Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

particularly illuminating line, Friedman (
ibid
. 6; emphasis added) argues that“[j]ealous of liberty, 
and hence fearful of centralized power, 
whether in governmental or private hands
, the 
nineteenth-century liberal [who we might called a “libertarian” today] favored political 
decentralization.” Though Friedman is no serious way tackles the problem of concentrated 
power in the capitalist economy, he cannot avoid the conclusion that just as concentrated power 
in the state is a problem, as is concentrated power in the economy. In any case, the essential 
point is that Friedman is committed (in principle) to this second anti-authoritarian value even if 
he and his followers have been primary proponents of economic concentration in the economic 
sphere. Hayek’s concerns about centralized power are even more pervasive. In a sense, he 
views his entire project in 
The Road to Serfdom
as a response to the growing prevalence of 
totalitarian regimes and what he saw as a growing tendency toward centralization even within the 
liberal democracies of Europe and North America, all of which he saw as “collectivism” of 

---

42 
various kinds. Each of these systems involves the “deliberate organization of the labors of 
society for a definite social goal” and aim to “organize the whole of society and all its resources 
for this unitary end…” (Hayek 2007, 100). Such centralized systems must, therefore, substitute a 
single judgment, a single plan, for the multiplicity of judgments and plans that would occur were 
individuals free to choose. Centralization and uniformity cannot but end in a loss of freedom – 
that is, “freedom from coercion, freedom from the arbitrary power of other men” (
ibid
. 77).
While both thinkers carefully lay out various roles for the state – which they sees as primarily 
needed to maintain decentralized and competitive markets – their skepticism toward 
centralization and their desire to disperse power place them firmly in the anti-authoritarian 
(albeit not anarchist) camp. 
Finally, both express a belief in the capacity and the desirability of voluntary self-
organization to foster social coordination and solve common problems. For Friedman (2002, 
13):
The basic problem of social organization is how to co-ordinate the economic 
activities of large numbers of people…The challenge to the believer in liberty is 
to reconcile this widespread interdependence with individual freedom. 
Friedman nicely identifies the essential challenge for any libertarian or anti-authoritarian 
economic system: to coordinate the activities of large numbers of people without coercion, that 
is, through voluntary cooperation. Hayek dwells a great deal on the desirability of decentralized 
and voluntary coordination. He contends, in a statement that bears great similarity to anarchist 
schools of thought, that he is committed to the “fundamental principle that in the ordering of our 
affairs we should make as much use as possible of the 
spontaneous forces
found in a free society, 
and resort as little as possible to coercion…” (Hayek 2007, 71; emphasis added). As Loren 
Lomasky (1987, 108 – 09), explains: 

---

43 
The analysis and defense of a spontaneous order in the work of F.A. Hayek has 
given us reason to rethink the assumption that a benign social order must 
primarily be the intended product of design. Hayek argues that spontaneous acts 
of adjustment by independent agents will regularly generate desirable social 
outcomes that could not have been foreseen or intended at the outset and that 
were thus not capable of production according to plan” (Lomasky 1987, 108-09). 
On this view, social coordination through spontaneous ordering and voluntary cooperation is not 
only possible, but is superior to centralized planning. The main reason why decentralized 
organization is both necessary and preferable has to do with the amazing complexity of modern 
societies and the corresponding difficulty of any single entity obtaining all the relevant 
information.
It is only as the factors which have to be taken into account become so numerous 
that it is impossible to gain a synoptic view of them that decentralization becomes 
imperative…As decentralization has become necessary because nobody can 
consciously balance all the considerations bearing on the decisions of so many 
individuals, the coordination can clearly be effected not by ‘conscious control’ but 
only by arrangements which convey to each agent the information he must 
possess in order effectively to adjust his decisions to those of others. (Hayek 
2007, 95). 
The critical point I would like to draw out here is that Friedman and Hayek are committed to the 
view that social organization is possible through spontaneous and voluntary cooperation and 
does not require the presence of either a centralized planner or even a unified goal.