Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

II. Identifying Anti-Authoritarian Values in Hayek and Friedman 
Hayek, despite a reputation to the contrary, is no mere ideologue for neoliberalism 
capitalism. Allow me to give but a few examples from 
The Road to Serfdom
. At the beginning 
of chapter one, Hayek (2007, 65) approvingly cites a quote from then-President Franklin 
Roosevelt in which he laments the concentrated power of corporations in America. Further, 
Hayek contends that “strong arguments can be advanced that serious shortcomings…particularly 
with regard to the law of corporations and of patents, not only have made competition work 
much less effectively than it might have done but have even led to the destruction of 
competition in many spheres” (
ibid
. 87). Identifying what are arguably two of the defining 
features of neoliberalism – dominance of economic activity by the corporate form and the 
extension of patents and intellectual property throughout the world – are serious causes of 
concern for Hayek. Indeed, he is consistently concerned with how concentrations of power in 
the economic sector can undermine the possibility of competitive markets and free exchange 

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40 
among equal players. In a pointed line, which many American “libertarians” would do well to 
return to, Hayek says that he understands “the just irritation with those who use liberal 
phraseology in defense of antisocial privileges...” (
ibid
. 72). More broadly, Hayek (
ibid
. 71) 
explicitly argues that his libertarian commitments are quite flexible and 
do not
entail a 
commitment to laissez-faire economic policies. 
The fundamental principle that in the ordering of our affairs we should make as 
much as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as 
possible to coercion, is capable of an infinite variety of applications…Probably 
nothing has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of 
some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of laissez-
faire. 
Indeed, Hayek’s is a nuanced theory that is keenly aware of the tenuous nature of competitive 
markets in the context of not only socialism, but capitalism as well.
Despite a number of critical differences between Hayek and Friedman – differences that 
make Hayek a much more useful theoretical resource for anti-authoritarians – I contend that both 
theorists endorse the basic anti-authoritarian principles as a starting point for their theories. 
While both take these principles in directions I would like to resist, I think that their foundational 
commitments can fairly be described as anti-authoritarian and it is precisely these basic 
commitments that make them such compelling theorists for many “libertarians” in America. In 
any case, allow me to provide some evidence for the claim that, at their core, Hayek and 
Friedman are committed to anti-authoritarian perspectives. First, each holds a commitment to 
freedom or liberty as the highest political value. Because I do not suspect this to be a 
particularly controversial claim, I will move quickly here. In the introduction to 
Capitalism and 
Freedom
, Friedman – who views himself as a liberal in the classical sense – contends that 
“freedom [i]s the ultimate goal and the individual [i]s the ultimate entity in society” (2002, 5), 
where “political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his fellow men” (
ibid
. 15). 

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41 
In the introduction to 
The Road to Serfdom
, Hayek (2007, 60) expresses his “positive ideal”: 
“We know that we are fighting for freedom to shape our life according to our ideas.” As I will 
discuss later, this view of freedom, which goes beyond the mere absence of coercion and implies 
a collective, political component, can be fruitfully elaborated as (a particular model of) self-
determination.
Second, both profess a deep skepticism toward and desire to reduce, if not eliminate, 
centralized power (such as, but by no means limited to, the state) and an opposition to the 
arbitrary hierarchy and coercion that such centralized power often entails. Friedman speaks of 
the “great tragedy of the drive to centralization” (2002, 3), the problematic imposition of 
“uniform standards” (
ibid
. 4), the requirement that “government power must be dispersed” (
ibid
. 
3), and the desirability of having “numerous equipotent small centers of power” (
ibid
. 16). In a