defining these comparisons. Yet these methods involve strikingly different
assumptions and presumably have very different consequences. It is a
moral question which of these definitions and correspondence rules, if
any, are appropriate for a conception of justice. This is what is meant, I
believe, when it is said that interpersonal comparisons depend upon value
judgments. While it is obvious that the acceptance
of the principle of
utility is a matter for moral theory, it is less evident that the very proce-
dures for measuring well-being raise similar problems. Since there is
more than one such procedure, the choice depends upon the use to which
the measure is to be put; and this means that
ethical considerations will
eventually be decisive.
Maine’s comments on the standard utilitarian assumptions are apropos
here. He suggests that the grounds for these assumptions are clear once
we see that they are simply a working rule of legislation, and that this is
how Bentham regarded them.
49
Given a populous and reasonably homo-
geneous society and an energetic modern legislature, the only principle
that can guide legislation on a large scale is the principle of utility. The
necessity to neglect differences between persons,
even very real ones,
leads to the maxim to count all equally, and to the similarity and marginal
postulates. Surely the conventions for interpersonal comparisons are to be
judged in the same light. The contract doctrine holds that once we see
this, we shall also see that the idea of measuring and summing well-being
is best abandoned entirely. Viewed from the perspective of the original
position, it is not part of a feasible conception of social justice. Instead
the two principles of justice are preferable and far simpler to apply. All
things considered, there are still reasons for choosing the difference prin-
ciple, or the second principle as a whole, over
that of utility even in the
restricted context of a mixed conception.
50. THE PRINCIPLE OF PERFECTION
50. The Principle of Perfection
So far I have said very little about the principle of perfection. But hav-
ing just considered mixed views, I should now like to examine this con-
ception. There are two variants: in the first it is the sole principle of
a teleological theory directing society to arrange
institutions and to de-
fine the duties and obligations of individuals so as to maximize the
49. These remarks are found in H. S. Maine,
The Early History of Institutions
(London, 1897), pp.
399f.
285
50. The Principle of Perfection
achievement of human excellence in art, science, and culture. The prin-
ciple obviously is more demanding the higher the relevant ideal is
pitched. The absolute weight that Nietzsche sometimes gives the lives of
great men such as Socrates and Goethe is unusual. At places he says
that mankind must continually strive to produce great individuals. We
give value to our lives by working for the good of the highest specimens.
50
The second variant found in Aristotle among
others has far stronger
claims.
This more moderate doctrine is one in which a principle of perfection
is accepted as but one standard among several in an intuitionist theory.
The principle is to be balanced against others by intuition. The extent to
which such a view is perfectionist depends, then, upon the weight given
to the claims of excellence and culture. If for example it is maintained
that in themselves the achievements of the Greeks in philosophy, sci-
ence, and art justified the ancient practice of slavery (assuming that this
practice was necessary for these achievements),
surely the conception is
highly perfectionist. The requirements of perfection override the strong
claims of liberty. On the other hand, one may use the criterion simply to
limit the redistribution of wealth and income under a constitutional re-
gime. In this case it serves as a counterpoise to egalitarian ideas. Thus it
may be said that distribution should indeed be more equal if this is
essential for meeting the basic needs of
those less favored and only
diminishes the enjoyments and pleasures of those better off. But the
greater happiness of the less fortunate does not in general justify curtail-
ing the expenditures required to preserve cultural values. These forms of
life have greater intrinsic worth than the lesser pleasures, however widely
the latter are enjoyed. Under normal conditions a certain minimum of
social resources must be kept aside to advance the ends of perfection. The
only exception is when these claims clash with the demands of the basic
needs. Thus given improving circumstances,
the principle of perfection
acquires an increasing weight relative to a greater satisfaction of desire.
No doubt many have accepted perfectionism in this intuitionist form. It
50. See the passages cited in G. A. Morgan,
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