Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

actions 
and not only professed beliefs. As a result, 
there is no in principle reason why changing beliefs or enhancing deliberative 
ability, whether by education, biomedical cognitive enhancement or policy, should 
be the sole or even best way of decreasing the prevalence of racist actions. 
Moreover, it seems that what Andrew primarily needs is not a change in beliefs – 
that he embarks on the neuroscientist-led examination and change of his implicit 
biases already suggests that he is not fatally missing in the area of knowing the 
good. Rather, he struggles to make the belief ‘sink from top to bottom’: to the level 
of implicit beliefs and automatic emotional reactions that to a large extent guide our 
everyday actions. This gap between his rationally endorsed moral beliefs and an 
ability to translate them into everyday behaviours is Andrew’s chief problem. 
Harris made a similar comment about a different case in Douglas (2013), and it 
applies well to Andrew too – according to Harris, such agents do not lack moral 
goodness. 
Two functions of moral deliberation need distinguishing when we talk about change 
in moral conduct. One has to do with a distal reason motivating MB, the ability to 
review its effects and justify the intervention as indeed conducive to the good. What 
we are talking about here belongs to what I have previously called offline moral 
review and control. The second function has to do with online moral control and 
creating conditions in which the agent is more likely to act according to the good. 
This second function includes the ability to revise ones attitudes, implicit beliefs 
and behavioural schemas in accordance with such deliberatively examined and 
endorsed values and general beliefs. Harris 
(2012) argues 
that deliberation, and 
whatever enhances deliberation, is most conducive to morality – not only in its 
distally motivating and justificatory role, but also in fulfilling the second function. I 

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do not deny that deliberation oriented towards practical action, revising one’s 
beliefs and developing new ones is also immensely valuable insofar as it translates 
into action. However, I doubt that it is the only (or perhaps even the most) effective 
way of making our rationally endorsed beliefs ‘sink in.’
This empirical claim needs some more support. Psychology in its therapeutic aspect 
is perhaps the discipline most concerned 
with the kind of behavioural change we 
are talking about here (although usually more aimed at increasing well-being). The 
history of psychology reflects the above tension between the importance of insight 
into the sources, causes, functions and mechanics of particular behaviours 
(including the associated beliefs) and its aim of changing problematic behaviours 
and alleviating distress (Friedman, 2011). There is no need to discuss this 
controversy in detail. For the purpose of our discussion it is sufficient to simply 
refer to the gap familiar to psychotherapists
: the gap between insight and 
behavioural or emotional change.
Admittedly, the concept of ‘insight’ as used in psychology and psychiatry is 
somewhat vague and used to describe a variety of phenomena. However, even with 
this limitation in mind, it seems to encompass the belief change that results from 
deliberation and reflection and is thus applicable to the matter discussed here. 
Measures of ‘insight’ used in cognitive-behavioural therapy, for example, include 
‘becoming aware of one’s beliefs’ or ‘identification of errors in thinking’ (Tang and 
DeRubeis, 1999). In turn, the measurement of ‘insight’ used in more 
psychodyamically oriented approaches relies on the estimate of the patient’s 
understanding of his internal conflicts, associated problems, reoccurring behaviours 
and associations with previous experiences and includes the awareness of the 
connected beliefs (Johansson et al., 2010).
The
psychoanalytical tradition typically attributed a considerable potential of 
therapeutic change to insight. For a long time, behaviour change was seen as a 
natural consequence and an integral part of a so called ‘true’ insight (Sandler, Dare, 
and Holder, 1973). This way of thinking is difficult to uphold in light of current 
empirical examinations of the effects of therapy, as an observable therapeutic 
change often occurs only some time after achieving insight – and sometimes does 
not occur at all (see Høgland et al., 1994). Additionally, it is unclear to what extent 

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the change was brought about by insight alone, and to what extent by other, 
mediating factors, initiated by the insight or co-occurring with it. In fact, empirical 
research comparing the treatment outcomes of cognitive behavioural therapy with 
more behaviourally oriented approaches indicates that the ‘cognitive’ aspects of 
cognitive-behavioural therapy are less obviously effective than the behavioural 
components. Moreover, psychologists of various traditions often distinguish 
between what they call ‘intellectual insight’ and ‘emotional insight’, with only the 
latter thought to be accompanied by change in behaviour (for review see: Elliott et 
al., 1994). Although the concepts employed here admittedly are not very sharp, I 
think that even this crude distinction gets at an important observation repeatedly 
made by those professionally in the business of reflectively-embedded behavioural 
change: that there is a gap between consciously held beliefs and their impact on 
everyday behaviour. This gap is present in our everyday lives, but becomes 
especially vivid in the context of change.
There are limitations to drawing inferences from psychotherapy in discussing 
bettering moral agency and MB. The goal of therapy is different than moral 
enhancement aimed at making better moral agents. One would have to look more 
closely at the exact constructs evaluated to draw any strong conclusions. Discussion 
of particular therapeutic tools would ground a stronger argument. The assessment 
of particular aspects of therapy contributing to change is in its infancy, etc. As a 
result, the data from empirical evaluations is not sufficient to provide a basis for a 
strong claim that methods other than belief change should be prioritized. However, 
empirical evaluations of various methods of therapy still provide the best and most 
ecologically valid evidence we have for the effect of change in beliefs specifically – 
insofar as we expect the change of moral beliefs to be followed by change in action. 
As it stands today, the research supports the weaker claims I wish to make – that 
there is a gap between the reflectively endorsed beliefs and everyday behaviour, 
that this gap is common enough (as I suggest) to warrant attention, and that it is not 
best addressed by