A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

part of ourselves that we directly realize is joined to a wider and just
arrangement the aims of which we affirm. The division of labor is over-
come not by each becoming complete in himself, but by willing and
meaningful work within a just social union of social unions in which all
can freely participate as they so incline.
80. THE PROBLEM OF ENVY
80. The Problem of Envy
Throughout I have assumed that the persons in the original position are
not moved by certain psychological propensities (§25). A rational indi-
vidual is not subject to envy, at least when the differences between him-
self and others are not thought to be the result of injustice and do not
exceed certain limits. Nor are the parties influenced by different attitudes
toward risk and uncertainty, or by various tendencies to dominate or to
submit, and the like. These special psychologies I have also imagined to
be behind the veil of ignorance along with the parties’ knowledge of their
conception of the good. One explanation for these stipulations is that as
far as possible the choice of a conception of justice should not be affected
by accidental contingencies. The principles adopted should be invariant
with respect to differences in these inclinations for the same reason that
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The Good of Justice

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we want them to hold irrespective of individual preferences and social
circumstances.
These assumptions tie in with the Kantian interpretation of justice as
fairness and greatly simplify the argument from the standpoint of the
original position. The parties are not swayed by individual differences
in these propensities, thereby avoiding the complications in the bargain-
ing process that would result. Without rather definite information about
which configuration of attitudes existed, one might not be able to say
what agreement if any would be reached. In each case it would be contin-
gent upon the particular hypothesis laid down. Unless we could show
some distinctive merit from a moral point of view in the postulated array
of special psychologies, the principles adopted would be arbitrary, no
longer the outcome of reasonable conditions. And since envy is generally
regarded as something to be avoided and feared, at least when it becomes
intense, it seems desirable that, if possible, the choice of principles should
not be influenced by this trait. Therefore, for reasons both of simplicity
and moral theory, I have assumed an absence of envy and a lack of
knowledge of the special psychologies.
Nevertheless these inclinations do exist and in some way they must
be reckoned with. Thus I have split the argument for the principles of
justice into two parts: the first part proceeds on the presumptions just
mentioned, and is illustrated by most of the argument so far; the second