A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

The Limits of State Action,
ed. J. W. Burrow (Cambridge, The University Press, 1969),
pp. 16f, for a clear statement. He says: “Every human being, then, can act with only one dominant
faculty at a time; or rather, our whole nature disposes us at any given time to some single form of
spontaneous activity. It would therefore seem to follow from this, that man is inevitably destined to a
partial cultivation, since he only enfeebles his energies by directing them to a multiplicity of objects.
But man has it in his power to avoid this one-sidedness, by attempting to unite the distinct and
generally separately exercised faculties of his nature, by bringing into spontaneous cooperation, at
each period of his life, the dying sparks of one activity, and those which the future will kindle, and
endeavoring to increase and diversify the powers with which he works, by harmoniously combining
them, instead of looking for mere variety of objects for their separate exercise. What is achieved, in
the case of the individual, by the union of past and future with the present, is produced in society by
the mutual cooperation of its different members; for, in all stages of his life, each individual can
achieve only one of those perfections, which represent the possible features of human character. It is
through a social union, therefore, based on the internal wants and capacities of its members, that each
is enabled to participate in the rich collective resources of all the others.” As a pure case to illustrate
this notion of social union, we may consider a group of musicians every one of whom could have
trained himself to play equally as well as the others any instrument in the orchestra, but who each
have by a kind of tacit agreement set out to perfect their skills on the one they have chosen so as to
realize the powers of all in their joint performances. This idea also has a central place in Kant’s “Idea
for a Universal History,” in 
Kant’s Political Writings,
ed. Hans Reiss and trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cam-
bridge, The University Press, 1970). See pp. 42f where he says that every individual man would have
to live for a vast length of time if he were to learn how to make complete use of all his natural
capacities, and therefore it will require perhaps an incalculable series of generations of men. I have
459
79. The Idea of Social Union

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ground against which our aims can be understood. To say that man is a
historical being is to say that the realizations of the powers of human
individuals living at any one time takes the cooperation of many genera-
tions (or even societies) over a long period of time. It also implies that
this cooperation is guided at any moment by an understanding of what
has been done in the past as it is interpreted by social tradition. By
contrast with humankind, every individual animal can and does do what
for the most part it might do, or what any other of its kind might or can do
that lives at the same time. The range of realized abilities of a single
individual of the species is not in general materially less than the potenti-
alities of others similar to it. The striking exception is the difference of
sex. This is perhaps why sexual affinity is the most obvious example of
the need of individuals both human and animal for each other. Yet this at-
traction may take but a purely instrumental form, each individual treating
the other as a means to his own pleasure or the continuation of his line.
Unless this attachment is fused with elements of affection and friendship,
it will not exhibit the characteristic features of social union.
Now many forms of life possess the characteristics of social union,
shared final ends and common activities valued for themselves. Science
and art provide ready-to-hand illustrations. Likewise families, friend-
ships, and other groups are social unions. There is some advantage
though in thinking about the simpler instances of games. Here we can
easily distinguish four sorts of ends: the aim of the game as defined by its
not been able to find this idea expressly stated where I would expect to, for example, in Schiller’s