Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

IV. The Meaning of Radically Democratic Revolution 
The view of radical democracy – democracy as the dispersion of power – I have 
advanced in this dissertation is, at minimum, in tension with the state. This tension is manifested 
at both a conceptual and empirical level. At a conceptual level, since democracy means a 
situation in which people have power, the presence of a state – a separate organ of political 
power and one that, in addition, possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence – 
threatens the power of the people. Moreover, I have argued that the view of freedom as non-
domination, which I take to be at the core of an anti-authoritarian perspective on democracy – is 
clearly threatened by the state. While the state is by no means the only entity in society that 
possesses the power to arbitrarily interfere in people’s lives, it is surely one such entity. On an 
empirical level, the state routinely eradicates experiments in radical democracy. This was the 
story of Occupy and the 
Indignados.
As Arendt showed in 
On Revolution
it was also the story of 
the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution. Anytime radical democratic experiments 
emerge they constitute “a small power structure of [their] own” and are “clearly a danger for 
…centralized state power” (Arendt 1963, 237). For Arendt, it is the notion of state sovereignty 
itself that stands opposed to experiments in radical democracy.
The spectacular success of the party system and the no less spectacular failure of 
the council system [Arendt’s preferred model of radical democracy] were both 
due to the rise of the nation-state, which elevated the one and crushed the other, 
whereby the leftist and revolutionary parties have shown themselves to be no less 

---

210 
hostile to the council system than the conservative or reactionary right” (
ibid
. 
239).
For these reasons, I am inclined to suggest that the relationship between radical democracy and 
the state is not just one of tension, but rather one of opposition. They are irreconcilable social 
forms: “the multitude” rather than “the people,” “non-sovereign nodes” rather than the 
“sovereign body,” “centrifugal power” rather than “centripetal power.” I say this knowing full 
well that the radical democracy I have outlined – built on the practices of direct action and 
networked organization – is not a “complete” political proposal. It is not my intention, nor do I 
claim, to have presented a model of social organization that resolves all, or even most, of our 
basic political questions. Rather my aim has been to restore and reaffirm democracy’s radical 
nature, to position it as a revolutionary project, and to elaborate some of its core commitments 
(e.g. non-domination, non-sovereignty, self-governance, and diversity) and practices (direct 
action and networked organization). 
Independent of the questions of the feasibility or desirability of a revolution premised on 
these commitments and practices, I want to conclude by posing the question: What would 
radically democratic revolution even mean? To be sure: 
Twentieth century history is full of births of worlds that embody ‘old’ social 
relations…[I]n general, revolutions have not given birth to new worlds, though 
revolutionaries have tried to build them with the state apparatus…Despite the 
unimpeachable goodwill of so many revolutionaries, the fact remains that the state 
is not the appropriate tool for creating emancipatory social relations” (Zibechi 
2010, 4). 
What would it mean to do things differently and truly along radically democratic lines? If 
radical democracy means the dispersion of power, then a radically democratic revolution must 
not only mobilize power against the state, but also check the very power it generates. The 
challenge of such a revolution is to 
build
power, but not 
take
power.

---

211 
My hunch is that cultivating practices of direct action and networked organization have 
the potential to balance these two objectives. On the one hand, direct action mobilizes collective 
power and networks can function to amplify that power. On the other hand, 
democratic
direct 
action undercuts power inequalities and opens up spaces for others to exercise political power.
Additionally, networked organization “…is based on the continuing plurality of its elements…in 
such a way that reduction to a centralized and unified command structure is impossible” (Hardt 
and Negri 2004, 82-83). In these ways, direct action and networks have the capacity to build 
power without taking power. Indeed, a peculiarity about the power that is generated by social 
movements is that it has a self-limiting quality. As Arendt (1963, 166) puts it, “power comes 
into being only if and when men (
sic
) join themselves together for the purpose of action and it 
will disappear when, for whatever reason, they disperse and desert one another.” To its credit, 
this form of power can only be sustained so long as it is generated and propelled forward by 
collective action. Beyond that, I would argue that radical democrats have responsibility to 
cultivate limitations on the very power they develop. This means a self-conscious effort to leave 
room for other people, and other nodes of power. Consider this point from an internal debate 
about the direction of the “Dissent! Network” in the U.K:
Whatever Dissent! is, it is not THE network of resistance, we shouldn’t be trying 
to involve everyone possible, or we monopolise everything. I don’t see Dissent! 
as some kind of revolutionary council. We should get back to what we already 
are, a network” (quoted in Maeckelbergh 2009, 112). 
The argument here is that while Dissent! is rightly mobilizing collective power against state and 
capital, it also must put limits on itself. It should not attempt to be the sole network. The goal is 
not
to have everyone join their group or to have their organization involved in every struggle.
This would be tantamount to an effort to create a single locus of power against state and capital, 
and if they were successful, the origins of a new state. 

---

212 
Thus, the paradoxical situation for the theory and practice of radical democracy is how to 
generate power against domination, without recreating new forms of domination. A major aim 
of this dissertation is to provide some insights from anti-authoritarian theorists and social 
movements that speak to this possibility. Nonetheless, a radically democratic revolution faces 
two seemingly insurmountable challenges 
simultaneously
: it must overthrow the most powerful 
states that have ever existed, and prevent the rise of new states from developing internally. This 
is not advantageous terrain from which to fight, but these are the terms of the struggle for radical 
democracy.