A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Political Argument,
pp. 39f.
287
50. The Principle of Perfection

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ple of perfection gets into difficulty. For while the persons in the original
position take no interest in one another’s interests, they know that they
have (or may have) certain moral and religious interests and other cultural
ends which they cannot put in jeopardy. Moreover, they are assumed to be
committed to different conceptions of the good and they think that they
are entitled to press their claims on one another to further their separate
aims. The parties do not share a conception of the good by reference to
which the fruition of their powers or even the satisfaction of their desires
can be evaluated. They do not have an agreed criterion of perfection that
can be used as a principle for choosing between institutions. To acknowl-
edge any such standard would be, in effect, to accept a principle that
might lead to a lesser religious or other liberty, if not to a loss of freedom
altogether to advance many of one’s spiritual ends. If the standard of
excellence is reasonably clear, the parties have no way of knowing that
their claims may not fall before the higher social goal of maximizing
perfection. Thus it seems that the only understanding that the persons in
the original position can reach is that everyone should have the greatest
equal liberty consistent with a similar liberty for others. They cannot risk
their freedom by authorizing a standard of value to define what is to be
maximized by a teleological principle of justice. This case is entirely
different from that of agreeing to an index of primary goods as a basis of
interpersonal comparisons. The index plays a subordinate role in any
event, and primary goods are things that men generally want in order to
achieve their ends whatever they are. Wanting these goods does not dis-
tinguish between one person and another. But of course accepting them
for the purpose of an index does not establish a standard of excellence.
It is evident, then, that much the same argument that led to the princi-
ple of equal liberty requires the rejection of the principle of perfection.
But in making this argument I have not contended that the criteria of
excellence lack a rational basis from the standpoint of everyday life.
Clearly there are standards in the arts and sciences for appraising creative
efforts, at least within particular styles and traditions of thought. Very
often it is beyond question that the work of one person is superior to that
of another. Indeed, the freedom and well-being of individuals, when
measured by the excellence of their activities and works, is vastly differ-
ent in value. This is true not only of actual performance but of potential
performance as well. Comparisons of intrinsic value can obviously be
made; and although the standard of perfection is not a principle of justice,
judgments of value have an important place in human affairs. They are
not necessarily so vague that they must fail as a workable basis for
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assigning rights. The argument is rather that in view of their disparate
aims the parties have no reason to adopt the principle of perfection given
the conditions of the original position.
In order to arrive at the ethic of perfectionism, we should have to
attribute to the parties a prior acceptance of some natural duty, say the
duty to develop human persons of a certain style and aesthetic grace, and
to advance the pursuit of knowledge and the cultivation of the arts. But
this assumption would drastically alter the interpretation of the original
position. While justice as fairness allows that in a well-ordered society
the values of excellence are recognized, the human perfections are to be
pursued within the limits of the principle of free association. Persons join
together to further their cultural and artistic interests in the same way that
they form religious communities. They do not use the coercive apparatus
of the state to win for themselves a greater liberty or larger distributive
shares on the grounds that their activities are of more intrinsic value.
Perfectionism is denied as a political principle. Thus the social resources
necessary to support associations dedicated to advancing the arts and
sciences and culture generally are to be won as a fair return for services
rendered, or from such voluntary contributions as citizens wish to make,
all within a regime regulated by the two principles of justice.
On the contract doctrine, then, the equal liberty of citizens does not
presuppose that the ends of different persons have the same intrinsic
value, nor that their freedom and well-being is of the same worth. It is
postulated though that the parties are moral persons, rational individuals
with a coherent system of ends and a capacity for a sense of justice. Since
they have the requisite defining properties, it would be superfluous to add
that the parties are equally moral persons. We can say if we wish that men
have equal dignity, meaning by this simply that they all satisfy the condi-
tions of moral personality expressed by the interpretation of the initial
contractual situation. And being alike in this respect, they are to be treated
as the principles of justice require (§77). But none of this implies that
their activities and accomplishments are of equal excellence. To think this
is to conflate the notion of moral personality with the various perfections
that fall under the concept of value.
