Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

7.9. Conclusions 
In this chapter I aimed to contribute to the analysis of the ethical God Machine 
thought experiment considered the extent to which issues raised in relation to 
freedom in the discussion of Savulescu and Persson’s (2012a) thought experiment 
calls the desirability of MB into doubt. Using a series of thought experiments to 
tease out exactly in what way the God Machine could endanger freedom (various 
cases of overdetermination of agent’s actions).
In sections7.3-7.5 I have argued that the main problem with the God Machine is 
that it breaks the link between agents own reasons for action and the outcome in the 
world. Section 7.3 explicated the issues in relation to moral luck and prise and 
blame, section 7.4 used Frankfurtian analysis in order to argue that an important 
aspect of the God Machine’s threat to freedom lies not in endangering free will 
generally but rather by undermining specifically the ability to form a 
will of our 
own
. Section 7.5 I argued that the problem does not necessarily lie in the fact that 
the God Machine is a case of overdetermination, and that the more plausible uses of 
MB that involve overdetermination would be significantly less problematic.
Section 7.6 examined Sparrows (2014) objection in the context of Pettit’s freedom 
as non-domination. After outlining Sparrow’s (2014) objection and discussing the 
freedom as non-domination account, I have argued that Sparrow’s (2014) critique 
fails because it misconstrues the God Machine as an agent and the facts of the ideal 
world scenario presented by Savulescu and Persson (2012a). The freedom as non-
domination theory might be particularly ill-suited to the ethical analysis of the God 
Machine, due to problematic aspects of the notion of agency in that theory as well 
as an unclear agential status of the God Machine. Thus, I have concluded that that 

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non-domination theory of freedom as interpreted by Sparrow (2014) is ill fitted to 
ground a robust critique.
In section 7.7 I used an analysis of the application of Mill’s harm principle and 
argued that the God Machine would be an undesirable way of achieving a morally 
better world because it might adversely affect the way the desires and inclinations 
for action are formed. This discussion shed light on the factors that are to be 
considered when evaluating the impact of MB on moral agency. 
However, I have argued that the conclusions taken from the consideration of the 
God Machine thought experiment can only bring our attention potentially important 
aspects, but due to the degree of abstraction and important differences between the 
God Machine and MB, the arguments related to the God Machine should be 
transferred with much caution to the ethical assessment of real-world MB. I have 
concluded that the arguments raised in relation to the God Machine thought 
experiment fail to call the desirability of real world, hopefully voluntary and agent 
led MB, into doubt.

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