Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

8.3.4. Deliberation to action 
In his response to Harris’ (2011) concerns, Douglas (2013) elaborates on what he 
calls the Kantian objection to MB. 
Kant held that if any action is to be morally 
good, it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law – it must also be done 
for the sake of the moral law.
This requires deliberation – a deliberative review 
from the moral standpoint.
Agents' actions after biomedical modification of 
emotions, insofar as MB affects conative states (what Douglas calls ‘brute 
conformity’ enhancements), were produced through non-deliberative means. As a 
result, the argument goes, the resultant conduct is not ‘moral’ and even if MB 
makes agents act according to the good, it is not truly ‘moral’ conduct.
Douglas (2013) argues that some technologically plausible enhancement might 
‘operate precisely by facilitating the sort of deliberation that the Kantian … takes to 
be necessary for moral worth’ (p. 7).
60
Discussing a series of examples of 
biomedical and non-biomedical enhancements, he suggests that removing the 
influence of non-endorsed bias, such as unconscious racist attitudes (the case of 
60
A similar proposal was brought forward in Douglas’ 2008 paper, in which he proposed 
that enhancing moral motives through eliminating known biases might be a biomedical 
enhancement that escapes much of the bioconservative criticism. 

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Andrew) or being insufficiently moved by moral motives (the case of Bryoni) could 
improve moral deliberation.
‘Andrew is a doctor working in multi-racial area. He was 
brought up in a racist environment and emotional responses 
introduced during his childhood still have a biasing influence on 
his conduct. For example, they incline him to take more care in 
treating White patients than Black patients. Andrew is aware of 
this aspect of his psychology and suspects it to be morally 
problematic. Hoping to mitigate his bias, he embarks on a new 
programme developed by neuroscientists. He first observes 
stimuli that elicit racial aversion (such as photos of mixed race 
couples and civil rights protests) while undergoing high 
resolution brain scanning to determine which neural connections 
mediate the aversion. Those connections are then selectively 
attenuated via regular sessions of transcranial electrical brain 
modulation. This programme significantly weakens his 
disposition to racial aversion and does indeed lead him to treat 
his Black and White patients more equally.’ (Douglas, p. 8) 
In response, Harris (2011) argues that, although racist beliefs are still present in 
many parts of the world, traditional means of influencing moral agency such as 
education, legislation and public disapproval has greatly reduced the prevalence of 
racist behaviours. As a result, the non-biomedical means seem to be effective in 
reducing the racist bias and there is no need to resort to biomedical means, which 
are likely to be less specific in their actions and may come with side effects. 
Moreover, Harris (2011) points out that prejudices such as 
racism, sexism or 
homophobia are unlikely to be simple, visceral aversive responses – such as, for 
example, an aversion to spiders might be. Rather, prejudicial attitudes are linked to 
and rely on cognitive content. Thus, one may conclude, changing false beliefs and 
prejudices is best achieved by a combination of rationality and education and 
possibly biomedical cognitive enhancement.

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Although Harris 
(2011) correctly 
pointed out that prejudicial attitudes are more 
complex than simple aversions and may be linked to, sustained by and necessarily 
include beliefs about facts, I think it is questionable to claim on this basis that 
beliefs are at the centre of prejudicial behaviour and are corner-stones of prejudicial 
reactions. Rather, prejudice is likely to involve beliefs about the world as well as 
emotions and behavioural habits all linked in the web that influences the way we 
perceive events and people around us, along with the ways in which we react to 
them. This multifactorial way of seeing moral agency especially applies insofar as 
we are concerned with agents’