitability and legality of such ¶ arrangements. For example, private U.S. firms ¶ produce much of the oil exported by Chad, but they ¶ are prohibited from purchasing oil from Iran because ¶ of U.S. trade sanctions against that country. Despite ¶ those sanctions, U.S. households and businesses still ¶ benefit from Iran’s production of oil as long as Iran is ¶ able to sell its oil to other countries and firms that, in ¶ turn, require less oil from elsewhere in the world. ¶ (The largest importers of Iranian oil in 2008 were ¶ Japan, China, and India.)

At best we can only be independent for 10 years

Glenn Williams 11/27/12 (aol energy “Not So Fast on Energy Independence” http://energy.aol.com/2012/11/27/not-so-fast-on-energy-independence/)

Some politicians and analysts have been confusing the energy independence issue by blending US data with North American data to make numbers more attractive. Nevertheless, domestic oil production has increased and domestic consumption has decreased. The net result is an apparent trajectory towards oil independence.¶ But that trajectory is an illusion. The bipartisan American Security Project (ASP) warns the real message behind IEA's World Energy Outlook is a very different picture than most headlines suggest. It turns out most of IEA's coverage of oil independence focused on a handful of the report's nearly 700 pages. According to ASP, the majority of IEA's report is a warning against unchecked exploitation of US oil. Specifically, IEA warns:¶ The United States' ability to lead the world in oil production is realistically limited to between five and ten years at most.¶ In order to achieve production levels necessary to reach the status of number one oil producer, the US would have had to excavate almost all of its fossil fuel reserves by 2020.¶ Third, according to IEA's main scenario, which assumes an amount of efficiency policy that is yet to be implemented, the US could still be consuming 5.5 million barrels per day more than it is producing in 2020, when the oil boom peaked.¶ The news that the US will become energy independent by 2017 is simply not a fact. For the US, energy independence is an unlikely goal. In fact, it could provide more harm than good. But the recent success in natural gas has the nation moving in the direction of independence and that achievement has benefitted the US economy.

Self-sufficiency can’t solve national security issues – global market and aggressive petrostates

Jeffrey D. Colgan ’13, Assistant professor American University, PhD, MPP, B. Engineering, AU expertise in International oil politics, causes of war, international energy institutions, resource curse, and political revolutions, Belfer Center for Science and National Affairs, "Oil, Conflict, and U.S. National Interests", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23517/oil_conflict_and_us_national_interests.html

Understanding the eight mechanisms linking oil to international security can help policymakers think beyond the much-discussed goal of energy security, defined as reliable access to affordable fuel supplies. Achieving such an understanding is important in light of recent changes in the United States. As hydraulic fracturing—"fracking"—of shale oil and gas accelerates, energy imports are projected to decline, and North America could even achieve energy independence, in the sense of low or zero net overall energy imports, in the next decade. Yet the United States will continue to import large volumes of oil, and the world price of oil will continue to affect it. Moreover, so long as the rest of the world remains dependent on global oil markets, the fracking revolution will do little to reduce many oil-related threats to international security. The emergence of aggressive, revolutionary leaders in petrostates would likely continue to pose threats to regional security. Petrostates will continue to be weakly institutionalized and thus subject to civil wars, creating the kind of security problems that demand responses by the international community, as occurred in Libya in 2011. Petro-financed insurgent groups such as Hezbollah will persist, as will threats to the shipping lanes and oil transit routes that supply important U.S. allies, such as Japan. In sum, energy autarky is not the answer. Self-sufficiency will bring economic benefits to the United States, but few gains for national security. So long as the oil market remains globally integrated, national oil imports matter far less than total consumption. Rather than viewing energy self-sufficiency as a panacea, the United States should contribute to international security by making long-term investments in research and development to reduce oil consumption and provide alternative fuel sources in the transportation sector. In addition to the economic and environmental benefits of reducing oil consumption, substantial evidence exists that military and security benefits will accrue from such investments.

