Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

Conclusions
The recent boom in neuroscience investigation of sociality stimulated a great deal 
of philosophical and ethical debate. Public intellectuals, psychologists and 
philosophers began to examine the possibility of enhancing our moral faculty and 
behaviour to address the problems that humanity faces (Persson and Savulescu, 
2008; Rifkin, 2010a; Baron-Cohen, 2011; Churchland, 2011; Savulescu and 
Persson, 2012b; Harris, 2011). The capacity for empathy has enjoyed much 
attention, with several thinkers proposing that an increase in empathy will pave the 
way for a better tomorrow.
Those concerns were reflected in the ethical debate on the desirability of MB and 
ethical issues raised by its potential application. Persson and Savulescu (2008) 
argued that since cognitive enhancement and increased access to technology means 
that the society is increasingly exposed to the risk of large scale harm perpetuated 
by a small minority, we have a reason to complement cognitive enhancement with 
MB aimed at preventing such harm. They proposed enhancing social sentiments 
and capacities such as empathy and sense of fairness and argued that MB could 
help to solve the great problems facing humanity, such as climate change and 
poverty. Douglas (2008; 2013; 2014) argued that direct emotion modulation using 
biomedical means could be a permissible way of moral enhancement understood as 
making better moral agents.
However, the idea of MB via direct emotion modulation has also attracted criticism. 
Among others, critics raised concerns about the plausibility of MB related to low 
specificity or weak effects of the proposed interventions, questioned whether the 
modification of pro-sociality translates into enhanced moral agency and raised 
doubts related to moral disagreement. Moreover, critics pointed out that MB could 
have a negative impact on our identity and freedom, and so might not be desirable. 
The aim of the current work was to contribute to the ethical discussion of MB by 
examining the claims and arguments put forward both by its proponents and critics.

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This work aimed to explore what ethical issues should one consider when deciding 
whether and how to use biomedical means of moral modification. Chapters 1-4 
focused on the conceptual issues and the plausibility of MB. Chapters 5-7 addressed 
objections and doubts raised about the ethical desirability of MB. Chapters 7 and 8 
examined arguments related to the potential impact of MB on freedom and moral 
agency.
Chapter 1 addressed the question of what can be considered to be moral 
enhancement by examining the ambiguity of the phrase ‘moral enhancement’ and 
clarifying what can be meant by ‘moral’ and ‘enhancement’. In section 1.2 I have 
outlined the three uses of ‘moral’ and proposed that ‘moral enhancement’ can refer 
to any enhancement that is morally desirable, interventions aimed at making 
morally better agents and enhancement in the moral sphere that is beneficial to the 
agent. In section 1.3 I have outlined the objections to the normative strength of the 
treatment-enhancement distinction and, finding the arguments convincing, proposed 
to understand ‘enhancement’ widely as ‘improvement’ and proceeded on this basis. 
This meant that the ethical assessment of MB might include MB utilized both in 
medical-therapeutic and non-therapeutic contexts. In section 1.4 I have argued that 
the additional level of moral consideration includes the assessment of the overall 
moral permissibility of the specific way MB is used.
Thus, in this first conceptual chapter I have proposed that we consider ‘moral 
enhancement’ widely, as biomedical interventions that modify the moral sphere in 
addition to those aimed at improving moral agency specifically. I have also 
proposed that in the debates sprang out by the prospects of modifying the 
underpinnings of morality and sociality, we should also attend to cases where the 
modification does not aim at creating morally better people, but rather is done on 
the basis of other, e.g. prudential, considerations. This means that an enhancing 
intervention in the sphere relevant to moral function may bring a dis-enhancement 
in moral agency and questions about what is and is not conducive to morality in 
given context and for certain occupations (e.g. military personnel, doctors, care 
professionals). I have proposed that the use of the term ‘biomedical moral 
modification’ (MB) might be more appropriate, given various possible goals of 
such modifications and pending the assessment of the numerous, often context-

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dependent, factors that influence the assessment whether a given intervention is 
morally desirable.
In Chapter 2, I have asked whether specifically biomedical means of modifying the 
moral sphere are likely to be effective, and what kinds of effects can be expected 
after MB and thus what goals are in this context reasonable. I argued that MB is 
plausible, but that we should revise our goals and expectations in discussion MB. 
The aims such as eliminating large scale harm, reducing poverty or addressing 
climate change (Rifkin, 2010; Persson and Savulescu, 2008) mean that we expect 
too much of MB. Instead, I proposed that we see MB similarly to biomedical 
cognitive enhancement: as a small but significant improvement in underlying 
cognitive or affective processes that will help us to better do what we want. With 
our goals revised and expectations adjusted, the examination of the effects of 
oxytocin on social function revealed that sometimes the effects of biomedical 
modification can be significant. This gives a