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If freedom means to not be subject to relationships of domination – and what could freedom
mean if not, at least, freedom from domination? – and domination
implies that no one has too
much power over us, then political freedom and political equality are not, fundamentally, at odds
with each other. Indeed, political equality – the dispersion of power throughout society – makes
possible political freedom. In this way, I aimed to provide a defense of democracy grounded on
freedom as non-domination, arguing that we adopt of view of democracy as the dispersion of
power.
In Chapter II, “The Indian Against Leviathan,” I argue against the
Hobbesian view that
we must centralize power in the state in order to avoid abuses of power by others. While liberal
and republican thinkers generally eschew Hobbes, I contended that they (often implicitly)
endorse Hobbes’s centripetal logic of power. But this logic is quite obviously deeply
problematic: in authorizing or assuming a sovereign state we create a beast that possesses far
greater capacities for violence, coercion, and abuses of power than any other entity in society.
Moreover, from the perspective of freedom as non-domination, we have created an entity that we
should have every reason to believe can dominate us. But this is not the only option: there is an
alternative to state sovereignty. I then drew on insights from anarchist anthropology to show
that, and how, non-state peoples have adopted a divergent logic of power. The mobilization of a
centrifugal logic of power
spreads and disperses power, rather than concentrating or centralizing
it. Both in their international politics and their external relations, “Indian” societies adopt this
alternative logic of power. The questions, then, become not centered on the possibility but rather
on
applicability
– What form(s) might centrifugal power take in the contemporary world? – and
desirability
– Can centrifugal power be mobilized in ways that are democratic and non-
dominating?
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This is the conceptual relationship between Part I of the dissertation, “Anti-Authoritarian
Perspectives on Freedom and Power” and Part II of the dissertation, “Interventions in
Democratic Theory.”
One the one hand, the theories of domination and non-domination, as well
as centripetal and centrifugal power, developed in the first half of the dissertation, are meant to
ground (i.e. provide justification for) the social movement practices of direct action and
networked organized developed in the second half of the dissertation. On the other hand, the
practices of direct action and networked organization are meant to provide mechanisms for the
realization of non-domination and centrifugal power.
In
Chapter III, “The Democratic Potential of Direct Action” I presented direct action as a
political practice that enacts or mobilizes power. In this way, it is distinct from many other
forms of political activity, including many instances of demonstrating and protesting, because its
primary objective is not to communicate. While this makes direct action a potentially dangerous
practice, it is also precisely this feature that makes it potentially more democratic. The
challenge, at least from the perspective of freedom as non-domination and centrifugal power, is
to mobilize direct
action in ways that disperse, rather than centralize power. I contended that
direct action is democratically desirable when it has a centrifugal logic, and democratically
undesirable when it has a centripetal logic. Direct action can function according to a centrifugal
logic by challenging and seeking to break apart centers of power and by opening up spaces for
others to exercise political power. Direct action is democratic in these ways because it enables,
in a very concrete fashion, political equality: it moves toward the ideal that people have enough
power to manage their own life, but not so much that they can manage the lives of others. I
concluded that chapter with a set of criteria or guidelines for amplifying direct action’s
centrifugal tendencies.
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In
Chapter IV, “Network Democracy,” I argued for a networked form of organization as a
further mechanism for dispersing power. Networks enable people to collaborate and engage in
collective action (essential for radical democracy), without creating a centralized, sovereign
power or requiring unanimity (both of which are anathema to an anti-authoritarian perspective).
Habermas (1996, 372) argues that…
…democratic movements emerging from civil society must give up holistic
aspirations to a self-organizing society…In no way [do civil society movements]
occupy
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