Doesn’t solve terror - US will still have a large foot print in the region

O’Sullivan, 13 (Professor International Affairs Harvard, 2-14-’13, Meghan, “’Energy Independence’ Alone Won’t Boost U.S. Power” Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-14/-energy-independence-alone-won-t-boost-u-s-power.html?alcmpid=view)

No Independence Still, despite all this good news, the U.S. energy boom won’t deliver the one geopolitical benefit Americans long for most: a release from the Middle East. True, by 2020 the U.S. will be importing substantially less oil than it does today, and probably none of it will originate in the Middle East. The U.S. will, however, remain invested in stability in that part of the world even if it doesn’t consume a single drop of Middle Eastern oil. Interests other than energy, such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the security of Israel and the well-being of more than more than 300 million Arabs, will continue to be high on the U.S. agenda. The U.S. will continue to have enduring energy interests in the Middle East, given that its allies and China -- the single largest engine of global economic growth -- will become increasingly dependent on the Middle East in the years ahead. Even more important, because all oil is priced on a global market, a disruption in the Middle East will quickly filter back to the U.S. economy. Americans in 2020 may transmit less of their income abroad in the case of a surge in oil prices, but a major increase in global prices caused by instability in the Middle East would be almost as destabilizing to the U.S. as it was when Uncle Sam secured much of its oil from Saudi Arabia.

Status Quo Solves, Dependence Low Now

Zumbrun June 17th , 2014, Josh Zumbran , National Economics Corresp. For WSJ, “Upshot of Domestic Oil Boom: Fewer Shocks”, Wall Street Journal, http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=385322 //RD

The latest spasm of violence in the Middle East has sent crude-oil prices climbing in recent weeks, a familiar action-reaction that frequently has proved to be a drag on economic growth. Yet that dynamic figures to ease in coming months and years as U.S. dependence on Mideast oil is, by a variety of measures, at a generational nadir. In the current flare-up of unrest, Islamist militants have swept across northern Iraq, threatening Baghdad and spurring fears that violence could disrupt the country's 2.7 million barrels a day in exports. Amid this, the U.S. crude-oil benchmark on the New York Mercantile Exchange has climbed to around $107 a barrel, the highest level since September. The oil-price instability has been playing out broadly since late 2010, when a string of popular political revolutions across the Middle East drove up the price of crude to $113 a barrel from $85 over five months. Much has changed since the so-called Arab Spring to alter the U.S. energy picture. Advanced technologies such as hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, have boosted U.S. crude-oil production by 47% since late 2010. Domestic U.S. oil production in October surpassed imports for the first time in nearly two decades, putting slack into the global oil market and making more crude available at lower prices to countries like China and India. Canada, too, has made great gains in oil production, so that the U.S. now imports about as much oil from its northern neighbor as from all of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, meaning that the Middle East's importance to the U.S. energy supply has shrunk. Better fuel economy has also left many consumers less sensitive to oil prices. For model year 2013, vehicles had average mileage of 24 miles a gallon, up 6% from 2010 and 22% from a decade ago. "The U.S. is less vulnerable to oil shocks," said Brian Levitt, senior economist at OppenheimerFunds. "Over time, there's going to be less and less vulnerability to events in the Middle East." That's not to say the U.S. is invulnerable. The nation still imports more than 7 million barrels a day of crude oil, and for many Americans, the amount of gasoline they consume is largely determined by the length of their commute. Higher gas prices—now at a national average of $3.69 a gallon, up 11% since the start of the year, according to the Energy Information Administration—can take a bite from consumer spending elsewhere. An increase of just $10 a barrel in the price of oil over three months would reduce U.S. gross domestic product by about 0.2 percentage point, according to Joseph LaVorgna, chief U.S. economist at Deutsche Bank. Higher oil prices are "a risk factor and one that we're taking very seriously," said Jason Furman, chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, speaking Tuesday at a CFO Network event hosted by The Wall Street Journal. Increased domestic oil production and more-efficient cars mean the U.S. is more insulated from oil shocks than in past decades, he said, "but no one is fully insulated." Still, while climbing oil prices would hurt U.S. consumers, any increase would benefit U.S. energy producers, providing a partial offset for the overall U.S. economy, according to Jason Schenker, the president of Prestige Economics in Austin, Texas. "Because we're importing less, the risks to a widening trade deficit are somewhat diminished," he said, referring to the reduced need to import foreign oil. And there are potentially gains "from a corporate-profit standpoint" now that more U.S. firms and workers stand to gain when oil prices rise.

Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

No risk of nuclear terrorism – technically impossible

Michael, 12 (Professor Nuclear Counterprolif and Deterrence at Air Force Counterprolif Center, ’12 (George, March, “Strategic Nuclear Terrorism and the Risk of State Decapitation” Defence Studies, Vol 12 Issue 1, p 67-105, T&F Online)

Despite the alarming prospect of nuclear terrorism, the obstacles to obtaining such capabilities are formidable. There are several pathways that terrorists could take to acquire a nuclear device. Seizing an intact nuclear weapon would be the most direct method. However, neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear technology has proliferated to the degree that some observers once feared. Although nuclear weapons have been around for over 65 years, the so-called nuclear club stands at only nine members. 72 Terrorists could attempt to purloin a weapon from a nuclear stockpile; however, absconding with a nuclear weapon would be problematical because of tight security measures at installations.¶ Alternatively, a terrorist group could attempt to acquire a bomb through an illicit transaction, but there is no real well-developed black market for illicit nuclear materials. Still, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons around the world presents the risk of theft and diversion. 73 In 1997, the Russian General, Alexander Lebed, alleged that 84 ‘suitcase’ bombs were missing from the Russian military arsenal, but later recanted his statements. 74 American officials generally remain unconvinced of Lebed’s story insofar as they were never mentioned in any Soviet war plans. 75 Presumably, the financial requirements for a transaction involving nuclear weapons would be very high, as states have spent millions and billions of dollars to obtain their arsenals. 76 Furthermore, transferring such sums of money could raise red flags, which would present opportunities for authorities to uncover the plot. When pursuing nuclear transactions, terrorist groups would be vulnerable to sting operations. 77¶ Even if terrorists acquired an intact nuclear weapon, the group would still have to bypass or defeat various safeguards, such as permissive action links (PALs), and safing, arming, fusing, and firing (SAFF) procedures. Both US and Russian nuclear weapons are outfitted with complicated physical and electronic locking mechanisms. 78 Nuclear weapons in other countries are usually stored partially disassembled, which would make purloining a fully functional weapon very challenging. 79¶ Failing to acquire a nuclear weapon, a terrorist group could endeavor to fabricate its own Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). For years, the US government has explored the possibility of a clandestine group fabricating a nuclear weapon. The so-called Nth Country Experiment examined the technical problems facing a nation that endeavored to build a small stockpile of nuclear weapons. Launched in 1964, the experiment sought to determine whether a minimal team –in this case, two young American physicists with PhDs and without nuclear-weapons design knowledge –could design a workable nuclear weapon with a militarily significant yield. After three man-years of effort, the two novices succeeded in a hypothetical test of their device. 80 In 1977, the US Office of Technology Assessment concluded that a small terrorist group could develop and detonate a crude nuclear device without access to classified material and without access to a great deal of technological equipment. Modest machine shop facilities could be contracted for purposes of constructing the device. 81¶ Numerous experts have weighed in on the workability of constructing an IND. Hans Bethe, the Nobel laureate who worked on the Manhattan Project, once calculated that a minimum of six highly-trained persons representing the right expertise would be required to fabricate a nuclear device. 82 A hypothetical scenario developed by Peter Zimmerman, a former chief scientist for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Jeffrey G. Lewis, the former executive director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, concluded that a team of 19 persons could build a nuclear device in the United States for about $10 million. 83¶ The most crucial step in the IND pathway is acquiring enough fissile material for the weapon. According to some estimates, roughly 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium or 8 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium would be required to support a self-sustaining fission chain reaction. 84 It would be virtually impossible for a terrorist group to create its own fissile material. Enriching uranium, or producing plutonium in a nuclear reactor, is far beyond the scope of any terrorist organization. 85 However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which maintains a database, confirmed 1,562 incidents of smuggling encompassing trade in nuclear materials or radioactive sources. Fifteen incidents involved HEU or plutonium. 86 Be that as it may, according to the IAEA, the total of all known thefts of HEU around the world between 1993 and 2006 amounted to less than eight kilograms, far short of the estimated minimum 25 kilograms necessary for a crude improvised nuclear device. 