A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

The Enforcement of
Morals
(London, Oxford University Press, 1965), and H. L. A. Hart, 
Law, Liberty and Morality
(Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1963), who take different positions on this issue. For
further discussion see Brian Barry, 
Political Argument,
pp. 66–69; Ronald Dworkin, “Lord Devlin
and the Enforcement of Morals,” 
Yale Law Journal,
vol. 75 (1966); and A. R. Louch, “Sins and
Crimes,” 
Philosophy,
vol. 43 (1968).
291
50. The Principle of Perfection

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even at some significant expense to others who do not receive compensat-
ing benefits. Taxation for these purposes can be justified only as promot-
ing directly or indirectly the social conditions that secure the equal liber-
ties and as advancing in an appropriate way the long-term interests of the
least advantaged. This seems to authorize those subsidies the justice of
which is least in dispute, and so in these cases anyway there is no evident
need for a principle of perfection.
With these remarks I conclude the discussion of how the principles of
justice apply to institutions. Clearly there are many further questions that
should be considered. Other forms of perfectionism are possible and each
problem has been examined only briefly. I should emphasize that my
intention is solely to indicate that the contract doctrine may serve well
enough as an alternative moral conception. When we check its conse-
quences for institutions, it appears to match our common sense convic-
tions more accurately than its traditional rivals, and to extrapolate to
previously unsettled cases in a reasonable way.
292
Distributive Shares

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CHAPTER VI. DUTY AND OBLIGATION
In the two preceding chapters I have discussed the principles of justice for
institutions. I now wish to take up the principles of natural duty and
obligation that apply to individuals. The first two sections examine the
reasons why these principles would be chosen in the original position and
their role in making social cooperation stable. A brief discussion of prom-
ising and the principle of fidelity is included. For the most part, how-
ever, I shall study the implications of these principles for the theory
of political duty and obligation within a constitutional framework. This
seems the best way to explain their sense and content for the purposes of
a theory of justice. In particular, an account of the special case of civil
disobedience is sketched which connects it with the problem of majority
rule and the grounds for complying with unjust laws. Civil disobedience
is contrasted with other forms of noncompliance such as conscientious
refusal in order to bring out its special role in stabilizing a nearly just
democratic regime.
51. THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL DUTY
51. The Arguments for Natural Duty
In an earlier chapter (§§18–19) I described briefly the principles of natu-
ral duty and obligation that apply to individuals. We must now consider
why these principles would be chosen in the original position. They are
an essential part of a conception of right: they define our institutional ties
and how we become bound to one another. The conception of justice as
fairness is incomplete until these principles have been accounted for.
From the standpoint of the theory of justice, the most important natural
duty is that to support and to further just institutions. This duty has two