189
However, Harris’ argument about bypassing morality can be made sense of within a
compatibilist view of free will and free action such as Frankfurt’s. Indeed, Harris
states that ‘no assumptions about the viability of a non-deterministic account of free
will and,
for what it is worth, think some version of compatibilism is probably
right’ (Harris, 2014b).
43
Even though in his reflections on the God Machine, Harris
seems to argue that we need to keep PAP in order to preserve the ‘ought implies
can’ principle, I agree with Harris that this line of the debate is not the most
relevant.
44
According to compatibilists, what matters is whether the decision was
arrived at in the right way, with the right sort of relationship between one's
preferences and actions – thus, acting on some – and not other –
kinds of causal
influences. If one acts with the ability to act in accordance with good reasons
(Wolf, 1990) or if one acts with ‘guidance control’ which consists in part of acting
on a reasons-responsive mechanism
for which one has taken responsibility
(Fischer
and Ravizza, 1998), one
can be responsible for one's actions. This approach is
consistent with Harris’ emphasis on the importance of the all-things-considered
judgement (Harris 2011, 2012, 2013a
, 2014a, 2014b). Thus, according to a
compatibilist account, freedom can be impaired if action is produced by causal
influences that do not satisfy the right criteria.
Moreover, at this point of the debate I think it is important to move beyond the
following line of reasoning. Harris’ argument can be
seen as addressing only the
cases brought forward by Persson and Savulescu (2008). Harris sees Persson and
Savulescu (2008) proposing the use of biomedical means in such a way as to
necessarily produce morally good outcomes via modulation of emotions, sentiments
or attitudes. When talking about serotonin and oxytocin’s influence on what
psychologists and neuroscientists call moral judgement, Harris (2014b) states that:
‘[t]he presence of these molecules in particular doses is indeed “freedom-
43
Although in another article Harris defends the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
(Harris, 2014a).
44
I do not see it as ‘irrelevant,’ as our commitments in the compatibilism/incompatibilism
domain may influence the kinds of arguments we are going to find more or less
compelling. However, I do not think that taking hard positions
on those questions is
necessary for continuing a meaningful debate about moral enhancement. Accepting the
'ought implies-can' maxim should lead one to accept that an agent must have genuine
access to the world which renders the 'can-claim' true. Even if unconvinced by my
argument that the agent has such access in overdetermination cases, it remains an open
question to what extent this would apply to more worldly incarnations of MB.
190
subverting” – if it were not, it is unlikely they would
have the effects vaunted by
their advocates, that is, effects that operate independently of the will or of
judgement ...’ (p. 373). Although the interpretation of the original Savulescu and
Persson paper (2008, and latter proposals) is justified and Harris’ argument works
in this context, this line of discussion seems to me to be a dead-end. For one,
oxytocin and serotonin are very unlikely to produce the type and magnitude of
effects that Savulescu and Persson seem to be after in their early paper – an effect
strong enough to preclude large scale harm. Secondly, as psychopharmacological
means are used
more and more to modify mood, cognition and our social
functioning, more plausible uses of MB warrant a careful examination. In
considering biomedical emotion modulation and its potential for moral
enhancement understood as making better moral agents, God lies in the details.
In this chapter I will first examine whether Harris’ worry about the freedom-
subverting effects of psychopharmacological means that act on attitudes or desires
is likely to apply to more plausible attempts at MB. I will ask whether biomedically
created ‘compulsions to do what is good’ preclude moral review, addressing the
question of whether morality is indeed bypassed by MB. Using the example of
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) to illustrate
the issue and considering
biomedical mood modification, I will suggest that even strong impulses to act in a
certain way are not beyond meaningful moral review.
The second part of the chapter addresses issues related to moral control. I consider
MB in the context of a discussion of Aristotelian concepts of virtue, enkrateia,
akrasia and vice. I suggest that inverse-akrasia is the best analogy for Persson and
Savulescu’s (2008) MB and argue that even where the agent acts akratically,
compulsory MB would not be desirable. In further sections I argue that enhancing
individual moral agency is a valuable pursuit and that modulation of inclinations
(including biomedically-aided modulation) not only has a legitimate place in this
pursuit, but is a crucial part of it.