87 An amount of fissile material adequate for a workable nuclear device would be difficult to procure from one source or in one transaction. However, terrorists could settle on less demanding standards. According to an article in Scientific American, a nuclear device could be fabricated with as little as 60 kilograms of HEU (defined as concentrated to levels of 20 percent for more of the uranium 235 isotope). 88 Although enriching uranium is well nigh impossible for terrorist groups, approximately 1,800 tons of HEU was created during the Cold War, mostly by the United States and the Soviet Union. 89 Collective efforts, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the G-8 Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, have done much to secure nuclear weapons and fissile materials, but the job is far from complete. 90 And other problems are on the horizon. For instance, the number of nuclear reactors is projected to double by the end of the century, though many, if not most, will be fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU). With this development, comes the risk of diversion as HEU and plutonium stockpiles will be plentiful in civilian sectors. 91¶ Plutonium is more available around the world than HEU and smuggling plutonium would be relatively easy insofar as it commonly comes in two-pound bars or gravel-like pellets. 92 Constructing an IND from plutonium, though, would be much more challenging insofar as it would require the more sophisticated implosion-style design that would require highly trained engineers working in well-equipped labs. 93 But, if an implosion device does not detonate precisely as intended, then it would probably be more akin to a radiological dispersion device, rather than a mushroom. Theoretically, plutonium could be used in a gun-assembly weapon, but the detonation would probably result in an unimpressive fizzle, rather than a substantial explosion with a yield no greater than 10 to 20 tons of TNT, which would still be much greater than one from a conventional explosive. 94¶ But even assuming that fissile material could be acquired, the terrorist group would still need the technical expertise to complete the required steps to assemble a nuclear device. Most experts believe that constructing a gun-assembly weapon would pose no significant technological barriers. 95 Luis Alvarez once asserted that a fairly high-level nuclear explosion could be occasioned just by dropping one piece of weapons-grade uranium onto another. He may, however, have exaggerated the ease with which terrorists could fabricate a nuclear device. 96¶ In sum, the hurdles that a terrorist group would have to overcome to build or acquire a nuclear bomb are very high. If states that aspire to obtain nuclear capability face serious difficulties, it would follow that it would be even more challenging for terrorist groups with far fewer resources and a without a secure geographic area in which to undertake such a project. The difficulty of developing a viable nuclear weapon is illustrated by the case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which after 20 years of effort and over ten billion dollars spent, failed to produce a functional bomb by the time the country was defeated in the 1991 Gulf War. 97 Nevertheless, the quality of a nuclear device for a non-state entity would presumably be much lower as it would not be necessary to meet the same quality standards of states when fabricating their nuclear weapons. Nor would the device have to be weaponized and mated with a delivery system.¶ In order to be successful, terrorists must succeed at each stage of the plot. With clandestine activities, the probability of security leaks increases with the number of persons involved. 98 The plot would require not only highly competent technicians, but also unflinching loyalty and discipline from the participants. A strong central authority would be necessary to coordinate the numerous operatives involved in the acquisition and delivery of the weapon. Substantial funding to procure the materials with which to build a bomb would be necessary, unless a weapon was conveyed to the group by a state or some criminal entity. 99 Finally, a network of competent and dedicated operatives would be required to arrange the transport of the weapon across national borders without detection, which could be challenging considering heightened security measures, including gamma ray detectors. 100 Such a combination of steps spread throughout each stage of the plot would be daunting. 101¶ As Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier once pointed out, in setting the parameters of nuclear terrorism, the laws of physics are both kind and cruel. In a sense, they are kind insofar as the essential ingredients for a bomb are very difficult to produce. However, they are also cruel in the sense that while it is not easy to make a nuclear bomb, it is not as difficult as believed once the essential ingredients are in hand. 102 Furthermore, as more and more countries undergo industrialization concomitant with the diffusion of technology and expertise, the hurdles for acquiring these ingredients are now more likely to be surmounted, though HEU is still hard to procure illicitly. In a global economy, dual-use technologies circulate around the world along with the scientific personnel who design and use them. 103 And although both the US and Russian governments have substantially reduced their arsenals since the end of the Cold War, many warheads remain. 104 Consequently, there are still many nuclear weapons that could fall into the wrong hands.