I have just noted that persons’ being of equal value is not necessary for
equal liberty. It should also be observed that their being of equal value is
not sufficient either. Sometimes it is said that equality of basic rights
follows from the equal capacity of individuals for the higher forms of life;
but it is not clear why this should be so. Intrinsic worth is a notion falling
under the concept of value, and whether equal liberty or some other
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50. The Principle of Perfection

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principle is appropriate depends upon the conception of right. Now the
criterion of perfection insists that rights in the basic structure be assigned
so as to maximize the total of intrinsic value. Presumably the configura-
tion of rights and opportunities enjoyed by individuals affects the degree
to which they bring to fruition their latent powers and excellences. But it
does not follow that an equal distribution of basic freedoms is the best
solution.
The situation resembles that of classical utilitarianism: we require
postulates parallel to the standard assumptions. Thus even if the latent
abilities of individuals were similar, unless the assignment of rights is
governed by a principle of diminishing marginal value (estimated in this
case by the criteria for excellence), equal rights would not be insured.
Indeed, unless there are bountiful resources, the sum of value might be
best increased by very unequal rights and opportunities favoring a few.
Doing this is not unjust on the perfectionist view provided that it is
necessary to produce a greater sum of human excellence. Now a principle
of diminishing marginal value is certainly questionable, although perhaps
not as much so as that of equal value. There is little reason to suppose
that, in general, rights and resources allocated to encourage and to culti-
vate highly talented persons contribute less and less to the total beyond
some point in the relevant range. To the contrary, this contribution may
grow (or stay constant) indefinitely. The principle of perfection provides,
then, an insecure foundation for the equal liberties and it would presum-
ably depart widely from the difference principle. The assumptions re-
quired for equality seem extremely implausible. To find a firm basis for
equal liberty, it seems that we must reject the traditional teleological
principles, both perfectionist and utilitarian.
So far I have been discussing perfectionism as a single-principle tele-
ological theory. With this variant the difficulties are most evident. The
intuitionistic forms are much more plausible, and when the claims of
perfection are weighted with moderation, these views are not easy to
argue against. The discrepancy from the two principles of justice is much
less. Nevertheless similar problems do arise, for each principle of an
intuitionistic view must be chosen, and while the consequences are not
likely to be so great in this case, there is as before no basis for acknowl-
edging a principle of perfection as a standard of social justice. In addi-
tion, criteria of excellence are imprecise as political principles, and their
application to public questions is bound to be unsettled and idiosyncratic,
however reasonably they may be invoked and accepted within narrower
traditions and communities of thought. It is for this reason, among others,
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that justice as fairness requires us to show that modes of conduct interfere
with the basic liberties of others or else violate some obligation or natural
duty before they can be restricted. For it is when arguments to this
conclusion fail that individuals are tempted to appeal to perfectionist
criteria in an ad hoc manner. When it is said, for example, that certain
kinds of sexual relationships are degrading and shameful, and should be
prohibited on this basis, if only for the sake of the individuals in question
irrespective of their wishes, it is often because a reasonable case cannot
be made in terms of the principles of justice. Instead we fall back on
notions of excellence. But in these matters we are likely to be influenced
by subtle aesthetic preferences and personal feelings of propriety; and
individual, class, and group differences are often sharp and irreconcilable.
Since these uncertainties plague perfectionist criteria and jeopardize indi-
vidual liberty, it seems best to rely entirely on the principles of justice
which have a more definite structure.
53
Thus even in its intuitionistic
form, perfectionism would be rejected as not defining a feasible basis of
social justice.
Eventually of course we would have to check whether the conse-
quences of doing without a standard of perfection are acceptable, since
offhand it may seem as if justice as fairness does not allow enough scope
for ideal-regarding considerations. At this point I can only note that
public funds for the arts and sciences may be provided through the ex-
change branch (§43). In this instance there are no restrictions on the
reasons citizens may have for imposing upon themselves the requisite
taxes. They may assess the merits of these public goods on perfectionist
principles, since the coercive machinery of government is used in this
case only to overcome the problems of isolation and assurance, and no
one is taxed without his consent. The criterion of excellence does not
serve here as a political principle; and so, if it wishes, a well-ordered
society can devote a sizable fraction of its resources to expenditures of
this kind. But while the claims of culture can be met in this way, the
principles of justice do not permit subsidizing universities and institutes,
or opera and the theater, on the grounds that these institutions are intrinsi-
cally valuable, and that those who engage in them are to be supported
53. Illustrative of this point is the controversy concerning the so-called enforcement of morals,
morality often having the narrow sense of sexual morality. See Patrick Devlin,