Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

7.7.3. The inner citadel 
In his 
Two Concepts of Liberty
, Berlin wrote about the retreat to the inner citadel 
that happens when a person realises he cannot attain his desires:
‘I am the possessor of reason and will; I conceive ends and I desire to 
pursue them; but I am prevented from attaining them I no longer feel 
master of the situation. … I determine myself not to desire what is 
unattainable. … It is as if I had performed a strategic retreat into an 
inner citadel - my reason, my soul, my 'noumenal' self - which, do 
what they may, neither external blind force, nor human malice, can 
touch. I have withdrawn into myself; there, and there alone, I am 
secure. (1958, pp. 181-182) 
Berlin uses the above passage to argue that the definition of liberty as the ability to 
do what one wishes to do is not sufficient; it would imply that when one cannot 
attain what one desires due to an oppressive and unjust social order, teaching 
oneself not to desire it would be a solution consistent with liberty – and yet, this is 
the antithesis of political freedom. Perhaps retreating to the inner citadel is not the 
kind of freedom that we wish to pursue and create via our social institutions, but I 
wish to make another point here. The terrifying fate that Berlin describes is 
42
There is much more to be said here about Mill’s view of paternalism (See Mill 1859, 
chapter V) and alternative views, but it is sufficient to say here that Savulescu and 
Persson’s (2012a) appeal to the harm principle is insufficient. 

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180 
surpassed by the God Machine world where there is not even a citadel to retreat to. 
The God Machine, in contrast to even highly coercive measures such as 
imprisonment, undermines the very basic independence – the safety of the citadel 
itself.
The inner citadel, the ability to engage with the world and interpret it in our own 
way, engage with and take a stance towards the societal values and conditions we 
found ourselves in, lies at the root of the value of liberty. This ability is not 
everything, but it remains important and foundational – whether or not there are 
obstacles to living according to our endorsed choices and values. On the one hand, 
such conceived ‘inwardly focused’ autonomy is only one of the many facets of 
freedom. The idea of a ‘chain of freedom’ (Harris, 2014a), a chain from thought to 
action is, I think, compelling. The chain leading to free and effective action in the 
thickest sense may be severed in many places and by various influences. Our 
beliefs may be erroneous; our choices marked by the values of the society we 
would not reflectively endorse; the incentives, nudges and prods of policy makers, 
the law and circumstance may change the architecture of rationally endorsable 
options, and the exercise of our wills may be subject to obstacles, whether rooted in 
nature, social arrangements or intentional actions of other people. On the other 
hand, the God Machine does something more than break the chain: it attacks the 
chain at the very source of it, at the spot on which the meaningfulness of the whole 
chain depends.
What would justify the crucial importance of freedom of thought that I am 
advocating? Mill gives two reasons that could provide grounding for this idea in his 
defence of expressive liberties and arguments against censorship. The first is the 
utility of public discussion to promote the generation of knowledge. In the second 
argument, and the one that is more appealing in the context of the God Machine, 
Mill argues that freedoms of thought and discussion are necessary for fulfilling our 
natures as ‘progressive beings’ (ON, II 20). It is the exercise of our higher or 
deliberative capacities, Mill argues, that make a human life good (ON, I 11, 20; 
ON, III 1–10); the capacities to form, revise, assess, select, and implement our own 
ideas and plan of a good life. The God Machine, and heteronomy in general, 
undermines the exercise of those capacities in fundamental ways. 

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Another reason why Mill found liberty as independence from external influence 
important is because 
it is important that a person leads his life on his own terms and 
develops his capacities and faculties according to ‘his own mode of laying out his 
existence’ (Mill, 1859, p. 64), and to deny him that opportunity via interference is 
profoundly insulting – treating another not as an equal being capable of developing 
her own ideas of the good (see also: Quong, 2011, pp. 101–106). Raz puts forward 
a similar point: 
It is commonplace to say that by coercing or manipulating a person 
one treats him as an object rather than as an autonomous person. 
But how can that be so even if the consequences of one's coercion 
are negligible? The natural fact that coercion and manipulation 
reduce options or distort normal processes of decision and the 
formation of preferences