EXT - Can’t Drill to Independence

Demand outstrips production – plan forces reliance on OPEC

Eyal Aronoff 12/4/12 (founder of the fuel freedom foundation, real clear energy, “Why is the IEA Report Considered Good News?” http://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2012/12/04/why_is_the_iea_report_on_energy_independence_considered_good_news_106804.html

A surge in unconventional supplies, mainly from light tight oil in the United States and oil sands in Canada . . push non-OPEC production up after 2015 . . .. This is maintained until the mid-2020s, before falling back . . . in 2035. Output from OPEC countries rises, particularly after 2020, bringing the OPEC share in global production from its current 42% up to 50% by 2035.¶ In other words, the long-range result of our surge in unconventional oil may only leave us even more dependent on OPEC in the following decade! Clearly, this is not a promising long-range scenario.¶ One other factor that looms large in the IEA Report is the coming emergence of Iraq as the world’s second-largest supplier.¶ In our projections, oil output in Iraq exceeds 6 mb/d in 2020 and rises to more than 8 mb/d in 2035. Iraq becomes a key supplier to fast-growing Asian markets, mainly China, and the second-largest global exporter by the 2030s, overtaking Russia.¶ Iraq has a long history of instability and competes with Iran in offering huge subsidies to its people for the consumption of domestic oil. It too seems like an unreliable place on which to be banking for long-term supplies.¶ The underlying problem, as the IEA continually points out, is that oil has no real competition in the transportation market. As developing countries expand their use of cars and trucks, this can only drive oil prices higher:¶ Growth in oil consumption in emerging economies, particularly for transport in China, India and the Middle East, more than outweighs reduced demand in the OECD, pushing oil use steadily higher . . . [T]he IEA crude oil import price rises to $125/barrel (in year-2011 dollars) in 2035. . . .The transport sector already accounts for over half the global oil consumption, and this share increases as the number of passenger cars doubles to 1.7 billion and demand for road freight rises quickly. The latter is responsible for almost 40% of the increase in global oil demand.¶ This price increase alone will ensure that Americans will pay $3 trillion over the next ten years for oil imports – more than we have spent over the last decade. This is equivalent to 75 percent of the financial shortfall faced by the federal government over the same period. Without unleashing ourselves from world oil markets, there is very little hope we will be able to find a resolution to our financial difficulties.

offshore drilling doesn’t solve dependence-not enough oil, quick production declines

ASPO-USA ’10 (Association for the Study of Peak Oil & Gas USA (ASPO-USA) was founded in 2005 as a network of scientists, researchers, analysts, and other energy observers, to foster critical examination of oil and gas depletion issues, 2010, “ANWR and Offshore Drilling,” http://aspousa.org/peak-oil-reference/peak-oil-data/anwr-and-offshore-drilling/)

Drilling in deepwater, as we are doing in the Gulf of Mexico, is the only way the to find oil fields in the Lower 48 that can produce large flows (50,000 barrels per day or more) of oil. However, deepwater fields tend to “crash” at high rates, with production declining at 20% per year or more once they pass the peak.¶ A good example is BP’s Thunder Horse platform, one of the most advanced deepwater platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. The field was discovered in 1999 in Mississippi Canyon blocks 788 and 822, and partners BP and Exxon announced that the field had a billion barrels of reserves. The Thunder Horse platform was originally designed to produce 250,000 barrels per day, but never reached that level. Its production is already declining by as much as 25% per year, and now produces about 180,000 barrels per day. Ultimate production from the Thunder Horse complex is expected to fall significantly short of a billion barrels.¶ Our dependency on deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico has been brought into sharp relief by the BP oil spill. (See also: “The Oil Spill in Perspective“ and “The Real Gulf Crisis“)¶ “Energy independence” is unachievable¶ Although every barrel we can produce domestically will be welcome and would slightly reduce our dependency on imports, the idea that we can somehow drill our way to independence from imported oil is misleading in the extreme. At the rate that the U.S. currently uses oil, the chance of producing all of our own needs domestically is zero. The only way we can truly become energy independent is by severely curtailing our oil demand, and switching loads over to renewables.

offshore drilling doesn’t solve dependence, is bad for the econ and the environment

Helvarg ’10 (David Helvarg, an author and Executive Director of the Blue Frontier Campaign, an ocean conservation and policy group, 4-1-10, “Oil drilling -- a nasty national habit,” LA Times, Lexis)

President Obama's decision to have Interior Secretary Ken Salazar open vast new areas of federal ocean waters to offshore oil drilling is no surprise. In his State of the Union address, the president explained that his vision for a clean energy future included offshore drilling, nuclear power and clean coal. Unfortunately, that's like advocating a healthy diet based on fast-food snacking, amphetamines and low-tar cigarettes.¶ If the arguments you hear in the coming days for expanded drilling sound familiar, it's because they've been repeated for generations. We've been hearing promises about safer drilling technologies since before Union Oil began drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel. And if you don't remember what happened that time, you should. Soon after the wells were bored, one of them blew out in January 1969, causing a massive oil slick that slimed beaches and killed birds, fish and marine mammals. The resulting catastrophe helped spark the modern environmental movement.¶ The president has promised no new drilling off the West Coast, and it's no wonder. Opposition was unified and vociferous during Salazar's public hearing on offshore energy development in San Francisco in April 2009. More than 500 people -- including Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), Gov. Ted Kulongoski of Oregon, California's lieutenant governor and four House members -- testified and rallied for clean energy and against any new oil drilling.¶ Boxer noted that the coast was a treasure and a huge economic asset "just as is," generating $24 billion a year and 390,000 jobs.¶ Still, in the new Department of Interior announcement, one can hear echoes of President Reagan's Interior secretary, Don Hodel, who warned us in the 1980s that if we didn't expand offshore drilling, we'd be "putting ourselves at the tender mercies of OPEC."¶ We did expand offshore drilling then, not off the stunning redwood coastline of Mendocino, Calif., as Hodel wanted, but where the oil industry knew most of the oil and gas actually was and is: in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico. We even created a royalty moratorium for the oil companies that went after those huge deep-water fields.¶ But offshore drilling has done little to wean us from Middle Eastern oil. And with less than 5% of our domestic oil located offshore, more ocean drilling won't help now either.

