in the manner in which it spells out the nature
of divine transcendence in relation to God’s attri-
butes so as to avoid the Scylla of
anthropomor
-
phism
and the Charybdis of attributes denuded of
concrete meaning. God’s attributes are one with
his essence, and those attributes are rendered in
metaphorical terms. (2) The
JUstice
(al-adl) of
God. By way of illustration: for the punishment
meted out by God to be just, man must possess
free will or choice, that is, the capacity to choose
between good and evil, with evil inhering in the
errors ascribed to human acts. Suffering and evil,
which is not the consequence of human choice
(e.g., the illness and subsequent death of a child),
is said to warrant compensation from God. More
intriguingly from an ethical vantage point, the
independent (i.e., prior to or apart from
revela
-
tion
) use of reason suffices for becoming aware
of at least some or minimal moral obligations,
as well as knowing the difference between good
and evil actions. In other words, for the Mutazila,
there are basic and general rational rules of ethical
conduct apart from divine guidance although, to
be sure, there are obligations that are known and
motivated exclusively by revelation. Indeed, “God
has graciously acceded to our frailty here and sent
prophets to tell us what rewards and punishments
await us in the next life and at the same time helps
us to achieve the former and avoid the latter by
detailing various laws and duties which strengthen
our disposition to act rightly and so merit the ulti-
mate reward” (Leaman, pp. 164–165). God is just
by definition, meaning he is constrained by the
rules of justice. Thus we do what is right and good
because, objectively speaking, it is right and good,
not simply or only because God has commanded
us to do it. (3) The “promise and the threat” (al-
wad wa al-waid). In reference to Judgment Day,
God promises recompense to those who obey him
and threatens punishment for those who disobey
him. Those guilty of grave sin (e.g., murder) who
die without repentance will suffer the torments of
hell. (4) The theory of an “intermediate state” (al-
manzila bayna l-manzilaytan). As discussed above,
a grave sinner was classified as neither believer
nor disbeliever but was said to be in an interme-
diate state between these categories, hence also
betwixt and between the views of the Khawarij
(or Kharijites) and the m
UrJia
(Murjiites). (5) The
imperative addressed to all Muslims for “. . . com-
manding right and forbidding wrong.” This is an
obligation both personal and public. The Mutazila
provide an analytical treatment of this topic, as
well as display an “underlying homogeneity of
doctrine over space and time.” All the same, their
approach to the subject has been characterized as
“activist” if not “heroic.”
As theologians, the Mutazila employed their
considerable dialectical rationalist skills on behalf
of Quranic revelation and the interpretation of
sharia
. They understood their employment of rea-
son as furthering the endeavor to provide a correct
interpretation of the divine will. This assumes we
have fulfilled our first and fundamental obligation
to enlist the power of reason so as to know God,
so as to establish the truth of his existence. The
Mutazila here rely on the cosmological argument,
for that which has begun to exist and in fact does
exist implies dependence on a God that transcends
the contingency of that which he has created. Our
capacity for reasoning should prompt us to ask
questions on the order of why something, rather
than nothing, exists. Persistence and trust in the
power of reason should lead us to a belief in the
absolute necessity of God’s existence and eventu-
ally to a nuanced appreciation of his attributes.
With good reason, later Mutazilis called them-
selves the “People of Divine Unity and Justice”
(ahl al-adl wa l-tawhid).
See also a
bbasid
c
aliphate
; t
Welve
-i
mam
s
hiism
.
Patrick S. O’Donnell
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