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year period in order to become guild craftsmen or farmers. After five years. those who do not
comply and yet remained in the state would be considered “useless” and applied to special
military and labor service: they would be conscripted at age 20 at three times the normal Jewish
intake, not for the usual 25 years of military service, but only for 10 years and were to use that
ten years to learn a productive craft or trade which they would practice on discharge—that is, to
give them compulsory job training.
This project was approved by Nicholas I; the term “useless Jews” was replaced by “those
with no productive work.”) Other measures also went forward, such as laws for the destruction
and disbandment of the Kahal in all its forms; the establishment of government-sanctioned
“provincial rabbis”; mandatory secular secondary education for Jews in an attempt to dismantle
the yeshiva system; more settlement of Jews on state-owned land with plows thrust into their
hands; and finally a ban on the wearing of traditional Jewish dress. These laws of various kinds
were in effect in Russia for almost a third of a century, and none of them worked. The 1840
regulations provided a five-year period of pre-employment selection, and through assorted
bureaucratic misadventure which may or may not have arisen from massive bribes by the Jews to
various Czarist functionaries, the measure itself was only officially promulgated in 1846, so that
the analysis phase was to be completed in January 1852. In 1843, arguing against the “parsing”
of the Jews, the Governor-General of New Russia M. Vorontsov wrote that the occupation of the
“numerous class of small traders and middlemen referred to the number of useless [80 percent]
of the Jewish people”—that is, 80 percent of Jews were mainly involved in trade. But Vorontsov
hoped that the spacious conditions and economic potential of the Novorossiysk Territory would
attract enough Jews to make coercive measures unnecessary. He also warned about probable
European indignation due to the “analysis,” and indeed this tendency on the part of European
Jewry to meddle in Russia’s internal affairs did become of concern, notably with the Moses
Montefiore intervention described below.
In order to avoid adverse European reaction provoked by previous attempts to evict Jews
from the border zone, in 1846 the Russian government publicly announced a new policy: that the
Jews in Poland had no nationality, no right to immovable property, and were forced to restrict
their activities to petty trade and moneylending. while under the ongoing transition in Russia
Jews received increased civil and economic rights, entry into the state of Russian commercial
life, commercial, real property rights, the right to join an agricultural colony and the right to
[secular] education, including universities and academies.’ Clearly the objective was to try to
lure the lage Jewish population out of Poland and herd them into the vast interior, where they
would not have an already surly and volatile Gentile population to subject to their predations,
thus creating even more instability in Poland.
And let it be made clear that the Jews did in fact receive all these rights during the first
decades in the notorious “prison of peoples” as Czarist Russia came to be called, in many cases
enjoying legal status and economic benefits far superior to Gentiles. However, a century later,
Jewish authors would recall a time of mass expulsions from the villages (occasionally begun but
almost never completed); double taxation (often imposed and just as often canceled every few
years); the establishment of Pale (we have seen that, in the circumstances of the late 18th century
the boundaries of Settlement were initially the Jews’ geographical heritage, the lands where they
already lived.)
The 1846 decree stated “Always a stranger to merger with the civil society among which
they [the Jews] live, they have remained in their previous mode of existence at
the expense of the
labor of others, giving rise to fair complaints … For the benefit of all, there is a need to take
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them out of dependence on the elders of the community.” The Jewish population needed
education and practical knowledge, to acquire which the government proposed to to establish a
special Jewish secondary school, provide the means for then to transition to farming, an idea
which successive Czarist governments seemed unable ever completely to let go of.
Also in 1846, the Jewish Sir Moses Montefiore arrived in Russia with a letter to Nicholas
from Queen Victoria, his mission being to “improve the plight of the Jewish people” in Russia.
He toured some cities, densely populated by Jews; then from England he sent the Emperor a long
letter with a proposal to release the Jews from all restrictive legislation, to grant them “equality
with all other subjects” (except, of course, the serfs), “and as soon as possible eliminate
restrictions on the right of residence and movement within the Pale of Settlement.” Merchants
and craftsmen were to be allowed to travel in the interior provinces, Jews were to be allowed to
hire Christians as servants and (more vitally) laborers and employees, and the Kahal was to be
restored. In his response to the Montefiore memorandum Nicholas objected that if
the conversion
of the Jews to productive work were successful, this would by itself lead to the gradual reduction
of constraints.
There was now enhanced resistance to conscription among the Jews. Evasion became so
widespread that by 1850 a new order was issued that for each called-up recruit who failed to
report for duty, three would be physically seized and sent to the army. What then occurred was
one of the more notorious examples in history of the Jews turning on their own kind. The three-
for-one rule gave the Jewish community a vested interest to catch their own draft-dodging
fugitives. They hired men called
lovchikoviki or “snatchers” who captured the
poymannikovi,
those who really were draft evaders or simply anyone with an expired passport, even if from
another province, or a teenager without a family, anyone to turn over to the recuiting sergeants in
fulfillment of the quota.
But all this still did not make up the shortage of recruits. In 1852 two new statutes were
added. One was that for each extra man surrendered to the recruiters a reward of 300 rubles
would be paid in the form of relief from tax arrears, since vitually all Jews owed unpaid taxes.
The second was a law
On Suppression Of The Practice Of Hiding Jews From Military Service,
which prescribed a series of punishments for those who fled from conscription, penalized the
communities in which they are hiding, and allowed the army instead of the missing recruits to
take the service of their family or community leaders who were responsible for the timely supply
of manpower. Trying by every means to avoid conscription, many Jews fled abroad or went to
other provinces .
The
lovchikoviks grew more active and brutal, but still even more Jews fled the draft,
often hiding and living by night, and fines and arrears grew. There were innumerable protests
and petitions from settled, productive part of the Jewish population. The main bone of contention
was the “analysis,” the classification system which designated certain Jews as “useful” and
others as useless and therefore subject to conscription. In the early years there were repeated
attempts to get the analysis and categorization delayed, bog it down in petty bureaucratic
nitpicking over terminology, and so on. Finally the Czar lost patience with the suspicious foot-
dragging on the part of his officials and he issued
Interim Rules On The Analysis Of The Jews
which made it clear what criteria of wealth, occupation, and economic utility to society were to
be followed.
In February 1855 Nicholas I died suddenly, and the “analysis” was permanently stopped.
So the sudden death of the Emperor rescued Jews at a dangerous point in their history—as
occurred a century later with Stalin’s death.