Oil production doesn’t solve dependence – political and environmental movements prevent

Clifford Krauss, 4-22-2014, national business correspondent covering energy, author, journalist,4/22/2014. “Challenges Lie Ahead for North American Oil Production,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/business/energy-environment/challenges-lie-ahead-for-north-american-oil-production.html?_r=0

At a time when Russia is saber-rattling and the Middle East is in turmoil, a welcome geopolitical trifecta could be in the making. The United States is poised to surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia as the world’s top oil producer. Canada’s oil sands have vaulted the country to energy superpower status. Mexico is embarking on a historic constitutional energy overhaul that its president promises will propel the country’s economy. And there is no shortage of cheerleaders. “The North American production outlook is incredibly bright,” said Jason Bordoff, a former senior energy adviser in President Obama’s White House. “Everything we see on the ground suggests reasons to be optimistic.” BIG RIG A Petróleos Mexicanos complex in the Gulf of Mexico. Pending legislation could open exploration and production in Mexico to international oil companies.Energy Special Section But as bright as the future may appear, energy executives and other experts say it is time for a reality check before declaring energy independence for the United States and its continent. Gushing oil and gas give North America hopes of becoming what some call “Saudi America,” but fossil fuels development is always contentious for its environmental costs. The Keystone XL pipeline, intended to connect Canada’s oil sands to American refineries, has been tangled in politics and regulatory concerns for years. Grass-roots environmental movements have stopped natural gas drilling in New York State and Quebec, and they threaten the expansion of oil company operations, pipelines and port terminals in the Western United States and Canada.

Oil dependence inevitable – demand too high

Brad Plumber 12, Reporter on domestic energy issues, 5/10/2014, “True oil independence is an unrealistic dream,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/oil-independence-is-an-impossible-dream/2012/05/10/gIQAy2EoFU_blog.html

Over at the Council of Foreign Relations, Michael Levi takes issue with some of the recent hyperbole about U.S. energy independence. He points out that even if the United States does become the world’s biggest producer of oil, natural gas and biofuels by 2020 — an impressive achievement, for sure — we’d still be importing 22 percent of our oil and gas from abroad. To put that in perspective, that would still leave the U.S. more dependent on foreign energy than it was back in 1973, when OPEC oil shocks were kneecapping the economy

EXT – Doesn’t Solve Hegemony/National Security

Only reducing consumption solves their internal link – global markets means enemies still profit – their 1AC article

Rebecca Lefton And Daniel J. Weiss, 1-13-2010, "Oil Dependence Is a Dangerous Habit," American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2010/01/13/7200/oil-dependence-is-a-dangerous-habit/

As a major contributor to the global demand for oil the United States is paying to finance and sustain unfriendly regimes. Our demand drives up oil prices on the global market, which oftentimes benefits oil-producing nations that don’t sell to us. The Center for American Progress finds in “Securing America’s Future: Enhancing Our National Security by Reducing oil Dependence and Environmental Damage,” that “because of this, anti-Western nations such as Iran—with whom the United States by law cannot trade or buy oil—benefit regardless of who the end buyer of the fuel is.” Further, the regimes and elites that economically benefit from rich energy resources rarely share oil revenues with their people, which worsens economic disparity in the countries and at times creates resource-driven tension and crises. The State Department cites oil-related violence in particular as a danger in Nigeria, where more than 54 national oil workers or businesspeople have been kidnapped at oil-related facilities and other infrastructure since January 2008. Attacks by insurgents on the U.S. military and civilians continue to be a danger in Iraq. Our oil dependence will also be increasingly harder and more dangerous to satisfy. In 2008 the United States consumed 23 percent of the world’s petroleum, 57 percent of which was imported. Yet the United States holds less than 2 percent of the world’s oil reserves. Roughly 40 percent of our imports came from Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, but we can’t continue relying on these allies. The majority of Canada’s oil lies in tar sands, a very dirty fuel, and Mexico’s main oil fields are projected dry up within a decade. Without reducing our dependence on oil we’ll be forced to increasingly look to more antagonistic and volatile countries that pose direct threats to our national security.

