A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

parties must be used as the basis of equality. Rather this interpretation
seems to be the natural completion of justice as fairness. A full discussion
would take up the various special cases of lack of capacity. That of
children I have already commented upon briefly in connection with pater-
nalism (§39). The problem of those who have lost their realized capacity
temporarily through misfortune, accident, or mental stress can be re-
garded in a similar way. But those more or less permanently deprived of
moral personality may present a difficulty. I cannot examine this problem
here, but I assume that the account of equality would not be materially
affected.
I should like to conclude this section with a few general comments.
First of all, the simplicity of the contract view of the basis of equality is
worth emphasizing. The minimum capacity for the sense of justice in-
sures that everyone has equal rights. The claims of all are to be adjudi-
cated by the principles of justice. Equality is supported by the general
facts of nature and not merely by a procedural rule without substantive
force. Nor does equality presuppose an assessment of the intrinsic worth
of persons, or a comparative evaluation of their conceptions of the good.
Those who can give justice are owed justice.
The advantages of these straightforward propositions become more
evident when other accounts of equality are examined. For example, one
might think that equal justice means that society is to make the same
proportionate contribution to each person’s realizing the best life which
he is capable of.
32
Offhand this may seem an attractive suggestion. It
32. For this idea, see W. K. Frankena, “Some Beliefs about Justice,” pp. 14ff; and J. N. Findlay,
Values and Intentions,
pp. 301f.
446
The Sense of Justice

---

suffers however from serious difficulties. For one thing it not only re-
quires a method of estimating the relative goodness of plans of life, but it
also presupposes some way of measuring what counts as an equal propor-
tionate contribution to persons with different conceptions of their good.
The problems in applying this standard are obvious. A more important
difficulty is that the greater abilities of some may give them a stronger
claim on social resources irrespective of compensating advantages to
others. One must assume that variations in natural assets will affect what
is necessary to provide equal proportionate assistance to those with dif-
ferent plans of life. But in addition to violating the principle of mutual
advantage, this conception of equality means that the strength of men’s
claims is directly influenced by the distribution of natural abilities, and
therefore by contingencies that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.
The basis of equality in justice as fairness avoids these objections. The
only contingency which is decisive is that of having or not having the
capacity for a sense of justice. By giving justice to those who can give
justice in return, the principle of reciprocity is fulfilled at the highest
level.
A further observation is that we can now more fully reconcile two
conceptions of equality. Some writers have distinguished between equal-
ity as it is invoked in connection with the distribution of certain goods,
some of which will almost certainly give higher status or prestige to those
who are more favored, and equality as it applies to the respect which is
owed to persons irrespective of their social position.
33
Equality of the first
kind is defined by the second principle of justice which regulates the
structure of organizations and distributive shares so that social coopera-
tion is both efficient and fair. But equality of the second kind is funda-
mental. It is defined by the first principle of justice and by such natural
duties as that of mutual respect; it is owed to human beings as moral
persons. The natural basis of equality explains its deeper significance.
The priority of the first principle over the second enables us to avoid
balancing these conceptions of equality in an ad hoc manner, while the
argument from the standpoint of the original position shows how this
precedence comes about (§82).
The consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity requires
us to view persons independently from the influences of their social
33. See B. A. O. Williams, “The Idea of Equality,”