Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

2.3.
Reconsidering our expectations 
2.3.1. Context-dependency and individual differences 
I have outlined some of the reasons why MB may indeed be incapable of 
eliminating the risk of large-scale harm, as Persson and Savulescu (2008) seem to 
require. But the expectation that MB 
eliminates 
the risk of large-scale harm seems 
to be not only potentially impossible but also unreasonably demanding. One of the 
reasons why it is unreasonably demanding was pointed out by Harris (2011): the 
expectation that MB 
ensures 
safety by 
eliminating 
risk seems to be impossible to 
satisfy. Even if MB were fantastically efficient and cost-effective, it would be 
unlikely to eliminate the risk of large-scale disaster because one malevolent person, 
who slipped through the net of enhancement or for whom the intervention did not 
work, is enough for the risk not to be eliminated. Even assuming that all disasters 
are caused only by malevolent individuals, the standard for the effectiveness of 
moral enhancing interventions is set very high. Although we may have such hope, 
6
As pointed out by John Harris (1980).

---

34 
we do not normally expect cognitively enhancing technologies to work for every 
single person, nor do we expect most very effective treatments to work in every 
single case.
Both cognitive and moral enhancement can be achieved by a variety of means. One 
of the possibilities is to use pharmacology. Pharmacological interventions often 
vary in effectiveness from individual to individual, and the influence of individual 
differences on outcomes is very well known, especially when the goal of 
intervention is to modify behaviour, mood or thinking processes. Predictions of 
outcomes (and side-effects) for a single patient can be so unreliable that suitable 
medication is decided upon only after a process of trial and error (Huskamp, 2003). 
Often, a group of patients will be unresponsive to all of the pharmacological 
remedies, and sometimes to both different types of medication and different types 
of therapies, as well as to combined approaches. The use of pharmacology that 
seems to be sensitive to individual differences and pharmacological interventions, 
at least as our experience so far suggests, is likely to work for some but not for 
others. The number of subjects who might experience a desired effect is likely to 
increase with the growing variety of available interventions, as new drugs and other 
technologies (such as deep brain stimulation) are designed and tested to address the 
needs of those for whom nothing has yet worked (Mayberg et al. 2005; Berton and 
Nestler, 2006). 
It is important to admit that pharmacological interventions have their limitations, 
but it is equally important not to forget about the cases where those interventions 
are effective. It may be regrettable that a drug is not effective for 
all 
(or even 
many), but denying the plausibility of moral enhancement because it does not work 
for all seems to be unjustifiably demanding.
Moreover, whether a potentially enhancing intervention is indeed enhancement 
depends both on the context and on a particular person’s needs. While weight gain 
may be an enhancement for an underweight individual, it would not be so for an 
obese person. Although we may think of a change as a typical cognitive 
enhancement, for example an increase in the ability to focus on a particular task 

---

35 
while ignoring distractions (focusing attention), the same intervention may be 
neutral or even counterproductive in some tasks that require creativity.
Whether a particular intervention is going to have morally enhancing effects
7
depends on the context, individual and individual’s activities. However, this only 
means that Savulescu and Persson’s goal will unlikely to be furthered by moral 
bioenhancement. Context-dependency abolishes neither the usefulness and 
plausibility of cognitive bioenhancement nor the usefulness or plausibility of moral 
bioenhancement.