More evidence - consumption patterns draw the US into warming based aid that hamstrings the military and makes the terror advantage inevitable

Rebecca Lefton And Daniel J. Weiss, 1-13-2010, "Oil Dependence Is a Dangerous Habit," American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2010/01/13/7200/oil-dependence-is-a-dangerous-habit/

Meanwhile, America’s voracious oil appetite continues to contribute to another growing national security concern: climate change. Burning oil is one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions and therefore a major driver of climate change, which if left unchecked could have very serious security global implications. Burning oil imported from “dangerous or unstable” countries alone released 640.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, which is the same as keeping more than 122.5 million passenger vehicles on the road. Recent studies found that the gravest consequences of climate change could threaten to destabilize governments, intensify terrorist actions, and displace hundreds of millions of people due to increasingly frequent and severe natural disasters, higher incidences of diseases such as malaria, rising sea levels, and food and water shortages. A 2007 analysis by the Center for American Progress concludes that the geopolitical implications of climate change could include wide-spanning social, political, and environmental consequences such as “destabilizing levels of internal migration” in developing countries and more immigration into the United States. The U.S. military will face increasing pressure to deal with these crises, which will further put our military at risk and require already strapped resources to be sent abroad. Global warming-induced natural disasters will create emergencies that demand military aid, such as Hurricane Katrina at home and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami abroad. The world’s poor will be put in the most risk, as richer countries are more able to adapt to climate change. Developed countries will be responsible for aid efforts as well as responding to crises from climate-induced mass migration. five biggest companies importing oil from unstable countries Military and intelligence experts alike recognize that global warming poses serious environmental, social, political, and military risks that we must address in the interest of our own defense. The Pentagon is including climate change as a security threat in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated report that updates Pentagon priorities every four years. The State Department will also incorporate climate change as a national security threat in its Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. And in September the CIA created the Center on Climate Change and National Security to provide guidance to policymakers surrounding the national security impact of global warming. Leading Iraq and Afghanistan military veterans also advocate climate and clean-energy policies because they understand that such reform is essential to make us safer. Jonathan Powers, an Iraq war veteran and chief operating officer for the Truman National Security Project, said “We recognize that climate change is already affecting destabilized states that have fragile governments. That’s why hundreds of veterans in nearly all 50 states are standing up with Operation Free—because they know that in those fragile states, against those extremist groups, it is our military that is going to have to act.” The CNA Corporation’s Military Advisory Board determined in 2007 that “Climate change can act as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world, and it presents significant national security challenges for the United States.” In an update of its 2007 report last year CNA found that climate change, energy dependence, and national security are interlinked challenges.

AT: Technology/Alliances Internal Link

Your evidence is about gas fracking, renewable development, and if the US becomes a net exporter WITHIN THIS DECADE– the plan is just oil (and our other case D proves getting oil takes too long)

Dan Mahaffee, Dir. Policy and Board Relations @ Center for the Study for the Pres., summer 2012, “The Geopolitics of U.S. Energy Independence,” International Economy, http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Su12_GeopoliticsEnergySymp.pdf

If the United States becomes a net energy exporter within a decade through expanded oil exploration, alternative energy innovation, and natural gas shale "fracking" techniques, we can continue to shape the global marketplace. As a result, the future will look an awful lot like the balance of power we enjoy today. With the development of new U.S. energy exports, our close allies will be a natural destination for these products. While post-nuclear Japan will be a major destination for U.S. energy, there is already an existing open-market affinity between the United States and Europe. Although Germany may need to seek closer relations with Russia for its energy needs, it could also turn to its more natural ally, the United States, for exports, as well as U.S. expertise to help harness Europe's own sources of energy from European shale formations. Ultimately, the United States may find itself in a position of power, not in terms of barrels or BTUs, but rather in the technical expertise we develop in cutting-edge energy extraction. In this respect, investments today in our education system and science infrastructure may be the deciding factor.

