Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

participants with high and low AQ scores was indistinguishable. 
The exact mechanism underpinning the influence of oxytocin on trust, empathy and 
other potentially morally relevant abilities is still debated, but only looking at the 
known effects paints an intriguing picture. Assuming that the results discussed so 
far are confirmed, we may be able to gain a new, and possibly more convenient, 
means of influencing our level of trust and empathic ability, probably without a 
worry of overdoing it drastically (although there is some indication that oxytocin 
seems also to increase envy [see Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2009]). This may be not 
good enough for those envisaging radical human enhancement, but, as was argued 
above in the section on ‘reconsidering our expectations’, the potential for this 
substantial, although not universal or radical, enhancement may be worth pursuing.

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Although increases in trust or empathy may not eliminate (or maybe even decrease 
or keep constant) risks of large scale harm, an increase in empathy for those at the 
lower end of the functioning spectrum has the potential, via possible improvements 
in social cognition, to contribute to a greater ability to take into consideration 
others’ wellbeing— an ability fundamental to moral consideration.
Positive behavioural effects demonstrated by couples during conflict in Ditzen et al. 
(2008) (which are most probably also mediated by an influence on the amygdala 
and stress levels) seem to point us towards the potential for a marked behavioural 
effect. These can be especially useful in professions that require empathy, a well-
developed ability to notice others’ distress, and maintaining prosocial attitudes 
under stress and during conflict, such as in the caring professions. The ability to 
increase generosity and trust in social exchanges where the exchange partner is 
judged to be trustworthy (or at least not particularly untrustworthy) seems highly 
unlikely to solve the serious political conflicts exacerbated by lack of trust. 
However, we can easily imagine a situation where an increase in the frequency of 
acts typical of a Good or even a Splendid Samaritan—doing what is morally 
desirable but not obligatory—can have a notable and positive influence on what 
kind of social world we live in. I will further explore the reasons for and against 
facilitating moral agency of Good Samaritans in chapter 8.
On the other hand, we are not justified in seeing oxytocin as an unproblematic 
social or moral enhancer. Firstly, whether or not the pro-social effects of oxytocin 
are truly pro-social will depend on the context. The pro-social effects might also be 
tied to undesirable effects such as increasing envy. Moreover, as Harris (2011) 
pointed out, the increase in pro-social behaviour does not necessarily imply that 
such effects will lead to truly better moral agency. Where there is no appropriate 
moral judgement involved, even where agents do more good their good acts need 
not be motivated morally. Moreover, where such moral guidance by reason is 
absent, we can expect that the pro-social effects might be sometimes inimical to 
morally good outcomes. If oxytocin increases in-group trust and co-operation, it 
might be pro-social in a narrow sense but lead to evils if the group aims, for 
example, at attacking another group. Guidance by reason remains a necessary 
component of moral decision-making and moral action, and no nasal shot of 
oxytocin is going to assure the ethical behaviour of the recipient of such 

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intervention. The difference between the moral and the prosocial in relation to the 
importance of reflection in changing pro-social inclinations is further explored in 
Chapter 3. The importance of deliberation undertaken from a moral standpoint in 
the process of choosing moral modification, as well as in the process of evaluating 
outcomes of the procedure, will be further discussed in Chapter 7 and 8.