EXT – Doesn’t Solve Terror

Other concerns in the region maintain a footprint – makes the resentment internal link intvitable

Wolf 12 “The Geopolitics of U.S. Energy Independence” Charles Wolf- Distinguished Corporate Chair in International Economics, RAND Corporation, Professor, Pardee Rand Graduate School, and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution,Summer 2012, International http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Su12_GeopoliticsEnergySymp.pdf

U.S. foreign policy and military security concerns are not thereby likely to be diminished. Such collateral events as the following would account for our continued concerns: Iran’s persistent pursuit of deliverable nuclear weapons (if not by then having been already acquired); Saudi concerns with countering this development; also the heightened concerns of other Sunni elements in the Middle East; Egypt's restiveness still further aggravated by these circumstances; and Israel's concerns about what to do and how to do it in the face of these developments. In sum, I doubt that the area will be more quiescent as a result of the sharp change in relative oil and gas prices. That said, it's as plausible that U.S.-Israeli relations will become more harmonious in these circumstances as it is that they will become less so.

EXT – No Hegemony Impact

Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war – conflicts would be small and managable

Haas, 8 (Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html)

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

Military superiority doesn’t translate into winning wars

Keating, 13 (Joshua, associate editor at Foreign Policy, 3/18, “Why can't America win a war these days?”, Foreign Policy, http://ideas.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/18/why_cant_america_win_a_war_these_days)

With the 10th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq this week, it seems a worthwhile time to reflect on the fact that for all its obvious military advantages over every country on the planet, the United States doesn't seem particularly good at winning wars anymore.

In her book-length study, Who Wins: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict, University of North Carolina political scientist Patricia L. Sullivan writes:

"The United States failed to achieve its primary political objectives in approximately 30 percent of its major military operation between 1946 and 2002. In almost every one of these failues, the United States chose to terminate its military intervenion short of victory despite the fact that it retained an overwhelming physical capacity to sustain military operations. The U.S. withdrawal from Somalia after the death of sixteen Army Rangers may appear to be an extreme case, but it is consistent with a pattern in which the United States experienced higher-than-expected costs and withdrew its troops short of attaining intervention objectives, despite the fact that its military was, at most, only marginally degraded in the conflict. The United States' unsuccessful intervention in Vietnam is, of course, the quintessential example. "

Sullivan argues that the most important factor in predicting whether a country will be successful in initiating military conflict is not its relative military might or prosperity compared to its opponent, or even it's "resolve" to keep up the fight in the face of high casualties, but the goals and expectations it has going into the conflict. She writest that superior firepower is less of an advantage the more the attacker's war aims require its opponents to change its behavior:

Powerful states do not lose small wars simply because they have less cost tolerance than their weak adversaries. The extent to which a physically weaker actor's cost-tolerance advantage can affect armed conflict outcomes is largely a function of the degree to which the stronger actor has war aims that require the weak actor to change its behavior. The balance of military capabilities between the belligerents is expected to be the most important determinant of outcomes when the objects at stake can be seized and held with physical force alone. The defender's tolerance for costs becomes more significant when a challenger pursues political objectives that require a change in target behavior.

Operation Desert Storm was an example of the first type of objective. Despite Saddam Hussein's warning to the United States that "yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle," the war was over must faster than even U.S. miltary planners expected. The expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait was a goal that could be accomplished through brute force alone, and the U.S. military advantage was decisive. This was true of Saddam's initial ouster in 2003 as well.

But, Sullivan argues, following the ouster of Iraq, the second Bush administration vastly overestimated the usefulness of its firepower advantage in supporting the new Iraqi government against a growing domestic insurgency.

The book's conclusions aren't exactly shocking in the post-Iraq era -- the field of counterinsurgency studies is devoted largely to the question of how to affect a population's behavior in situations where firepower isn't an advantage -- but judging by the news out of Mali, it's not clear that militarily-superior western power have exactly learned the lesson.

EXT – No Nuclear Terrorism

No risk of WMD terrorism – don’t have the resources or focus

Mueller and Stewart, 12 (Professor PolSci Ohio State, and Stewart, Professor Infrastructure Performance at U of Newcastle, ’12, John- Senior Research Scientist Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Mark- Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow, Summer, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11” International Security, Vol 37 No 1, ProjectMuse)

Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50¶ If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 [End Page 98]¶ Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

Theoretical possibilities are irrelevant – there are too many difficult steps which make it functionally impossible

Chapman 12 (Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: Afxter Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.